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(-dl ndia declared herself as a democratic country where free and 
frank expression of ideas are as important as the democracy itself. The 
best medium through which this object can be achieved is the press. In 
a true democracy, therefore, the importance of freedom of press can 
not be denied. Blackstone rightly says, 'liberty of press is indeed es-
sential to the nature of a free state, but this consists in laying no previ-
ous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure or 
from criminal matter when published'. 
Unlike U.S. Constitution which provides (through First Amendment) 
that Congress shall make no laws, abridging the freedom of speech or 
of the press , 'the Indian Constitution despite, guaranteeing the 
same freedom under Article 19(1 )(a), does not specifically mention the 
word press. Again unlike U.S. Constitution where the restrictions have 
been evolved through judicial pronouncements, the aforesaid freedom 
in India is directly subject to the limitations provided under Article 19 
(2) because no individual right however vital by itself can be an abso-
lute dogma. The individual good must at times give place to social good. 
Since the aforesaid freedom is not absolute and reasonable re-
strictions may be imposed upon the press, the government, therefore, 
always try to keep some control over the press under different laws 
justifying them under Article 19(2). Successive governments have lev-
elled the press as dangerous nuisance. The government raises the 
follwing charges; 
1) Press is a source of much tension, it is a nuisance for the work-
ing of the state and various public sectors of the civil society. 
2) Another popular charge against the press is that it is monopolis-
tic. The first Indian Press Commission has aired such charges 
with more emphasis, 
3) The third charge against the press is its failure to contribute to 
developmental goals. 
In the light of above stated facts the freedom of press comes un-
der the shadow of suspicion. The reason is that on the one hand the 
freedom of press is guaranteed as a fundamental right under the free-
dom of speech and expression but on the other hand the government 
always tries to keep the press dancing upon her tune. 
in the present work, therefore, an attempt is made to find out that 
whether the press enjoys the freedom as envisaged under the Constitution. 
And what has been the role of the Supreme Court in protecting such 
freedom as the enforcing authority of fundamental rights. 
The freedom of press is basically the freedom of individuals to 
express themselves through the medium of press. This freedom is fun-
damental to the life of an individual in a democratic polity. In India free-
dom of press is regarded as a species of which freedom of speech and 
expression is a genus. The jurists, various commissions on Press and 
the courts all have expressed their view to explain the meaning of a free 
press which according to them has three essential elements: 
a) freedom of access to all sources of information, 
b) Freedom of publication; and 
c) freedom of circulation. 
A free press thus, means freedom from any governmental, social, 
financial, internal or external pressure. The government, therefore, may 
neither adopt any measure which curtails the circulation or volume of a 
newspaper nor it may resort to any punitive action against the press. 
The importance of the press in modern society is second to none. 
A free press is not only a necessary adjunct of democracy; it is the sine 
qua non for the proper functioning of a democratic society. 
The importance of press has increased many folds with the de-
velopment of press as an instrument of mass communication which has 
been recognised time and again by the various Press Commissions in 
U.K., U.S.A. and India alike as democracy can thrive only under the 
care and guidance of public opinion developed through the press. 
The judiciary too, has acknowledged the importance of the press. 
According to U.S. Supreme Court the importance of the press stands as 
one of the greatest interpreters between the Government and the people. 
To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves. 
The Supreme Court of India following the U.S. Supreme Court 
cautioned to be vigilant in guarding the freedom of press as one of 
the most important freedom because it is of paramount importance un-
der a democratic const i tut ion. It constitutes one of the pillars of the 
democracy and is the heart of the social and political intercourse and 
has acquired the role of public educator. 
Despite the acknowledgement of its importance in modern times 
from every segment of the society, the press does not enjoy any spe-
cific rights or privileges essential for its effective functioning either in 
U.K., U.S.A or in India. It is subject to same laws and regulations as are 
applicable to any other citizen. It does not enjoy any exemption from dis-
closing any information before a court of law, received by it [Sec. 15(2) of 
Press Council Act forms an exception in any proceeding before the Press 
Council). Therefore, the approach of law is that where there are no excep-
tions the general rule of duty to disclose should be followed. Nevertheless 
under exceptional circumstances some additional rights have t>een con-
ferred upon the press as a public institution. 
In India the origin of the newspaper in its present form may be 
traced to Aurangzeb's regime but the first newspaper 'Bengal Gazette' 
was started by James Hicky in 1780. He was extremely critical of East 
India Company and inturn faced the consequences when his newspa-
per was closed. Some other newspapers started during that period also 
met with the same fate. 
Lord Wellesly was instrumental in imposing press censorship upon 
the press in 1799. Printing the name of the editor was also made obliga-
tory upon the press. In 1813 Lord Hastings lifted the censorship of the 
press and adopted liberal attitude towards it but simultaneously framed 
new rules prohibiting it from reporting any matter regarding the pro-
ceedings of Board of Directors in London relating to India, having ten-
dency to create any suspicion among native population. 
The first Indian newspaper 'Vengal Gazette' in Bengali was started 
in 1821 by Ganga Kishore Bhattacharya. The next few years were tur-
bulent for the press when it was subjected to many restrictions. It took a 
sigh of relief and enjoyed maximum freedom in the British India during 
the period of Lord William Bentinck and Sir Charles Metcalf. The Ben-
gal Press Regulation, and Bombay Press Regulation, 1925 and 1927 
respectively were repealed by the Act of 1835. 
Lord Auckland did not follow his predecessors policy towards the 
press and an ordinance similar to that of 1823, was issued. In 1857, he 
introduced the Act XV to deal with the press. In the coming years sev-
eral newspapers were started after passing of India Council Act, 1861. 
Even then the press was not left free and in 1867, Press and Registra-
tion of Books Act was passed to regulate it. The Criminal Law Amend-
ment Act, 1870 inserted sec. 124-A In I.P.C to curb the publication of 
seditious matters. The section was amended twice during 1894-1898. 
The Vernacular Press Act was also enforced with the intention to elimi-
nate the seditious writings. 
By the early 20th century the spirit of independence had reached 
to its zenith. More stringent easures, therefore, were adopted by the 
government to crush the press. Consequently the newspapers (Incite-
ment to offences) Act, 1908, Official Secret Act, 1923 the Indian Press 
Act, 1910, Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931 and the press 
(Special Powers) Act, 1947 were passed to tackle the situation. These 
enactments conferred wide powers upon the magistrates including de-
mand of security deposit and seizure of the press. 
When India achieved her independence a Press Laws En-
quiry Committee was constituted which recommended to repeal certain 
enactments but advised to retain Official Secret Act, 1923. After inde-
pendence few enactments including Young Persons (Harmful Publica-
tion) Act, 1954, Parliamentary Proceedings (Protection of Publication) 
Act, 1956 Working Journalists Act, 1955, The Newspaper (Price and 
Page) Act, 1956 and the Press Council Act, 1965 were passed. These 
enactments were instrumental in regulating the press but they were not 
harsh comparing to earlier enactments. 
The promulgation of Emergency brought back the bitter memories 
of pre-independence era to the press. Several journalists were sent to 
jail and foreign correspondents were thrown out of the country. The Press 
Council Act, 1965 and Parliamentary Proceedings (Protection of Publi-
cation) Act, 1956 were repealed. Prevention of Publication of Objec-
tionable Matter Act, 1976 was passed and used with Defence of India 
Act and Maintenance of Internal Security Act. 
In 1977 when the Janata Party's Government took charge of the 
country, the repressive laws enacted during emergency were repealed 
and pre-emergency position was restored. The Press Council Act, 1978 
was passed with certain improvements and under certain circumstances 
the Constitutional protection was provided to the press by inserting Ar-
ticle 361-A into the Constitution. Since then despite some flutter on rare 
occassions there has been no significant development relating to the 
press or the press laws in India. 
In Constituent Assembly when the provision relating to freedom 
of speech and expression was being discussed, several members wanted 
a seperate provision guaranteeing the freedom of the press. They how-
ever, could not succeed as Dr. Ambedkar, the Chairman of the Drafting 
Committee declared that the freedom of press is included within the 
freedom of speech and expressiosn guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) 
of the Constitution. 
The aforesaid view of Dr. Ambedkar was affirmed by the Supreme 
Court in Romesh Thappar and Brij Bhushan Cases when it held that 
freedom of speech and expression includes the freedom of press. It can 
neither be subjected to pre-censorship nor the government can stop the 
circulation of any newspaper or the publication of any matter. 
The press though does not enjoy any immunity from the laws of 
general taxation but the same can not be levied upon it in such manner 
which adversely affects the freedom of the press. The government can 
not take any action to eliminate the unfair competition between the big 
and small newspapers in the guise of Press Commission recommenda-
tion by implementing newsprint policy. Similarly it can not take any pu-
nitive action to muffle the voice of the press. 
The press on the rule of balance of convenience may be stopped 
form publishing any matter if it comes in conflict with other's fundamen-
tal right. Even in those cases considering the importance of press, it 
can not last beyond the period than actually required under the circum-
stances of a particular case. It is not that only the press can claim its 
freedom against the state as a fundamental right but under exceptional 
circumstances even an individual may claim the publication of his views 
in a magazine maintained out of public funds to enable the readers to 
have a complete picture upon which his opinion is formed. 
The advertisements have always been a major source of revenue 
for the newspapers. They not only bring down the price of a newspaper 
but also fulfill the economic needs guided by information disseminated 
through print media. Consequently the publication of any advertise-
ment (commercial speech) can not be denied. However, this freedom (of 
press) is not absolute and the Constitution of India expressly provides 
certain grounds under Article 19(2) upon v^ h^ich reasonable restrictions 
may be placed upon the press. 
The press, therefore, has no freedom to publish any material 
which may endanger the sovereignty and intergrity of the country 
neither it may be allowed to carryout any matter which is likely to 
put the security of the country at risk.' But only the public distur-
bances of unmanagable magnitude and not of purely local signif i-
cance may pose any risk to the security of the state. Press, may 
also be restrained from acting in such a manner which may disturb 
the public peace. 
Reasonable restrictions may also be placed on the press to pre-
vent it from publishing any material which taken as a whole may debase 
and debouche the minds of young and adolescent readers. Taking this 
plea however, the publication of any matter which is vulgar may not 
be denied and whenever the Court is confronted with an issue of 
obscenity, the opinion of experts though not binding plays a domi-
nant role where the Court is not conversant with the language used 
in the work alleged to be obscene. 
If the press has a duty to comment upon the day to day affairs 
and keep the people informed the courts too, have the pious duty to 
impart justice and, therefore, press is not at liberty to publish any mat-
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ter which put the creditability of the courts under suspicion. However, 
like any other public institution the courts also are subject to public 
scrutiny. Any matter therefore, published with an honest intention of 
pointing out the shortcomings and seeking their improvement amounts 
fair comment and does not constitute the contempt of court. 
Any person if on account of any publication is defamed, the press 
could not escape from the liability. It does not, however mean that the 
state or its officials if apprehend their defamation by any publication 
may prohibit it by an order having no force of law. In their individual 
capacity, however, such officials have equal freedom like others in mat-
ter relating to defamatory statements. It is also universally recognised 
principle that freedom of press may not extend to a limit where it 
amounts the incitement to an offence and therefore, it may be subjected 
to reasonable restrictions on the aforesaid ground. But taking this plea 
there could be no restriction upon the press if it advocates any change 
in the existing circumstances through peaceful means. 
During emergency promulgated under Article 352 on ground of 
external aggression and war the freedom of speech and expression re-
mains suspended under Article 358 of the Constitution. The press un-
der such circumstances may be subjected to pre-censorship and could 
not claim the freedom as a fundamental right. But it may be restrained 
only in respect of aims and objects intended to be achieved under the 
censorship order and not beyond that. 
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To curtail the freedom it is not sufficient that restrictions should 
be based on any of the grounds enshrined under Article 19(2), but it is 
also essential that the restriction must be reasonable. The Constitution 
nowhere lays down what is and what is not a reasonale restriction ? 
and for that matter it does not define what a fundamental right eg. the 
right of freedom of speech and expression consist in or may or may not 
include. Hence it has been left to the courts to determine the standard 
of reasonableness to be adopted in judging the validity of a particular 
legislative restriction. Whether a particular restriction is reasonable or 
not will depend upon the facts of a particular case because no abstract 
standard can be laid down as applicable to all cases. Infact the very 
purpose would be defeated if it is tried to formulate a general standard 
to the words 'reasonable restriction'. 
The phrase 'reasonable restriction' connotes that the limitation 
imposed upon a person in the enjoyment of a right should not be arbi-
trary or of an excessive nature, A legislation which arbitrarily or exces-
sively invades the right can not be said containing quality of reason-
ableness. It is essential that a restriction to be reasonable it must fulfill 
substantive as well as procedural aspect of reasonableness. 
The substantive reasonableness require that the Court looks not 
to mere form but to the substance of things and it enters into an inquiry 
whether the legislature has transgressed its powers by imposing unrea-
sonable restrictions. Accordingly the Court does not go by the name 
and description which the legislature may have choosen itself but its 
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real character and its reasonable and substantial effect on the right 
involved in the light of its practical application and for that it takes into 
consideration the object, purpose, and the real intention of the enact-
ment as a whole. 
Procedural reasonableness is concerned with the machinery for 
enforcement of restrictions. In examining the reasonableness of proce-
dure, the Court insists that procedure must be such as may yield an 
objective and fair decision by the authority administering the law and 
does not result into arbitrary curtailment of individual freedom. Accord-
ingly the Court has given due importance to the principle of natural jus-
tice in scrutinising the procedural reasonableness of a restriction. 
The study of the cases clearly demonstrate that the Supreme 
Court has given a differential treatment to the restrictions under differ-
ent circumstances by applying different standard of reasonableness. It 
has evolved following principles to ascertain the reasonableness of 
restriction. 
1) The restriction must strike a proper balance between the freedom 
guaranteed and permitted social control. 
2) It is only the reasonableness of restriction and not the policy of 
restrictive law which the Court exmine. 
3) The restriction may extend to the point of complete prohibition for a 
limited period if the circumstances in a particular case require. 
4) A restriction made exercisable on the subjective satisfaction 
of government may be judicial ly upheld but in exceptional cases 
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within narrow limits. 
5) The restriction must have a proximate nexus with the object in-
tended to be achieved under the law. 
6) In determining the reasonableness of a restrictive law, both sub-
stantial and procedural aspect of the impunged legislation should be 
taken into consideration. 
7) Where the conflicting rights are claimed the reasonableness of 
restriction is determined on the balance of convenience. 
8) Reasonableness of a restriction demands an equality of opportu 
nity and beside Article 19, may be tested under Article 14 of the 
Constitution. 
9) Different vires may be adopted under a taxing statue depending 
upon the nature and importance of the services being rendered by the 
concerned institution. 
Privileges are the special rights enjoyed by the Parliament, its 
Committees and the individual members. The purpose of such privilege 
on the one hand is to enable the Parliament to function smoothly and to 
vindicate its authority, prestige and power and on the other hand en-
sure, that members may play their role in a meaningful manner. There-
for, the privileges are enjoyed individually as well as collectively. 
The privileges being enjoyed by Parliament under Article 105 of 
the Constitution are identical to the House of Commons which it en-
joyed at the Commencement of the Constitution. In India, the apex court 
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may decide the existence or non-existence of a particular privilege but 
once the existence of a privilege is established, only the Parliament is 
empowered to decide whether a particular act or omission amounts the 
breach of privilege or not. 
The parliamentary privileges are not subject to Article 19(1 )(a) 
of the Constitution and, therefore, press can not publish any matter 
which has been deleted from the record of proceedings. Nevertheless 
Article 21 may still be invoked on the grounds that the act of legislature 
is malafide, capricious or against the principle of natural justice. Thus 
the exclusion of the application of rule of natural justice in M.S.M. 
Sharma's andKeshav Singh's Cases is no more a good law. 
The non-codification of parlimentary privileges despite a consti-
tutional directive has created a lot of confusion and generate contro-
versies regarding the existence or non existence of a particular privi-
lege. The Parliament is not sure of its privileges; the press has its own 
doubts and misgivings. 
Parliamentary Proceedings (Protection of Publication) Act, 1977 
which has now been accorded the constitutional recognition under Ar-
ticle 361-A of the Constitution provides a guarantee to the press from 
any liability Civil or Criminal before any court of law. But the immunity 
though available against any individual or authority can not be claimed 
against the Parliament itself if there is any breach of privilege. Simi-
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larly the press is not immune from the contempt proceedings before 
apex court or the high courts as these Courts themselve possess the 
power to commit any one for their contempt under Article 129 and 215 
respectively. 
The judicial attitude since the very begining seems to be based 
on balancing approach. On the one hand it acknowledged the impor-
tance of press in modern society and struck down any action on the 
part of the government which prevents or puts any unreasonable curbs 
upon the press on the other hand it did not overlook national interest 
and declined to support any attempt by print media to keep itself im-
mune from the laws of general application alleged as violative of Article 
19(1 )(a) in the guise of unreasonable restrictions. A law may be 
struckdown as ultravires to Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution only if it 
is enacted with the sole purpose of curtailing the freedom and not cov-
ered under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. To ascertain whether the 
freedom of press has been encroached upon or not, the apex court for-
mulated various tests ie. direct and inevitable effect, arbitrariness of 
action, imminent danger by holding that reasonableness of any restric-
tion may be tested independently of Article 19(2) after taking into con-
sideration the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 
The Supreme Court never overlooked the ground realities when 
pronouncing any verdict on freedom of speech and expression. In re-
spect of law and order the judicial attitude when the Constitution come 
into force was visited with a broad approach when it expressed the view 
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that freedom of press can not be curtailed for a more comprehensive and 
wider purpose than included in the constitutional provision. Later on this 
broad approach was side lined through a restrictive approach on the ground 
that there may be the situations when the authorities are supposed to act 
promptly. They are in the best position to assess the situation and the 
consequences to follow. Any drastic step, therefore, taken by the admin-
istration with certain safeguards is not bad in law. Regarding other re-
strictions provided under Article 19(2) of the Constitution it has tried to 
struck a balance. Consequently in cases relating to obscenity while fol-
lowing the Hicklin's test which overlooks the interest of adult and mature 
readers, the due weightage is being given to the expert opinion by the 
Court. In contempt cases the Court has not been very rigid and on most 
occassions contemners have been let off after a sincere apology is for-
warded but while asserting its authority the Court also admitted that it is 
not beyond public scrutiny itself and fair comment may be passed upon 
its performance. 
Regarding the impact of emergency on the press the judicial ap-
proach has been very positive. Any law which was itself illegal when en-
forced does not acquire legitimacy on account of promulgation of emer-
gency subsequently. Moreover, the press though can not claim the free-
dom as a fundamental right during emergency yet it does not mean that 
censor can exercise his powers arbitrarily or beyond the purpose set out 
in the censorship order. 
On the matters relating to Parliamentary privileges the attitude of 
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the Court has been very restrained and confined only to the point of de-
ciding the existence or non-existance of a particular privilege and declined 
to interfere merely to correct the mistakes of judgement by House. The 
Court however, has made it amply clear that though Parliamentary privi-
leges are not subject to Article 19 yet any committal for contempt is sub-
ject to Article 21 of the Constitution. 
The discussion shows that the press in India to a large extent de-
spite the fact that the laws if frequently used are powerful enough to be a 
threat to the freedom, is enjoying it as guaranteed under the Constitution. 
Nevertheless, it is haunted many times by the successive governments ei-
ther under one pretext or the other whenever its actions do not find favour 
or criticised by the press. However, the Supreme Court has not taken kindly 
to restrictions on freedom of press until some interest considered equally vital 
was also involved. In cases where restrictions on the press have been upheld 
the maintenance of communal harmony, working conditions of Journalists etc. 
were to be promoted. Thus it has always been aware of protecting this cher-
ished freedom and has been sticky enough not to let the executive get 
away with much by bailing it out on most occassions but while doing so it 
has not overlooked its own authority. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Statement of Problem 
in India are engaged in the task of building up a welfare state. 
The concept of 'social welfare state' has come to stay and this has 
emphasised the primary need of vigi lant and courageous press. It is (the 
press) one of the important inst i tut ions in an open society and a forum 
that has the privilege of reaching large number of people. Free press is 
essential instrument for maintaining openness in society and also for re-
forming it. In a society, where overwhelming millions are mute, the ac-
cess to a forum that reaches large number of people could be viewed as 
a trust, to be exercised on behalf of the people and for the good of the 
people at large. Written word is only one of the instrument of change and 
it has only a limited effect in society such as ours; nevertheless it serves 
as an important source of feed back of information.'' 
Realising the role, which press has to play in contemporary soci-
ety, J.S. Mil l rightly said that, "If the whole mankind minus one person 
were of one opinion and one person were of contrary opinion, the man-
kind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, had 
he the power to do so, would be justified in silencing the whole mankind". 
The press, at present is one of the most effective media of expres-
sion. In a democracy an individual should have a right to learn facts; to hear 
1. Dhirendra Kr ishna; Role of Press in Improv ing Publ ic Admin i s t ra t i on . 
The Indian Journal of Public Administrat ion Vol. XXXIV No.4. 1988. at p.898 
all sides of a case, to form his own opinion and if he so desires to give 
expression to it. The press is one of the channels through which such 
goal is possible. The freedom of the press, therefore, becomes a matter 
of vital concern. 
The concept of the role of free press in a democratic setup is best 
defined by the U.K. Royal Commission on the press in the following 
words. 
"The democratic form of society demands of its members an active 
and intelligent participation in the affairs of their community whether locai 
or national. It assumes that they are sufficiently well informed about the 
issues of the day to day to be able to form the broad judgement requirea 
by an election and to maintain between elections and vigilance necessary 
in those whose governors are their servants and not their masters". 
Freedom of press is essential to political liberty. Where men 
can not freely convey their thoughts to one another, no freedom Is 
secure where freedom of expression exists, the beginnings of a free 
society and a means for every extension of liberty are already present. 
Free expression is therefore, unique among liberties, it promotes and 
protects all the rest.^ 
Talking about the freedom of press, Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru once said 
: "/ would rather have a completely free press with all the dangers 
involved in the wrong use of that freedom than a regulated orsuppresseo 
press". When he said this he was echoing the ideas of Jefferson who once 
said that " were it left to me to decide whether we should have Gov-
2 A Free and Responsible Press: Hutchinson Committee Report at p.6 
ernment without newspaper or newspaper without a Government, I should 
not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter".^ 
Addressing a seminar in Srinagar in 1970 on "Freedom of the Press" 
then Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting, Government ot 
India Mr. I.K. Gujral said, "It is known to you, Mr. President, and to all 
of us that communication in the modern life is a carrier of social pro-
cess and as such I think in a thousand unseen ways this carrier in-
fluences the political, social and cultural life of a community in which 
this medium functions. But this social process to a very great de-
gree depends on the communication, exchange and transmission of 
knowledge. And since knowledge is an integral part of this carrier, i 
think knowledge again depends upon communication. Thus the so-
cial process and social change are inseperable from the means oi 
communication, and therefore, the role of mass media can not be ig-
nored. It is not possible for us to separate them". 
The term 'press' is used in different senses and with different con-
notations. The Lexicon Webster's Dictionary define the press as ' a ma-
chine for printing; a printing press; printed literature in general, espe-
cially newspapers; with the; newspaper reporters; a printing, publishing, 
or broadcasting establishment; and its personnel.* 
In the aforesaid sense 'press' not only means all plants, machinery 
and other materials by means of which printing is done but also includes 
any printed literature, news establishment including a new agency 
3 Quoted in 'Voice of People' by Reo. M. Cheristenson & Robert O Mc 
Williams at p. 119 
4. Webster Lexicon Dictionary Vol. II at p. 754 
The term 'press' though in a narrower sense refers to the 'newspa-
per' in part icular ' but in its wider meaning it includes any book pamphlet 
or other document. It therefore, not only means any machinery which is 
used in printing and news establishment but also newspaper, book, pam-
phlet or other document. 
The freedom of press owes much to Jhon Milton's pamphlet speech 
to parliament, to which he gave the resounding tit le Areopagitica' The 
argument Milton used for unlicensed printing were for the most part al-
ready afloat the British air; they were chiefly appeals to experience 
and good sense. In the last point Milton comes to nub of principle and 
rises to the full grandeur of his subject. His words, often quoted may 
here be brought to mind again. "Though all the winds of doctrine were 
let loose to play upon the earth, so truth be in the field, we do inju-
riously by licening and prohibiting to misdoubt her strenght. Let her 
and Falsehood grapple; in a free and open encounter. Her words 
confuting is the best and surest suppressing^ 
The contents of the expression freedom of press have been variously 
understood, some have understood as meaning freedom to publish any mat-
ter by printed words, whether by way of statement or comments without 
any legal restraint or prohibition. Others have coupled it with freedom 
from prejudices and pre-concerned notions. Some others have thought 
that freedom of press consists in freedom from executive control. An-
other opinion suggests that it consists in freedom from the influence of 
5^  Under Section 1 (1) of Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 a newspaper 
means 'any printed periodical work containing public news or comments on public 
news. Thus it not only presents facts but also gives opinions through its editorial 
torials. 
6. Quoted in Freedom of Press - A Frame work of principles by Hocking, WE at 
p.5 
advertisers and proprietors or pressure groups. Stil l others have read 
into it the notion of freedom from v^ant ie. freedom from dependence on 
others for financial assistance.^ 
Freedom of press has three essential elements 
i) Freedom of access to all sources of information; 
ii) Freedom of publ ication; and 
iii) Freedom of circulation 
It is the function of the press to disseminate correct news and spread 
the truth. Free flow of information is essential to a democratic society 
and freedom to have access to public records is an important aspect of 
freedom of press. If the press has to rely on what the government chooses 
to supply it, the picture may be one sided and distorted and may not rep-
resent the truth. It is necessary, therefore, that the press should have 
access to public records but the government is reluctant to allow the 
press to have access to such records and has often denied it under the 
pretexts ie. defence, national security etc. 
Though freedom of thought is a personal freedom, freedom of ex-
pression and publication, which the press enjoys, is a collective free-
dom. It includes not only the right to propagate one's views but also the 
views of others. It follows that contributors to newspapers and journalists 
enjoy the same rights and privi lege as the press." The freedom of publi-
cation is secured by freedom of circulation. The Supreme Court as early 
as in 1950 held that freedom of circulation is as essential to the freedom 
(c^ expression) as the liberty of publication. Indeed without circulation 
7. Kedar Ghosh: Freedom or Fraud of the Press at p.4 
8. Sarkar R.C.S: The Press in India at p. 9 
publication would be of litt le value.® Explaining it further the apex couri 
held that "Freedom of expression covers both content and circulation if 
any law unreasonably curtai ls, directly or indirectly, the right of circula-
t ion, it would be void".' '" 
The Constitution of India unlike the American Constitut ion does 
not expressly provide the freedom of press as a fundamental right. In-
stead, it provides the guarantee of freedom of speech and expression but 
the analysis of discussion held in Constituent Assembly leaves no doubt 
that it was made a part of freedom of speech and expression.''"' Judicial 
verdicts of the Supreme Court in a catena of cases have confirmed it.""^ 
This right, like other rights is not absolute as certain amount of control 
over the press is of course necessary for the protection of the right where 
the right has to be harmonised with duties of the individual constitut-
ing the society. The right must be subjected to certain restrict ions To 
achieve this goal the Constitution itself subjects the freedom to Ar t ic le 
19 (2) which empowers the s ta te to impose reasonab le res t r ic t ions 
upon the press. 
Prior to the amendment Act of 1951 restrictions were not justiciable 
The Constitutional Amendment Act, 1951, which added three more grounds 
under Article 19(2) had one noteworthy feature which made the restric-
tions reasonable with the result that the courts were given the power to 
9. Romesh Thapper V. State of Madras AIR 1950 So 124 
10. Express Newspapers V. Union of India AIR 1958 So. 578 
11. C.A.D. Vol VII at p. 780 
12. The Supreme Court since the constitution came into force has held on various 
occasions from Romesh Thapper (1950) to TATA Press Company's case (1995) 
that freedom of press is included under Article 19(1)(a) as a part of freedom of 
speech and expression. 
decide in any particular case whether the restrictions imposed upon the 
press are reasonable or not. Article 19 (2) thus became justiciable like 
other restrictions enumerated under clauses (3), (4), (5) and (6) of Ar-
ticle 19 which were justiciable from the very beginning. 
Besides the restrictions provided under Article 1 9 (2) the need to 
impose the restrictions on the freedom of press on some other genuine 
grounds is universally recognised and no sensible person will ever say 
that the state should not be armed with adequate powers to deal with 
emergency. Under Article 250 of the Constitution, Parliament becomes 
empowered to legistate even with respect to the subjects enumerated 
under state list til l the emergency exist and, therefore, any law so made 
affecting the freedom of press can not be challenged before any court of 
law on the ground of legislative incompetency. 
The 44th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1978 to a little extent has 
restricted the scope of Article 358 of the Constitution. No restriction can 
be imposed now upon the press if the emergency is declared under Ar-
t icle 352 of the Constitution on the ground of armed rebel l ion. Moreover 
a law which seeks to curtail the freedom under Article 358 must bear the 
requisite recital. 
The press has often found itself caught in the dragnet of parlia-
mentary privileges and it is an area where the press requires a very cau-
tious approach to deal with. It has been held by the Supreme Court that 
the House is the sole judge to the occasion and the manner of its exer-
cise and that Article 105 (3) or 194 (3) are not subject to Article (19)(1 )(a) 
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The judicial verdicts, therefore, have further complicated the work of a 
journalist. 
The press at present is facing various new challenges in the form 
of mob violence, militancy, monopolistic att i tude of press barons ana 
ailurment of journal ists and workers of the press by the vested interest 
politicians to suit their own interests. In addition to the above stated pres-
sures which the press is already facing, the government too, sometimes 
leaves no stone unturned to harass the press where its wishes are not 
complied with. In a democracy the press discharges its function as the 
watchdog of public interest and it is destined to get into the hair of the 
government. Thus inevitably, the press and the government find them-
selves at cross purpose with each other, and a constant confrontation is 
the out come. The following charges are level led by the successive Gov-
ernments against the press. 
(1) Press is a source of much tension, it is a nuisance for working of 
the state and various public sectors of civi l society; 
(2) The press is monopolistic, charges the Government by referring 
that the First Press Commission also aired such charges with added 
emphasis; 
(3) The press has become a source of entertainment rather than of in-
formation and for most of the part fail ing to make the important news 
understandable; 
(4) The press has lost much of its prestige as a leader of public opin-
ion as it has fully involved itself with business activities and mak-
ing only profits; and 
(5) The press has failed to contribute to the developmental goals 
The state, therefore, in order to force the press to dance upon her 
tune adopts several measures ie. pre-censorship, prohibiting the circula-
tion in particular areas under the protective cover of Article 19(2) of the 
Constitution. It also adopts punitive measures against the press by im-
posing excessive tax upon it and by denying various facilities ie elec-
tricity, land for constructing office etc. 
The government in order to muffle the voice of the press has intro-
duced special bills. One of them v^ /as the Bihar Bil l, introduced in the House 
in 1982. It created an opportunity to expose hov^ the state can design the 
law to harass the press by making the provisions more stringent than 
necessary. A lot of hue and cry was raised in the press against it and 
after one year the Bill lapsed quietly. Similar laws were also intended m 
the states of Tamil Nadu and Orissa and the State of Jammu & Kashmir 
Not lagging behind the Central Government also introduced the Defama-
tion Bill in the Lok Sabha on Aug 29, 1988. The most controversial provi-
sion of the Bill was section 13, whereby a journalist might have been 
lodged in jai l for a minimum period of one month if he failed to dispro, e 
the violat ion of law. It also placed the newspaper in place of prosecutor 
while at the same time the state with its police powers and its various 
agencies would have stand between the press and proof available in its 
vault protected by right of privilege. The Bill, therefore, also violated the 
rule of natural justice provided under Article 21 of the Constitution. But 
all round condemnation both in side and out side the Parliament forced 
the government to appoint a five member Cabinet Committee with Mr. 
H.K.L. Bhagat as its convenor to look into the matter. The Committee rec-
ommended the withdrawal of the Bill and the government did accordingly. 
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The position of press in India, In the light of aforesaid facts seems 
to be ambiguous. The freedom of press, on the one hand is provided as a 
fundamental right under the caption freedom of speech and expression 
under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution but on the other hand the gov-
ernment by adopting various measure always try to keep the press under 
her control. In the light of these two conflicting facts the object of the 
study is to find out. 
(1) Whether or not the press enjoy the freedom as guaranteed under Article 
19 of the Constitution? and ; 
(2) The role being played by the Supreme Court in protecting the free-
dom of the press, as the f inal interpreter of the Constitution and 
enforcing authority of fundamental rights. 
SCOPE 
Legislation having relevance to the press may be divided as follow-
ing:-
(A) Legis la t ion which pr imar i ly or exclus ively concern the press 
e.g.Press and Registration of Books Act. 1867 and Press Council 
Act, 1978. 
(B) Laws under which speech or writ ing of certain categories are pun-
ishable or actionable, being legislation which is not aimed only at 
the press but would take within its coverage the press as well 
as other forms of written or oral expression. 
The legislation considered in the present study belongs to the sec-
ond category, comprising a number of enactments regulating the press 
media. 
11 
Though the major part of the study is related to the newspapers but 
other forms of print media have also been included, wherever required 
In other words the terms press has been used in wider context. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY -
The present work is based upon Doctrinal Research Methodology, 
Being library based work the text books, reference books, journals, re-
ports of various commissions appointed to look into the various aspects 
of the press have been used extensively. Beside above stated sources 
dissertations and doctoral thesis have also been used in the accompl ish-
ment of the present work. 
CHAPTERISATION 
Chapter first contains a general discussion on the freedom of press 
where the concept and importance of free press in present society has 
been discussed. 
To trace the origin and development of any institution Is of vital 
importance to work on that subject. To ful f i l l this requirement, the second 
chapter is devoted to the historical development of the press. An attempt 
has been made under this chapter to bringout the growth of press and 
press laws in India. 
The sope of the freedom of press is discussed in the third chapter 
of the present study with the help of case law decided by the Supreme 
Court. Though the work is based on case law decided by the apex court, 
but at places where no case by the Court is reported, the judgements of 
various High Courts have been referred in order to assess the ambit of 
the freedom. This chapter consists of two parts. The deliberations held in 
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the Constituent Assembly are analysed in part A. While part-B which again 
consists of two sub-parts evaluates the scope of freedom during peace 
time under sub-part (i), and the consequences of Emergency declared 
under Article 352 of the Constitut ion on the aforesaid freedom under sub-
part (ii). 
The Constitution under Article 19 (2) empowers the state to impose 
the reasonable restrictions on the freedom of press on certain grounds 
The material point of the provision is that restriction must be reasonable 
An analysis of different opinions expressed by the Supreme Court to as-
sess the reasonableness of restriction is made under chapter IV of the 
present work. 
Fundamental rights are one of the most important feature of the 
Indian Constitution. But like any other democracy our Constitution too 
attaches great importance to parliamentary privi leges. These two con-
cepts often conflict with each other. Under chapter Vth of the thesis a 
discussion, therefore, has been made on the relation between the free-
dom of press and parl iamentary privileges. 
The Supreme Court is not bound by its own decisions. Consequently, 
the Court is empowered to make a shift in its approach, in the interest of 
justice, whenever required. Chapter Vlth, therefore, deals with the judi-
cial approach adopted by the apex court while dealing with the issues 
relating to the freedom of press . 
Finally, in the last chapter, on the basis of the present study a con-
clusion has been expressed on the issues as raised in the object of the 
thesis. 
I hope that the present study would open new avenues regarding the 
freedom of press and also encourage further studies on the aforesaid subject 
CHAPTER: I 
FREEDOM OF PRESS: THE CONCEPT 
A) The Meaning of Free Press 
B) Importance of the Press 
C) Position of the Press 
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FREEDOM OF P R E S S : T H E CONCEPT 
The Meaning of Free Press 
^ 
free press is the very basis of democracy. But there had been 
persistent opposition to freedom of press and to all democratic movements 
from the Government all over the world. Freedom of press, as it is today, is 
the result of few centuries hard - won fight in the name of the people.^ 
The freedom of press is basically the freedom of individuals to express 
themselves through the medium of press. This freedom (of press) is funda-
mental to the life of an individual in the democratic polity. The concept of free 
press was explained by William Blackstone long ago in 1769 in the follow-
ing words; 
"The liberty of the press, is indeed essential to the nature of a free 
state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications.ano 
not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every free 
man has an undoubted right to lay what sentimetns he pleases before the 
public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of press; but if he publishes 
what is improper, mischivous, or illegal he must take consequence for his own 
temerity. To subject the press to the restrictive power of licensor is to 
subject all freedom of sentiments to the prejudice of one man, and make him 
1. Sarkar, R.C.S: The Press in India at p.4 
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the arbitrary and infalliable judge of all controverted points in learning, reli-
gion, and Government. But to punish any dangerous or offensive writ-
ings, which, when published, shall, on a fair and impartial trial, be adjudged oi 
a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and gooo 
order, of Government and religion, the only solid foundation of liberty.^ 
Lord Ellenborough in Rex V. Gobbet observed - "The lawof Englano 
is the law of liberty, and consistently with this liberty we have not what is 
called an imprimature; there is no such priliminary licence necessary but if a 
man publishes a paper he is exposed to the penal consequence as he is in 
every other act, if it be illegal. 
The view of Prof. A.V. Dicey also sounded similar to that of Blackstone 
when he says: "The freedom of press means the right of a person to publish 
what he pleases in books or newspapers but the laws of England do not 
recognise any special privilege attached to the press.^ 
The First Royal Commission on Press, (1947 - 48), however, choose 
not to discuss the meaning and significance of the press. The another Royal 
Commission on the press (1977) emphasised the freedom of press as, "that 
degree of freedom from restraint which is essential to enable proprietors, edi-
tors and journalists to advance the public interest by publishing the facts ano 
opinions without which a democratic electorate can not make re-
2 Blackstone Commentaries (1765) Vol. IV at p. p 151 - 52 
3 Dicey, A.V.: Study of Law and Constitution at p. 239 - 41 
15 
sponsible judgements. "A 
In the absence of a written Consititution or any guarantee of funda-
mental rights in England, the concept of freedom of press, like the wider con-
cept of freedom of expression, has been basically negative. But as Dicey 
observes, "No such thing is known with us as a licence to print, or a censor-
ship either of the press or political newspaper, leaves no doubt in the mino 
that it means the right to print and publish any thing which is not prohibited by 
a law or made an offence like sedition, contempt of court, obscenity, defama-
tion, blasphemy, official secrets, public order etc. 
The freedom of press in England, therefore, is measured by freedom to 
write anything provided the law is not infringed. Since the constitutionality of 
any law made by parliament can not be questioned, eventually freedom of 
press is nothing but the residue left after parliamentary regulation. And, there-
fore, the freedom of press in England is the freedom from prior restraints to 
precensorship. 
In United States freedom of press has been guaranteed by the First-
Amendment to the Constitution. It says "Congress shall make no /auv 
abridging the freedom of the press". The Fourteenth Amend-
ment bars the states from making any law depriving any person, inter alia, of 
liberty without due process of law. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that this 
amendment made the First Amendment binding on the states^ 
4. Final Report of Royal Commission on Press (1977) at p.p 8 - 9 
5. Gitlaw V. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) 
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Social and Economic developments in USA, in modern times have added 
a positive content to initial negative approach of freedom of press. Thus it 
has come to include not only absence of prior restraint of any form, but also a 
freedom from control as to what may be published through the press and from 
any restriction which may even indirectly hamper the freedom. 
This dual aspect of freedom of press was expressed by Commission 
on Freedom of Press in USA in the follov^ i^ng words..7\ free press is free 
for the expression of opinion in all its ptiases. It is free for the achievement oi 
those goals of press service on which its own ideals and the requirement 01 
the community combine and which existing techniques make possible For 
these ends it must have full command of technical resources, financial strength, 
reasonable access to source of information at home and abroad and the nec-
essary facilities for bringing the information to the national market. The press 
must grow to the measure of this market.^ 
The more liberal interpretation to the freedom of speech and the press 
started in thirties of this century and now the broader aspect of freedom ot 
press has been formulated judicially. " the guarantee of freedom 
of speech and press were not designed to prevent the censorship of the press 
merely but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent 
such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely es-
sential.^ 
It does not however, mean that the press in USA is absolutely free to 
publish whatever it please. The judiciary there has evolved the restrictions 
6. Report of the Commission on Freedom of Press in USA at p. 208 
7. Bigelow V. Virginia (1975) 44 L. Ed. 2nd. at p. 600 
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be placed upon it in the interest of public at large, and the violation of which 
may invite punishment. In the words of Cooley, " liberty of the press 
might be rendered a mockery and a dilusion, // while every man 
was at liberty to publish what he pleased, the public authorities might never-
theless punish him for harmless publications.^ 
Though no specific or seperate guarantee or identity is provided to the 
press under the Indian Constitution, nevertheless it is accorded recognition 
as a part of freedom of speech and expression enshrined under Article 19(1) 
(a). In India, therefore, freedom of press is regarded as a species of which 
freedom of speech and expression is a genus. This freedom is stated m wide 
terms and includes not only freedom of speech which manifests itself by oral 
utterances, but freedom of expression, whether such expression is communi-
cated by written word or printed matter. There can, therefore, be no doubt 
that the freedom of press is included in the fundamental right of freedom ot 
speech and expression guaranteed to the citizens under Article 19 (1)(a) of 
the Constitution. 
In Indian the freedom of press is an expression which is both 
elastic and ambiguous. The term press is used in different senses in 
different contexts. It may mean an establishment where Printing is done. 
In that sense it includes all plants, machinery and other material by 
means of which printing is done, similary the content freedom of press' 
is also differently understood by different persons Some have under-
stood to mean freedom to publish any matter by printed words without any legal re-
8^  Cooley: Constitutional Limitations, at p. 833 
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straint or prohibition. Others take it as freedom from prejudices and pre-
concieved notions. However, neither the First Royal Commission on the press 
in England nor the Second Press Commission in India choose to discuss the 
meaning and significance of this aspect. The First Press Commission how-
ever, expressed the view that freedom of press means, "freedom to hold opin-
ion, to recieve and impart informations through the printed words without any 
g 
interference from any public authority". 
The judgement delivered by the Press Council of India in Verghese's 
Case views the concept of freedom of press into following words. 
"Freedom of press is commonly understood as the freedom of expres-
sion, idea, views and information through the printed material and publisheo 
for circulation; and free from interference, pressure, restraint or compulsions 
from whatever source; Government or social." 
The Supreme Court lost no time and held in a catena of cases that 
imposition of pre - censorship''", or any order which amounts to prior restraints'^ 
are a restriction on the freedom of press and, therefore, violative of constitu-
tional provision under Article 19(1) (a). Similarly prohibiting newspaper from 
publication of its own views or the views of the correspondants about the 
burning topic of the day is a serious encroachment upon the valuable right of 
freedom of speech and expression.'^ 
9. Report of 1st Press Commission 1954 at p. 358 
10. Brij Bhushan V. State of Delhi AIR 1950 S.C. 129 
11. R.Rajgopalan V. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1995 S.C. 264 
12. Virendra V. State of Punjab. AIR 1957 S.C. 896 
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The freedom of press also includes propagation of ideas, the liberty ot 
circulation and consequently any order under a law curtailing circulation or 
banning entry on the ground of 'public safety' or 'maintenance of public or-
der' falls out side the scope of reasonable restrictions provided under Article 
19 (2). The foremost function of the press is the dissemination of news and 
to provide the information to the people and this can not be denied. If any 
order affects the freedom, it infringes not only the freedom of the press but 
also the people's right to information so important in a democratic society. 
The policies of the governments^ or the orders of the administration either 
levying excessive tax"*^, and thereby putting excessive burden on the press 
or adopting punitive measures^'against the press which ultimately curtail the 
freedom of press, therefore, are not permissible. 
13. Sakal Papers Ltd. V. Union of India AIR 1962 S.C. 305 
14. Indian Express Newspapers V. Union of India AIR 1986 S.C. 515 Printer 
(Mysore) Ltd. V. Asstt. Commercial Officer (1994) 2 S.C.C 434 
15. A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 872 
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Importance of The Press 
^ n a democracy, freedom of press is regarded extremely vital and 
crucial. A free press is not only a necessary adjunct of democracy; it is the 
sine qua non for the proper functioning of a democratic society. 
The American Press Commission has said "Freedom of press is es-
sential to political liberty and proper functioning of democracy. When men 
can not freely convey their thoughts to one another, no freedom is secureo 
where freedom of expression exists the begining of a free society and means 
for every retention of liberty are already present". 
During many years in which one country after another was striving to 
extort full self government from monarches and oligarchies, the press be-
came the strongest force on popular side. It exposed oppression and corrup-
tion; it helped the friends of liberty to rouse the masses. It won popular con-
fidence and sympathy because it embodied and focused the power of public 
opinion without which the victory of opinion over the armed forces of the Gov-
ernment could not have been won.''^Bismark's so called reptile press provea 
effective engine for strengthening his position and set an example followed 
in other countries. 
The democratic form of society demands of its members an active and 
intelligent participation in the affairs of their community, whether local or na-
16. Bryce ; Modern Democracies Vol. I at p. 105 
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tional. The responsibility for fulfilling these needs unavoidably rests in large 
measure upon the press, that is on the newspaper and periodicals which are 
the main source from which information, discussion and advocacy reach the 
public. The views of Thomas Jefforson, one of the architect of American 
Constitution in this regard are noteworthy. He was so much infatuated by the 
power of the press that he was even ready to prefer a newspaper at the cost 
of the establishment of the Government. 
Acknowledging the power of the press Nepoleon Bounaparte who 
played with the destiny of Europe said that, "A journalist is a grumbler, a 
censure, a giver, a regent of sovereign, a tutor of nations. Four liostile news-
papers are to be feared more than a thousand baynots". 
The press if honest promotes the, "Victory of truth over false hood" 
in the public arena. It is a necessary condition of a free society to have dis-
cussion on the subject of public importance and for that freedom of speech 
and expression which includes freedom of press is a necessry condition A 
newspaper is, in all literalness, a "Bible of Democracy" the book out of 
which people determine its conduct. It is the only serious book, most people 
read everyday.'"' 
The importance of freedom of press has been stressed time and 
again. Emphasising its importance Pt. Nehru once said," The press is one 
of the vital organs of life , more especially in a democracy The press has to be 
respected , the press has to be co-operated. Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, former 
17. Walter Lipman : Liberty and the News at p. 57 
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Chief Justice of India, wrote that freedom is of (Press) considerable signifi-
cance in a democratic society as it gives full scope to an individual for his 
development and ample opportunity for propagation of his views, philosophy 
and ideology; and also as it plays a vital role in education, growth and devel-
opment of public opinion on issues of public importance,''* 
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state 
It forecloses the state from assuming 'a guardianship of the public mind' 
Authority is to be controlled by public opinion, not the public opinion by the 
authority. 
The importance of the press has greatly increased with the develop-
ment of the press as an instrument of mass communication. Its importance 
lay in the fact that it forms the very root and agency of mass communication 
It must be understood that the freedom of press is not a fixed and isolated 
value, the same in every society and in all times. It functions within a society 
and must vary with the social contexts. 
The Royal Commission on the Press has emphasised the importance 
of press by saying that, "It advance the public interest by publishing the facts 
and opinions without which a democratic electorate can not make responsible 
judgements."'^^ 
The Indian Press Commission too, has echoed the same views when 
it says that "Democracy can thrive not only under the vigilant eyes of its leg-
~^. Gajendrahadkar, P.B: Law, Liberty and Social Justice at p.p. 89 - 90 
19. Supra note (4) 
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islatures but under the care and guidance of public opinion and the press is 
par execellance, the vehicle, through which the opinion can become 
articulative". The judiciary too, has acknowledged the importance of press in 
modern society Lord Denning observed that, "The reason why in these cases 
(where freedom of speech prevailed over other rights) the law gives no rem-
edy is because of the importance it attaches to the freedom of press; or bet-
ter put, the importance in a free society of the circulation of true information. 
The metes and bounds of this are already staked out by the rule of law."^° 
Speaking on the importance of the press the American Supreme Court 
observed " The newspapers, magazines and other journals of the country, it 
is safe to say, have shed and continue to shed more light on the public ana 
business affairs of the nation than any other instrumentality of publicity; ana 
since informed public opinion is the most patent of all restraints upon mis-
government, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a 
free press can not be regarded otherwise than with grave concern A 
free press stands as one of the greatest interpreters between the Govern-
ment and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves".^'^ 
Supreme Court of India since the time Constitution came into force has 
been very conscious in highlighting and protecting the aforesaid freedom In 
Romesh Thappar and Brij Bhushan's cases, speaking through Patanjali Sastri, 
the Supreme Court observed that, "Freedom of speech and expression is the 
foundation of all democratic organisations and is essential for the proper func-
tioning of the process of democracy, "quoting Blackstone's commentaries he 
20 In rex (1975) 1 All E.R. 697 
21. Alice Lee Grosjean V. American Press Co. 297 U.S. 233 at p. 250 (1936) 
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further said that, "Every free man has undoubted right to lay what sentiments 
he pleases before the public; to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of press "^^ 
Sounding a note of caution in Sakal Paper's case about the impor-
tance of freedom of speech and expression (of the which the freedom of press 
is a part), Mudhalkar, J. said that the, "courts must be ever vigilant in guard-
ing perhaps the most important freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution The 
reason for this is obvious. The freedom of speech and expression is of para-
mount importance under a democratic Constitution which envisage changes 
in the composition of legislatures and the Governments and must be pre-
served. " " While according to Ray. J; The faith in popular Government rest on 
the old dictum, "Let the people have the truth and the freedom to discuss it 
and all will go well". The liberty of press remains an "Ark of covenants" in 
every democracy. Steel will yield the products of steel. Newsprint will mani-
fest whatever is thought by man. Therefore, freedom of press is to be en-
riched by removing the restrictions.^* "It is the most chenshed and valueo 
freedom in a democracy: indeed democracy can not survive without a free 
press. Thus freedom of press constitutes one of the pillars of democracy ana 
indeed lies at the foundation of democratic organisation."^^ 
The Supreme Court re-interated its earlier views in Express Newspa-
pers V. Union of India " a n d held that the "Freedom of paress is the heart of 
22. Supra note (10) at p. 134 
23. Sakal Papers V. Union of India AIR 1962 S.C. 305at315 
24. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 106 at p. 129 
25. Maneka Gandhi V. Union of India AIR 1978 S.C. 597 at p 640 
26. Supra note (14) at p. 527 
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social and political intercourse. It is the primary duty of the courts to upholo 
the freedom of the press and invalidiate all laws or administrative actions 
which interfere with it contrary to constitutional mandate." 
The Auto Shankar's case further established the importance of press 
in a democratic society where it was held that freedom of press is more impor-
tant and it can not be restrained from publishing the autobiography of a con-
demned prisoner even if it is defamatory to state officials and any remedy if 
available to such officials whould arise only after the publication ^^  
27. Supra note (11) at p . 276 
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Position of The Press 
primary function of the press in a democratic society is to dis-
seminate correct news and spread the truth. Obviously a question which arise 
at this stage is while performing the aforesaid function, does press enjoy any 
special right or privilege ? 
Dicey remarks; "The law of England does not recognise in general 
any specific privilege on behalf of the press. The law of press as exists 
in England is merely part of the law of libel and the so called liberty oi 
the press is a mere application of the general principle that no man is 
punishable except for a distinct breach of / aw" , " In the words of Ivor 
Jennings: "Anything is lawful which is not unlawful. There is no more a 
right of free speech than there is a right than to tie up my shoe laces ^^ 
Earlier in England, the common law rule regarding the disclosure of 
informations was applicable and the decisions delivered before 1981, when 
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1981 was enacted clearly reflect the aforesaid 
view. The Vassal cases are worth note in this regard.^°To investigate into the 
leakage of certain admiralty secrets known as 'Vassal Scandal' a tribunal 
28, Op cite note (4) at p. 240 
29, Jennings, S.I: The Law and The Constitution at p 247 
30, A.G. V. Claugh (1963) 2 W.L.R. 343, A.G. V. Mulhoiand (1963) 2 W.L.R. 658 
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presided over by Lord Radcliff had been appointed. The Tribunal ordered 
two journalists one of the'Daily Sketch' and other of the 'Daily Mail' to dis-
close the source of informtion. These journalists however, did not follow the 
order but preferred to go to jail under the orders of the Lord Chief Justice 
Parker, for a period of six months each. 
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1981, however, provided the protection 
and under sec 10 of the Act there can be no compulsions against a journalist 
unless it fell within the ambit of any exception. 
In USA the rights or privileges of the press has received closest atten-
tion. Before Garland case ^^  journalists claim to privilege has been based on 
the common law but for the first time Miss Torre refused to identify her source 
of information on First Amendment ground. She was held for criminal con-
tempt. 
Justice Stewart, then of Second Circuit Court of Appeals, heard the 
case in 1958. He was agree with Torrence Attorney that compulsory disclo-
sure might abridge press freedom by imposing some limitations upon avail-
ability of news. But such freedom, he said, is not absolute. A determination of 
when curtailment is justified often presents a " delicate and difficult " task 
which requires a balancing of rights. Concerning the conflicting rights, he 
agreed that freedom of press is basic to a free society, but so too are courts 
armed with the power to discover truth. Further, the concept that it is duty of 
the witness to testify has roots as deep in history as a guarantee of a free 
press. If so the Court would not hesitate to conclude that freedom of press 
31. Garland V. Torre 358 U.S. 910 (1958) 
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must give place under the Constitution to a paramount public interest in the 
fair administration of justice. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the 
case and so Miss Torrence went to jail for 10 days. 
On June 29, 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered its long awaited 
first decision on the claim of newsmen to a constitutional privilege againsi 
disclosing source of information or the information itself. In a 5-4 decision 
the court held that freedom of press is not abridged when the newsmen are 
required to appear and testify before state and federal grand juries ^^  
In the decision for the Court, Justice White observed that "The great 
weight of authority is that newsmen are not exempted from the normal duty ot 
all citizens. Neither the common law nor constitutional law exempt newsmen 
from such duty and that there is no shield law and upto this time the only 
testimonial privilege has been rooted in Fifth Amendment. We are being askeo 
to create another by interpreting First Amendment to grant newsmen a testi-
monial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy. Thus we decline to do." 
However, he also held that harrasment of the press would not be counte-
nanced by the Court. Such juries are subject to judicial control. (Thus creat-
ing a qualified privilege for the newsmen under First Amendment). Justice 
Stewart, however in a dissenting opinion noted that traditionally the judiciary 
has imposed virtually no limitations oh the grand jury's broad powers to in-
vestigate. The Court's crabbed view of the First Amendment reflects a dis-
turbing insensitivity to the critical role of an independent press. 
32. Branzburg V. Haynes. 408 U.S. 663 (1972) 
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The Supreme Court thus held that the First Amendment, in guarantee-
ing freedom of speech does not implicitly confer upon newsman the right to 
conceal his sources from a state or federal grand jury, if their identity is rel-
evant to an investigation into the commission of a crime. In holding so, the 
Court rejected the argument that such a newsman's privilege was necessary 
in order to prevent the threatened exposure of those source from having a 
chillig effect on communications to newsmen by persons who desire to re-
main anonymous. 
Under certain situations, however, even after the Branzburg judgement, 
the courts still give protection to newsmen from forced disclosure of their 
source of information. In the words of Floyd Abrams "First Amendment privi-
lege is only qualified. It is not absolute and it is not absolutely sure that all the 
courts understand that this is the law, but there have been a number of deci-
sions since Branzburg case including court of Appeals decisions in the Sec-
ond Circuit and in the D. C. Circuit and Supreme Court opinions in Vermont 
and Virginia. These decisions seems likely to continue to issue and to holo 
that certainly in rather wide variety of situations the newsmen will not be re-
quired to disclose confidential sources on the basis of a First Amendment 
claim of the newsmen that they should not be required to do so. "^^ 
In India, it is well established by decisions rendered both before and 
after the Constitution came into force, that the freedom of journalist is an 
ordinary part of the freedom of citizen (apart from statutory provisions spe-
cially applicable to press). And the press does not stand on higher footing 
33. Francois W.E. : Mass Media, Law and Regulation at. p. 335 
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from an ordinary citizen in any way. Lord Show's observation in this context 
is often quoted. 
"The freedom of a journalist is an ordinary part of the freedom of the 
subject and to whatever lenghts the subject in general may go, so also may 
the journalist but apart from statute law, his privilege is no other and no higher. 
The responsibilities which attach to this power in the dissemination of printea 
matter may and in the case of a conscentious journalist do, make him more 
careful; but the range of his assertions, his criticisms, or his comments is as 
wide as, and no wider than, that of any other subject. No privilege attaches to 
his position.^ 
The same position continues under the Constitution. Since freedom of 
press is included in the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under 
Art 19 (1 )(a) to citizens , the press stands on no higher footing than any other 
citizen. In Constituent Assembly Dr. B.R. Ambedekar, Chairman of Drafting 
Committee of the Constitution, stated that - "The press is merely another way 
of stating an individual or a citizen. The press has no special rights which are 
not to be given to or which are not to be exercised by the citizen in his 
individual capacity".^* 
In many countries including India, journalist have been claiming that 
when they obtain information from any source in confidence, they should not 
be compelled to disclose the source.^^ This demand in a limited sense has 
M. C.Arnold V. King Emperor A.I.R. 1914 P.O. 116 at p. 124 
35. C.A.D. Vol Vll at p. 780 
36. Bakshi, P.M: Legal Protection of the Source of Information Obtained by a 
Journalist J.B.C.I. Vol. VIII No. 2 at p. 233 
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been acceded to The Press Council Act 1978, under Sec. 15(2) '^ says 
that no neswpapernews agency, editor or journalist can be compelled to dis-
close the source of any news or information publ ished by the newspaper or 
received or reported by the news agency editor or the journalist 
The Indian Evidence Act, however, does not recognise any such privi-
lege (as some persons are given privilege uder Section 122 - 126) Accord-
ing to the law of evidence a person can be compel led by a court of law to 
answer all questions which are relevant.^' 
The approach of the law is where there are no exceptions, the general 
rule of duty to disclose will prevail. On the same reasoning any person relat-
ing to the affair of the press can not claim in a court of law any privilege 
against the disclosure of the source of information obtained by him in confi-
dence. There are instances when the editors of the newspapers were called 
before the courts. In the first case Kaliprassna Kauyabi Sharad of Hitabodi^® 
and in the second case well known editor and journal ists Bipin chandra Pal'*" 
refused to depose in court about the authors of the ar t ic les appeared in 
37. Sec, 15 (2) says, "Nothing in sub-section (1) shall be deemed to compel) any 
newspaper, news agency, editor or journalist to disclose the source of any 
news or information published by that newspaper or received or reported by 
that news agency, editor or journalist". 
38 Sec. 23, however, makes it clear that if an admission is extrcted under a 
promise of secrecy, it is irrelevant but not protected from disclosure, unless 
protected from disclosing the same by any other law for the time being in 
force. 
39. Journalistic Privilege. Supreme Court Appeals No. 9 (1963) Vol I 
40. Editorial: Journalists & Their Sources (1980) V. 84 CWN 85 - 87 
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their newspapers. In M.S. Sharma ,V. Sri Krishna SInha Supreme Court held 
that, freedom of press in India "being only a right flowing from the freedom of 
speech and expression it" stands on no higher footing than the freedom of 
speech and expression of a citizen" and that the press enjoys no privilege as 
such, that is to say, "as distinct from the freedom of a citizen" '*^  Once again it 
clearly laid down that the press is subject to same laws and regulations as 
are applicable to other citizens, and press was not immune from the laws of 
general application or ordinary forms of taxation.*^ 
In another case involving the same newspaper (Express Newspaper) the 
Supreme Court reiterated its earlier stand when it held that press industry 
was not free from taxation. Taxes have to be levied by reason of public ser-
vices, facilities and amenities enjoyed by the newsprint industry, the burden 
of maintaining which falls on the government. But simultaneously made an 
important departure from its earlier stand in respect olprivilege of press when 
it said that different parameters may be adopted in respect of a statue taxing 
newsprint and of ordinary taxing statute thus created a limited scope for privi-
lege.^^ 
In India though the press as a general rule does not enjoy any privilege 
as distinct from a citizen, nevertheless the Supreme Court under exceptional 
circumstances has created a little privilege in favour of the press. In Prabha 
Dutt's case the Supreme Court allowed the press to conduct interveiw of the 
persons, condemned to death provided they are willing to be interviewed 
41. M.S.M. Sharma V. Sri Krishna SInha AIR 1959 SO. 395 at p.402 
42. AIR 1958 S.C. 578. 
43. Supra note (14) at p. 540 
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Court further held that, unless, in a given case there are weighty reasons for 
denying the opportunity to interview a condemned prisoner, the right of the 
press to interview the prisoner should not be denied. The reasons for the 
denial of the same should be recorded in writing.*^ 
Another aspect of privilege issue is related to the business activities ot 
the press and that is whether the press has any privilege to claim any adver-
tisement released by the government. On various occassions the courts have 
held that the newspapers have no right to demand the advertisement from the 
government. On the other hand the Government did have a right to choose 
the newspaper in which it would advertise. But the government's discretion to 
grant largess must be structured by rational, relevant and non discriminatory 
standards or norms.^' 
In printer (Mysore) Ltd. V. Asst Commercial Tax Officer, the Su-
preme Courts opinion seems to be that, "freedom of press stands on a higher 
footing than other enterprises in matters of taxing statutes. In view of the 
above opinion test for determining vires of statute taxing newsprint, have 
therefore, to be differnet from that is usually adopted for testing the vires ot 
other taxing statutes.*^ 
Thus freedom of press not only means and includes freedom from re-
straint imposed upon it by the government but also any measure which helps 
4A. Prabha Dutt V. Union of India AIR 1982 SO. 06 at p. 07 
45. Ramanna V. International Airport Authority 1979 SO 1628 at p. 1642 
46, Printers (Mysore) Ltd. V. Asstt. Commercial Tax Officer (1994)2 80 .0 
434 
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or keeps the press independent and free from any external pressure while 
disseminating news and views without which people living in a democratic 
system can not form a correct opinion. 
In modern democratic societies the press had acquired great impor-
tance. On the one hand by disseminating the information on various issues oi 
the day, it greatly influences the minds of the people on the other hand it 
keeps vigil over the functioning of modern welfare state. But despite the ex-
press recognition of its importance form every segment of the society and the 
judiciary as well the press simply being a part of freedom of speech and ex-
pression does not enjoy any privilege. The basic principle of common law 
that the law favours the disclosure in legal proceedings, of all relevant mate-
rial in the interest of justice, and it does not enjoy any privilege as distinct 
from a citizen is being followed. Nevertheless it has been accorded a little 
privilege as a public institution under exceptional circumstances 
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HIvSTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
he humanity has marched from the "Stone - Age" to the "Mod-
ern Age". Enormous progress during this period has been made in ev-
ery walk of life. Be it social, pol i t ical , economic, scientif ic or what so-
ever. One of the gift to the society as a result of such advancement is 
the press which has played an important role at crucial junctures. C.R. 
Srinivasan rightly says, "Many are the miracles of modern age of tfiem 
all, I should think the greatest is the modern newspaper. It is not a 
miracle in itself. It has laid the foundation for many miracles that we 
have witnessed in modern life. It makes and unmakes things. It creates 
and destroys the strength of the nation. It is a pivot around which revoivs 
the universe. It occupies the nuclear position in the life of the world. 
The present is essentially the age of newspaper and the immediate fu-
ture is not likely to be different."^ The history of journalism is the man s 
striving for ways and means of satisfying his curiosity and learning what 
is going on in the world. The man, since the time immemorial has striven 
for the knowledge and the press has made the material available quicker as 
wel l as cheaper to all those who desire it. In the words of Herbert 
Brucker, "Journalism, then, is the instrument we use to stock our 
1. Srinivasan C.P: The Press and Press and the public at p. 01 
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heads with information about the world that we can never know of 
our selves.^ 
Like Indian jurisprudence the press too, has got its roots in Brit-
ish counterpart. However, unlike the jurisprudence it has been brought 
to this country not as a result of "conscious and calculated thought" 
by those who had built slowly the magnificient empire as a miracle, but 
by a band of adventurous men who were allured to this country in the 
expectation of shaking the Pagoda Tree. ' 
The development of press in any country is essential ly according 
to its political, cultural and economic conditions and, therefore, to un-
derstand its development and the influence, it is essential to know the 
prevalent conditions in that country. Thus, the history of press in India 
is the history of consolidation and extension of Brit ish rule in India 
According to Margarita Barns, " A history of Indian press must, to a 
certain extent be a history of British occupation of India, or a cross 
section of that society.'"* 
For the better understanding of the development of press ana 
Press Laws in India, the study may be undertaken as fol lowing. 
1. Press and Press Laws up to the 1 8th Century. 
2. during the 19th Century 
3. during the 20th Century 
(a) Pre-independence period, and 
(b) Post-independence period 
2. Herbert Brucker: Freedom of information at p. 4 
3. Sanial, SO: History of Journalism in India at p. 355 
4. Margarita Barns : The Indian Press at p. 13. 
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Press and Press Laws Upto 18th Century 
© h e human mind is always occupied by the instinct of curiosity 
which in turn creates apetite for knowledge. From the earliest times 
man's inquisitiveness compelled him to find out ways and means to know 
about the happenings occuring in different parts of the Globe. The an-
cient Postal system of Europe and Western Asia and the banjara sys-
tem in ancient India may be called as earl iest form of journalism. 
After the conquest of India, the Muslim rulers also followed the 
ancient system of emissories with certain improvements for the effec-
tive administrat ion. They also gave it the form of an organisation The 
state regularly maintained a seperate department for keeping the court 
informed about the description of events, ceremonies and complaints 
etc in the form of Waqias or newsletter under the command of Waqia-
Nigar. However the origin of modern Indian journal ism can be traced to 
Aurangzeb's regime. Sanial observes, " The earl ier distinct mention ot 
ante-typographic newspaper is to be found in the Muntabakhat-Ai-
Lubab of Khafi Khan where we find the death news of Raja Ram of the 
House of Shivaji. The great historian also gives us clearly to under-
stand that the common soldiers in Aurangzeb's time were supplied with 
the newspapers".* 
The papers enjoyed great l iberty during Aurangzeb's time 
and it is evident from the fact that the newspapers were often commenting 
7 Op Cit note (3) 
38 
on the relations between him and his grand son Azim 0 Shan In the 
year 1828 Colonel James Tod has sent to the Royal Asiatic Society 
in London hundreds of original manuscript newspaper of the Moghul 
Court (1660). The size of these papers was eight inches by four and 
half inches, written in different hands. They give notices about promo-
t ion , v is i ts by the emperors to mosques, hunt ing expedit ions, the 
bestowel of presents and items of other interests etc.^ 
The growing weakness of Moghul power caused frequent conflicts 
among the rival provinces. The death of Nawab inevitably resulted in 
inheri tance tangles among the rival claimants to the throne. The East 
India Company first seized these opportunit ies for selling their ser-
vices to the warring group in lieu of profits and later on started direct 
intervention to suit her own interests. 
The battle of Plassey in 1757, decided the fate of India in favour 
of the Brit ish. Though before this battle printing press has already been 
brought in India by Vasco de Gama in 1557 to print religious books 
The East India Company established its f irst printing press in Bombay 
in 1674 and the first official printing press was installed in Calcutta in 
1779. The company's administration took precaution to ensure that any 
of these presses in its settlement were not used for printing any ac-
count of their activities in their country and, therefore, the efforts to 
start newspapers were strongly suppressed by bureaucrats of East In-
dia Company. 
Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, 1908 at p. 1121 
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In September, 1768 William Bolts, an ex-servant of the East In-
dia Company noti f ied: 
Mr. Bolts takes this method of informing the public that the want oi 
a printing press in this city being of a great disadvantage in business 
and making extremely difficult to communicate such intelligence to the 
community, as is of importance to every British subject, he is ready to 
give best encouragement to any person or persons who are versed in 
the business of printing, to manage a press, the types and utensils ol 
which he can produce. In the Meantime he begs leave to inform the 
public that having in manuscript things to communicate, which must in-
timately concern every individual, any person who may be induced by 
curiosity or other more laudable motives, will be permitted at Mr. Bolts 
house to read and take copies of the same. A person will give due at-
tendance at the hours from ten to twelve any morning".^ 
Mr. Bolt's notif ication came like a thunderbolt ; it alarmed the ad-
ministrators. He was served with a notice for deportation. It was held 
that he, by his attempt to utter "an odium upon the administration and 
to promote fr ict ion and discontent in the sett lement" has rendered him-
self unworthy of any further indulgence from the company and of the 
company's protection. 
For the next twelve years, no attempt was undertaken to publish 
any newspaper. Finally on Jan 29, 1780 the first Indian newspaper 
was published by James Augustus Hicky ent i t led Bengal Gazette or 
7. Quoted in 'A History of the Press in India by S. Natrajan at p. 10 
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Calcutta General advertiser. This man was a printer by trade and for 
his newspaper venture; he says - " I have no particular passion for 
printing newspaper; I have no propensity. I was not bred to slavish 
life of hard work, yet I take pleasure in enslaving my body in order to 
purchase freedom for my mind and soul ." ' 
Mickey's "Bengal Gazette or the Calcutta General Advertiser was 
a two sheet weekly political and commercial paper open to all parties 
but inf luenced by none." 
Hicky was bitterly opposed to those who were in power and tar-
geted even to Governor General Hastings and his wife. This policy 
soon landed him in trouble and in Nov. 1780 the circulation of his news-
paper through General Post Office was banned. Even then Hicky kept 
continue his newspaper and it was delivered in Calcutta through peons 
in neighbouring areas. But Warren Hastings was determined to crush 
the paper as well as the editor. 
Hicky was sentenced to two years imprisonment and a fine of Rs 
2000 on another count, he was ordered to pay Hastings Rs 5000 as 
damages for l ibel. Bail of Rs. 80000 was demanded of him on two 
counts during the tr ial. Protesting against the demand of such heavy 
amount for bail Hicky wrote a letter to the clerk of the Crown. This letter 
was published in Bengal Gazette during the week June 16-23, 1781 But 
his prayer was not granted. Failing to deposit Rs 80000 for granting the 
bail , Hicky was sent to jail. However he continued to edit the paper 
8. Quoted in 'Press, Public opinion and Government in India' by Shushila Agrawal 
at p.24 
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from jail. The equally indomitable, Warren Hasting on the other hand f i led 
suit after suit to harras the Hicky. Finally with the help of his fr iend Sir. 
Eliza Impey, chief justice of Supreme Court, he f inally succeeded in 
sel l ing out the Mickey's press, as he failed to pay the fine imposed upon 
him. 
During this period, Warren Hastings encouraged other menB. 
Messink and Peter Reed who started in the same year (1780) another 
newspaper "India Gazette" and assured the authorities that they would 
abide by the instructions and the regulations issued by them Four years 
later "Calcutta Gazette" came into existence under official patronage 
"Madras Courier" was the first newspaper published in Madras 
in the year 1785 and in Bombay the first newspaper appeared in the 
year 1791 by the name "Bombay Herald" and another one namea 
"Bombay Gazette" 
The editors of these journals, though, agreed to abide by the rules 
often attacked the authorities. Inturn they incurred the wrath of the such 
authorit ies. As a result Bombay Gazette suffered heavy losses, the Editor 
Mr. Farr, was deported and his successor readily agreed to sumbit proof 
sheets to the secretary for inspection before publication. Later on, the 
paper sought the patronage of government on the ground of heavy losses 
and became Government paper. 
In 1786, Lord cornwallis was appointed the Governor-General 
and was entrusted with an uphil l task of consolidation on the one hand 
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and to reform the administrat ion on the other. 
But in Bengal the case was different and editors revived their voice 
against bureaucratic norms. In 1791, William Duane editor of "Bengal 
Journal" published a false news of the Lord Cornwall is 's death. There-
after, he could not continue as the editor. Nevertheless Duane started 
another paper, Indian World in 1794. In the meantime his house was 
twice raided so he decided to sell the paper and arranged to transfer it 
to new proprietor on Jan 1, 1795. But on Dec 26th, 1794, he was ar-
rested and deported to England without a single word of information or 
explanation and without providing any compensation for the properties 
left behind here in India.^ 
In 1789, Lord Wellesly assumed the office of Governer General 
when Mr. Bruce, the editor of ^Asiatic Mirror', publ ished an article on 
the relative strength of Europeans and native populat ions. Wellesly 
got furious and wrote from Madras to Sir, Alfred Clarke in Calcutta in 
April 1799; 
"I shall take an opportunity for transmitting rules for the con-
duct of the whole tribe of editors, in the meantime if you cannoi 
tranquilize this and other mischivous publications be so good to 
suppress the papers by force and send their persons to Europe"J° 
This threat was immediately put into action and a fresh set of rules 
was published to shackle the press on May 13, 1799. Which provided 
9. Ghose H.P: The Newspaper in India at p. 11 
10. Op CIt note (4) at p. 67 
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1. Every printer of a newspaper to print his name at the bottom of 
the paper. 
2. Every editor and proprietor of a paper to deliver in his name and 
place of abode to the secretary to the Government. 
3. No paper to be published on Sunday. 
4. No paper to be published at all unti l it shall have been previously 
inspected by the secretary to the Government or by a person 
authorised byhimfor that purpose. 
5. The penalty for offending against any of the above regulations to 
be immediate embarkatian for Europe. 
The censor was instructed to prevent publication of matter relat-
ing to the subjects like "Public Credit". The aforesaid measures were 
just i f ied on the ground of emergency so long as the necessity existed 
for the maintenance of absolute power. These new rules were commu-
nicated to the editors and printers of various newspapers of that time. 
The editors viewed them with dismay yet they did not resent them. 
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During The 19th Century 
U i h e 19th Century is important from the Indian as well as British 
point of view. On the one hand the British consol idated their position, 
and on the other hand Indians realised that no foreign administration 
working for her own country can take care of them against poverty and 
famines. This factor gave life, impetous and encouragement to the In-
dian National Movement and Indian public awakening. 
The first decade of the 19th century did not bring any major change 
in the repressive pol icies of the government towards press. It contin-
ued to regard newspapers with great suspicion and was ready to strike 
it at first opportunity provided by them. The att i tude of the governmeni 
towards the press during that period is evident form the following opin-
ion, recorded in a minute by Mr. Elliot, Governor of Madras: "The prin-
cipal objects of those who desire the freedom of press are to dissemi-
nate the worst pol i t ical doctrines of the times, to bring the constitu-
tional authorit ies in Europe and Asia into contempt and to provide prof-
its for the lawyers from prosecutions of libel in the courts of justice" 
Lord Wellesly was very harsh towards the press. All these restric-
tions led to publ icat ion of a large number of pamphlets which bore nei-
ther the names of the authors nor ttiose of the printers who printed it 
Lord Minto, who had succeeded Lord Wellesley as Governor General. 
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therefore, in 1811 issued the orders that "It was the duty of all the pro-
prietors of all public presses established in this presidency or its de-
pendencies to cause, the name of the printer to be affixed to all works 
papers and advertisements printed at or issuing from those presses ana 
that any breach of regulations hereafter would incur the severe dis-
pleasure of Government. 
In 1813 Lord Hastings became the Governor - General. He treated 
the Indian Press with leniency. In 1814 Dr. James Bryce acquired the 
'Asiatic Mirror' and became its editor. After some time he came to a 
bitter conflict with Mr. Jhon Adam, the Chief Secretary who was also 
the censor. Thereafter Dr. Bryce made repeated representations against 
Mr. Jhon Adams. However, his representations were not acceeded 
The pre - censorship came to an end under peculiar circumstances 
When asked to exclude certain portions from his newspaper Morning 
Post, the editor Neatly refused to comply claiming that no action can 
be taken against him as he was a native of India (He was born of a 
European father and Indian mother). The press censor represented to 
the Governor - General that he was "powerless in dealing with an editor 
who was Indian born". Lord Hastings abolished the post of censor in 
1818 and placed the responsibil ity for excluding any matter likely to 
affect the authority of the government or anything injurious to the pub-
lic interest on the editors themselve but the directors of the company 
did not like it. Therefore, to appease them His Lordship formulated the 
following regulations prohibiting editors from publ ishing any matter fall-
ing under the fol lowing heads: 
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1. Animadversions on the measures and proceedings of Court of 
Directors, or other public authori t ies in England connected with 
the Government of India, or disqual i f icat ions on polit ical transac-
t ions of local administration or offensive remarks levelled at the 
public conduct of the members of the Council, of the judges of the 
Supreme Court or the Lord Bishosp of Calcutta. 
2. Discussions having a tendency to create alarm or suspicion among 
the native population of any intended interference with their reli-
gious opinions or observances. 
3. The republication, from English or other newspapers, of passages 
coming under any of the above heads, or otherwise calculated to 
affect the British power or reputat ion in India. 
4. Private scandal and personal remarks on individuals to excite dis-
sension in society. 
These regulations were hailed in India and despite vigilence over 
press in the form of aforesaid regulat ions the newspaper press once 
again breathed a free air, people again got busy starting new journals. 
when a few days ago none had dared to do such a thing. According to 
Margarita Barns the,"Most contemporary commentators regarded the new 
regulations as opening the way to a free press .'"'' . 
11. Id at p. 91 
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During this period three men played an important part in establishing 
the freedom of press in India. They were James Silk Buckingham, an 
indefatigable fighter for press freedom, second Raja Ram Mohan Rai's 
three newspapers were cosidered as fraught with danger and likely to 
explode all over India like spark thrown into a barrel of gunpowder, be-
cause of resolutely opposing Hindu social and religious belief and Lord 
Hastings who adopted a benevolent attitude towards press because he 
real ised that most effective safeguard for the government was permit-
t ing ful l freedom of discussion by the press as this would serve to 
strengthen the hands of the administration.' '^ 
The same year in 1818, James Silk Buckingham started the 
Calcutta Journal. He was a strong critic of the East India Company's 
monopoly, taxation etc. In 1819, he was warned for attacking the then 
Governor of Madras and after few years in 1823 he was deported when 
Jhon Adam became the off iciating Governor - General. 
Meanwhile, Ganga Kishore Bhattacharya started the first Bengali 
Weekly paper Vangal Gazette. He was a man of progressive reformist 
ideas which reflected in his paper. Raja Ram Mohan's first Bengali 
tract on Sati was printed in that week l y . " 
In 1822 Raja Ram Mohan Rai had taken over the charge of 
Samvad Kaumudi, a vernacular paper. He also published one paper 
Miratool Akhabar in Persian. 
12. Mudhalkar: Press Law p.p 15-16 
13. Sophia Dawson: The Life and letters of Raja Ram Mohan Rai at p. 205 
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Within the fortnight of Buckingham's departure, Jhon Adam, the 
Acting Governor - General issued a nine point ordinance making prior 
registration and l icence of every publication compulsory. Six emineni 
Indians Including Raja Ram Mohan Rai presented a joint petition but it 
was lost and in protest Raja Ram Mohan Rai declared the closure of his 
papers. 
Lord William Bentinck was well aware of the att itude of Court of 
Directors towards the press in India. He was having a liberal attitude 
but certainly was not prepared to take any permanent measure to liber-
ate the press. When he fell ill and resigned Sir Charles Metcalf as-
sumed the office of Governor General. He could real ise the feeling of 
bondage. He wrote, "All India is looking for our downfall . The people 
every where would rejoice or fancy they would promote it by all 
means in their powerJ* 
Metcalf had an i n tu t i ona l love for the f r e e d o m of press. 
Inspite of his knowledge of the contrary v iews of his col leagues 
and the Court of Di rectors he decided to remove al l fet ters on press 
in India and f rame a uni form law for both European and Indian 
newspapers. He wi th the help of Macaulay, the Law member m his 
counci l p roposed to f rame a uniform law for both European ana 
Indian newspapers al l over India and to repea l the harsh press 
laws, p rescr ib ing l i cenc ing of newspapers and prov id ing for the 
summary ac t ion . 
14. Quoted in 'A History of Indian Journalism ' by Mohit Mitra at p.101 
49 
Maculay pointed out that licencing regulations were indefensible 
and should be repealed. He expressed the view that the licences to 
printout not to be refused or withdrawn except under very peculiar cir-
cumstances. Whi le agreeing with the views of the Lord Macaulay, the 
Governor - General expressed the view that as the press laws differed 
in different provinces the enactment of general law for the whole of In-
dia was indispensible. But there were others in the Governor - General's 
Council who emphasised the importance of the government keeping a 
watchful eye part icularly on the 'Native press'. However, the Council 
passed a new Act repealing the Bengal Regulations of 1823 and 
Bombay Press Regulations of 1825 and 1827 The new Act was made 
applicable to all the territories of the East India Company and required 
the printer and publisher to give a declaration about the precise loca-
tion of the premise of the publication. For this change of law Sir Charles 
Metcalf brought the displeasure of the Court of Directors but under the 
Metcalf 's Act of 1835 the press in India developed rapidly in the three 
province o fBenga l .Bombay and Madras."" Sir Edv\^ard Thompson on 
the progress of press in India said. 
In India Metcalf liberated the press as Governor General and 
it angered the directors and that powerful immovable mass, the re-
tired officials.^® 
The year 1835, when press was liberated by Metcalf thus marked 
a turning point in the history of Indian Press. However, a reaction had 
15. Sankhdhar, B.M: People Press & public opinion in India at p.88 
16. P.Sitaramiyya: The History of Indian National Congress at p. 19 
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already begun in 1826, with the publication of First Hindi Newspaper 
Oodunt Martund. From this year to 1857 the press kept dealing with 
Indian aspirat ions and awake the sleeping giants of this country 
When the news of removing all the restrictions over the press 
reached England, the Court of Directors became furious and dispatched 
a letter on 1st Feb 1836 which stated, " We are compelled to observe 
that this proceeding must be considered as the most unjustifiable in as 
much as it has been adopted by a Government only provisional; and 
also when a commission for framing a code of laws for the three presi-
dencies was about to commence its important labours/"^ 
Metcalf had to pay a very heavy price for his love for the freedom 
of press. Inspite of his just claim he was not made permanent Governor 
- General . The Court of Directors found another opportunity of slighting 
Metcalf when, in 1836, he was passed over for the Governorship of 
Madras. One of the Company's directors informed him that his freeing 
of press was unforgiven. 
Lord Auckland too, followed the foot steps of Metcalf and during 
his regime cordial relations existed between the press and the Govern-
ment. This att i tude also encouraged the establishment of new newspa-
pers. Five newspaper in Persian language were started. Among them 
Jamai - Jahannuma and Sultan - ul - Akhbar were more prominent 
Lord Ellenborough who succeeded Lord Auckland in 1842, how-
17. Quoted in 'A History of Indian Journalism ' By Mohit Mitra at p. 104 
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ever, had no sympathy for the press. This behaviour resulted in a wide 
gul f between the govemmentand the press. He directed tii at, "Official 
documents and papers were in no case to be made public or com-
municated to individuals without the previous consent of the Gov-
ernment to which alone they belong." The government issued instruc 
tions to newspapers prohibit ing publication of official orders and delib-
erations to which they could not have had access except through good 
offices of highly placed off icials. Thereafter a controversy arose as to 
what may be officially communicated to press and what should not and 
also by whom ? This laid the foundation of Official Secret Act Later 
on the idea of Government official publicity was evolved. 
The language newspapers devoted themselves to questions like 
Sati, Caste, widow remarriage, polygamy, the atrocities of the indigo 
planters and the blunder of young magistrates. The importance of na-
tive press by then had become very considerable. 
In 1856, Lord Canning became Governor General. He was unlike 
Dalhousie but the seeds sown by Dalhousie were to sprout. In fact the 
seeds had not been sown by any particular person but the ideology on 
which British imperialism was based. As soon as the mutiny broke out 
the government gagged the press with an ordinance akin to the press 
laws of 1823. The revolt aroused great apprehension in the mind of the 
government and it felt that sedit ion had been poured to an audicious 
extent into the hearts of the people of India. Lord Canning introduced 
Act XV of 1857 to regulate the establishment of the printing press ana 
to restrain the circulation of printing books and papers in India 
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The Act appl ied to every kind of publication, be it in English or in 
an Indian language owned by Indians or by Europeans. Therefore, the 
Act reintroduced the main features of the Adam's licencing Regula-
tions of 1828. The Act was applicable to the whole of India and was 
limited for a period of only one year. 
In 1860, when Indian Panel Code came up for f inal adoption, Lord 
Canning, sensing that the sedition section could be injudiciously used 
against the liberty of press, recommended its omission and the section 
was omitted. 
In 1861, the first constitutional advancement India Council's Act. 
1861 came up, and it st irred the public opinion and resulted in the es-
tablishment of a number of newspapers including the Pioneer (1865) 
The press in India took a new turn after the mutiny of 1857. It 
adopted nationalist ic approach in character and the aspirations. The 
vernacular press became more important as it appealed directly to the 
masses and spoke their own language. 
The rapid growth of Indian languages press made the governmeni 
rather uneasy. The official opinion hardened towards the language press 
and the diehards among them stressed the need for a more effective 
law than that which existed. As Mill says "^ people may be unprepareo 
for good institution: but to kindle a desire for them is a necessary pan 
of the preparation. To recommend and advocate a particular institution 
or form of Government, and set its advantages in the strongest light, is 
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one of the modes, after the mode within reach, of educating the mind ol 
nation, not only for accepting or claiming, but also for the working of the 
institution". ""^  
The Indian newspapers have already started to nourish the public 
mind on the important political issues. In 1864 Jhon Lawrence became 
the Viceroy and during his regime Act No. XXV of 1867 known as the 
Press and Registration of Books Act was promulgated to regulate the 
press and newspapers. 
In 1869 - 70 the Wahabi movement came to the light. The govern-
ment, therefore, felt the necessity of new measures to crush such ac-
t ivi t ies. Thereafter, Act XXVIII of 1870 was passed which again in-
serted sec.124-A I.P.C, omitted by Charles Metcalf in 1835.""^ 
" This section was quite vague in its language and was applied 
according to the wishes of the rulers. These Acts however, proved a 
blessing in disguise as the press became more conscious of itself and started 
to struggle for its own freedom. 
The Indian papers were advocating the idea of a national govern-
ment and their preachings prepared the people for a national struggle 
18. Mill, J.S: Representative Government at p. 11 
19. Sec. 124 - A I.P.C provided:" Who so - ever, by words, either spoken or intended to 
be read or by signs, or by visible representations or otherwise excites or attempts to 
excite feelings of disaffection to the government established by law in British India, 
shall be punished with transportation for life or any term, to which fine may be 
added, or with imprisonment which may extend to three years, to which fine may be 
added, or without fine." 
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With the Russio - Turkish war of 1876, which was joined by the English, people 
became crit ical of the foreign policy of the government. In the year 1877, 
the Press Association, headed by Surendra Nath Banerjee, waited on 
the then Viceroy and made a fervent appeal not to impose any strin-
gent restr ict ions on the language press. The Viceroy in his reply made 
no reference of the subject. In 1878, the Vernacular Press Act was 
passed. The salient provisions of this enactment were to place news-
papers published in the Indian languages under "better control" and to 
furnish the government with more effective means than the existing 
law provided for punishing and suppressing seditious writings. The Act 
empowered the government, if necessary to require the editor of a Ver-
nacular newspaper either to give a bond to print nothing calculated to 
excite disaffection or to submit its proof for censoring. In case of breach 
of this undertaking, the security deposits with the district magistrate 
would be confiscated. 
The Vernacular Press Act, instead of cowing down the language 
press produced exactly the opposite effect. The general tone of the 
newspapers was one of opposit ion to Government and its measures^" 
This hosti le attitude continued ti l l 1880 when Gladestone, who himself 
has cr i t ic ised the Act, as a leader of the opposit ion on July 23rd, 1878 
in the House of Commons, became the Prime Minister, gave direc-
tions to repeal the Act It was repealed in 1882 by Act llird of that 
year which however, maintained the powers of Post Office authorities 
to search for and seize any vernacular publication of a seditious na-
ture, and to seize any seditious material the importation of which had 
20 Op Cit note (12) at p. 20 
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had been prohibited under Sea Customs Act, 1875. 
With the advancement in public consciousness the press run by 
the Indians was gaining influence and strength. In the later part of 19th 
Century, The Government of India v\/as haunted by the spectre of sedi-
tion By a notification promulgated on 25th June, 1891, the Govern 
ment restricted the rights of the free press even in Indian states The 
notif ication prohibited the publication of a newspaper within the terri-
tory of a Native State without the permission of a poli t ical agent and 
the disobedience of the aforesaid order made one liable to forcible ex-
pulsion. 
In 1894, during the regime of Lord Elgin an amendment was made 
regarding sedition in Indian Panel Code. Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya writes 
about it " While the cronic sores of abridged jury powers, and com-
bined judicial and executive functions were still festering and showeo 
no signs of improvement, new ulcer broke out in the body politics in 
1897 which brought to light regulation III of 1818 (Bengal), II of 1819 
(Madras) and XXV of 1827 (Bombay) under which anybody could be 
deported without trial. This was applied to the Sirdar Natu who by the 
time the Congress of 1897 met had been imprisoned over five months "^ ^ 
Secret Press Committees were established in 1898 which provoked 
a vehement protest from Mr. W.A. Chambers at the 14th Congress. These 
committees acted as thinly vei led censor. Another amendment was 
passed amending Section 124 -A of Indian Penal Code^^ 
21. Op Git note (16) at p. 36 
22. 124 - A Whoever by words, either spoken or written or by signs, or by visible 
representation or otherwise, brings or attempts, or excites or attempts ot excite 
disaffection towards her majesty or the Government established by law in British 
India, shall be punished with transportation for life or any shorter term , to which 
fine may be added or with Contd: 
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In July the same year Amba Prasad, the proprietor, editor and 
publisher of newspaper called the Jamil-ul- Ulam was charged for se-
dition under the aforesaid law. 
The closure of century thus, saw a crit ical state of affairs while 
the public clamoured for polit ical advancement the government did not 
respond to their call and this led even to few terrorist movements in 
20th Century. 
Contd: imprisonement which may extend to three years, towhich fine 
may be added or without fine. 
57 
During The 20th Century 
Pre - Independence Period 
early 20th Century period has been described by S. Natrajan 
as " amazing ly hyster ical per iod which the press in India passea 
through". Further Gokhle's remark that, "no where was the press so 
weak in inf luence as it was in India" was borne out by the fact that the 
Government promulgated an ordinance and enacted laws to control 
public meetings (1907), followed by the Newspapers (Incitement to 
offences) Act, 1908. Under the provisions of this Act, power was given 
to a magistrate to seize a printing press if he was convinced that a 
newspaper printed therein contained any incitement to murder or to an 
act of violence or to an offence under the Explosive substance Act 
1908. Power was conferred on the magistrate to make the conditional 
order absolute either by an ex-parte decision in an emergency or after 
hearing the evidence from persons concerned against the order How-
ever an appeal could have been made to the High Court within 15 days 
of order being made. The effect of this harsh law was that several news-
papers, which expressed sympathy with terrorist activities, ceased pub-
l ication in 1908. 
M e a n w h i l e two i nc iden ts o c c u r e d . On Nov, 18, 1909, in 
Ahmedabad, a bomb narrowly missed the carriage in which Lord and 
Lady Minto were travelling. And in Nasik on Dec. 21 , a magistrate A.M.P. 
Jackson was shot dead by extremists. In order not to allow the press 
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from highlighting such incidents from nationalistic point of view, the 
Indian Press Act 1910, was passed 
The Act increased Government control over the printing presses 
and publishers. The most harsh provision was that all proprietors who 
had made a declaration under the Act of 1867, for the first time, were 
required to deposit security of Rs 500/- to Rs 2000/- unless it was waivea 
by the local magistrate. This security was to be forfeited in all cases 
where the matter contained in the newspaper had a tendency, directly 
or indirectly, whether by inference, suggestion, allusion, metaphor, im-
pl icat ion or otherwise, to incite to murder or to any offence under the 
Explosive Substances Act, 1908, or to any act of violence, or to seduce 
any officer from his allegiance or his duty, to put any person in fear or 
incite any person to interfere with the administration of law or the main-
tenance of law and order and so on. Similarly a newspaper printed and 
publ ished in India could not have been transmitted through post unless 
a declarat ion was made as required under Sec. 5 of the Press and Reg-
istration of Books Act, 1867; and the publishers had deposited security 
when so required under this Act. Custom and Postal authorit ies were 
authorised to detain and search suspicious mail. Once a security was 
forfei ted, a person was required to make a fresh declaration with a 
higher amount than the first, and on third occassion, if an offence was 
al leged, the security deposited, the printing press used for printing the 
newspaper and all copies of such newspapers were forfeited In all dur-
ing 1910 - 1914, 355 cases were init iated against the printing presses. 
Vernacular Publications were main tartget of the attack and between 
1917 to 1920 some 963 newspapers and printing presses which had 
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existed before the Press Act of 1910, had been proceeded against un-
der the A c t . " 
Lord Chemsford became the Viceroy of India in 1916. He used 
the Press Act with severity and too often. Mrs. Besant was prohibited 
from entering the Bombay Presidency by Lord Wili ingdon under the 
Defence of India Act 1914. In Bengal, the number of young men in. 
ran up to nearly three thousand. The Congress urged the governmeni 
to repeal immediately the Defence of India Act, The Press Act, The 
Seditious Meetings Act, The Criminal Law Amendment Act and simi-
lar other repressive measures.^'* 
Far from responding to the Indian public opinion to repeal these 
Acts, the Government adopted harsh measures. The conduct of Gen. 
Dyar and Lt. Governor of Punjab O'Dwyer came in for strong condem-
nation in Indian Press. The position had become intolerable and a Press 
Law Committee was appointed under the Chairmanship of Sir Tei 
Bahadur Sapru. The journal ists deposed before the committee testi-
fied that Anglo - Indian Press was free to make most violent attack 
against them but if they replied they found themselves prosecuted for 
spreading hatred. 
The Press Committee was of the view that the special reasons (to 
crush the promotion of revolutionary conspiracies) for which these Acts 
were passed are over and the purpose of these Acts may be served by 
the ordinary laws by incorporating the provisions in the Act of 1910 of 
23. Agrawal, S.K: Press at the Crossroads in India at p.34 
24. Op Cit note (12) at p. 24 
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seizure and confiscation of seditious publications in the Press and Reg-
istration of Books Act, the Sea - Customs Act and the Post Office Act 
by suitable amendments. Therefore, it recommended to repeal the Acts 
1908 and 1910 which was done accordingly by Press Law Repeal and 
Amendment Act, 1922 
In April 1931, Lord Willingdon became the Viceroy of India Un-
sympathetic to the nationalist movement he adopted the policy of non-
concilation with nationalist leaders and Indian Press (Emergency Pow-
ers) Act,1931 was passed. This was described as an Act to provide 
against the publ icat ion of matter inciting to or encouraging murder or 
violence. This Act imposed on the press an obl igat ion to furnish secu-
rity at the call of the executive. This security was liable to be forfeited 
if the press publ ished any matter by which any of the mischivous acts 
enumerated in Sec. 4 of the Act were furthered eg. bringing the Gov-
ernment into hatred or contempt or inciting disaffection towards the 
Government, incit ing feelings of enmity and hatred between different 
classes of subjects, including a public servant to resign or neglect his 
duty. This Act was, in fact, an antiquated revival of trial by Star Cham-
ber of Press offences and the licencing system which English democ-
racy had fought and suppressed. The Draconian law hampered the 
growth of press in India. Various reputed newspapers, advocating na-
tionalistic approach like Amrit Bazar Patrika, Al-balagh by Maulana 
Azad and numerous other were persecuted. 
The British Governement tightened its grip on the printed matter 
with the begining of the World War II. The censorship machinery was 
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revived v^ith a chief censor and advisory committees in each prov-
ince. Later on the Press (Speical Powers) Act, 1947 was passed It 
declared that it is an act to continue certain special powers conferred 
on the administration for the better control of the dissemination of un-
desirable matter. Under the provisions of the Act power was conferred 
upon the Provincial Government to prohibit or regulate any matter which 
tends directly or indirectly to promote feel ings of enmity or hatred be-
tween different classes of His Majesty's subject. (Sec. 4) It also em-
powered to prohibit or regulate the entry into or sale or distr ibution or 
circulat ion and publication in a province (Sec. 5). Moreover, this Act 
also empowered the executive to take preventive measures in the form 
of forfeiture and seizure of a newspaper or any other document (Sec. 
6). 
The Act was made applicable to Chief Commissioner's Province 
and was in force up to Dec. 1949. 
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POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD 
A fter achieving independence on Aug. 15, 1947, the Govern-
ment of India in the same year appointed a Press laws Enquiry Com-
mittee. The Committee submitted its report in May 1948 v^^here it rec-
ommended to repeal Indian States (protection) Act, 1934, the Indian 
Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, and repeal of Foreign Rela-
tions Act, 1932, and its replacement with a new comprehensive legis-
la t ion . However, it recommended the retention of Official Secret 
Act,1923, and Section 124-A,153 - A and 505 of the Indian Penal Code 
deal ing with disaffection towards legally established Government, com-
munal hatred and tempering with the loyality of the armed forces.^^ 
In the Constituent Assembly Dr. Ambedkar the Chairman of 
the Constitution Drafting Committee made it clear that the freedom 
of speech and expression also includes the freedom of Press. But the 
circumstances after the country got the independence, deteriorated. The 
part i t ion of country had taken place on communal lines resulting into 
hatred and mutual suspicion among two major communities named, Hin-
dus and Muslims. The press too could not remain unaffected and, there 
fore, to curb this menace two steps were taken by the Government. 
f irst the consititution was amended in June 1951 whereby three grounds 
(a) fr iendly relations with foreign states; (b) public order, and (c) in-
citement to an offence were added under Article 19 (2) as reasonable 
25. Op Git note (23) at p. 43 
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restrictions. And Secondly in October 1951 the Press Objectionable 
Matters Act, was passed. This legislation was similar to those which 
were passed during 1910, and 1931. The press raised much hue and 
cry over this Act as a result it was allowed to lapse. It was finally m 
1952, Nehru announced the appointment of a Press Commission It 
composed of Dr. Zakir Hussein, M. Chalpati Rao and Justice G.S. 
Rajadhayksha. The commission beside favouring emergency legisla-
tion rather than incorporation of the provisions of 1951, Act into Indian 
Penal Code, improvement of working conditions, salary and benefits for 
the journalists and vesting administrative control to editor over the staff 
recommended the establishment of Press Council which came into ex-
istence in 1966 through Press Council Act, 1965 
During the Nehru era press enjoyed enormous freedom as he was 
a democrat to his heart and soul. He strongly favoured the editorial 
independence and detested proprietal interference in the running of the 
papers. Even during the Chinese aggression in 1962 when an emer-
gency was declared and Defence of India Act was passed to deal with 
the situation, the restrictions imposed on the press were minimal 
In contrast to Nehru's era, Mrs. Gadhi's period, marked the con-
frontation between the Government and the press. Visibly there were 
two reasons. First - The Indian Press by that time had gained maturity 
and had started to react more freely second, Mrs. Gandhi's chair was 
being challenged by the old Congressmen and her action of nationalising 
the banks, insurance companies and abolit ion of privy purse made the 
business community suspicious and frightened resulting in adverse com-
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merits in press owned by this strong lobby. 
On June 12, 1975, a historic judgement was del ivered by Justice 
Jagmohan Sinha of Allahabad High Court, declar ing Mrs Gandhi s 
election from Rae Bareilly constituency of Uttar Pradesh, invalid for 
adopting corrupt electoral practices in the 1971 parl iamentary elections 
and barred her from contesting any election or holding a polit ical office 
for a period of six years. Mrs. Gandhi f i led an appeal against the judge-
ment and Justice Krishna - Iyer ruled that she may remain the Prime 
Minister conditionally (she was not entitled to part icapte in the busi-
ness of parliament or to vote but could speak in either house) This 
decision further complicated her position and her resignation was de-
manded by all quarters. 
On June 25, 1975, Mrs. Gandhi recomended the president to de-
clare the emergency under Article 352 of the Constitution on the ground 
of internal disturbances which was done accordingly i On the same day 
all prominent leaders of opposit ion were arrested and the newspapers 
run by these parties were banned. Many journal ists were also arrested 
and among them was Kuldeep Nayer, an internationally acclaimed jour-
nalist. However, timely action of Delhi High Court saved him . 
Few foreign journal ists including Peter Hazelhurst of London 
Times, Loren Jenkins of News week, Peter Gill of London Daily, 
Lewis. M. Simpson of the Washington Post and most notably Mark 
Tully of B.B.C were expelled from the country 
During this per iod, Central Censorship orders were passed and 
65 
no news, comment or rumour or other reports relating to an action taken 
by the government in accordance with the proclaimation of emergency, 
( Maintenance of Internal - Security Act, 1971, Defence of India Act. 
1971 and other Acts come into force) could have been published with-
out their f irst being submitted for scrutiny to an authorised officer ot 
the Government. The Chief Censor was given total responsibil ity to 
enforce these measures. 
During emergency three enactments which had already come into 
existence were passed. First, The Press Council (Repeal) Act, 1976 
by this Act the Press Council Act was repealed and the Press Council 
const i tuted under the Act was abolished on the ground that it had failed 
to ful f i l l the objective with which it had been set up.,But in fact the ac-
tual and proximate reason for this action was that Press Council seemed 
likely to pronounce against K.K. Biria, a proprietor of Hindustan Times 
and a supporter of emergency regime.^^ 
The second enactment was Parliamentary Proceeding (Protec-
tion of Publication) Act, 1976 which eliminated the Parlimentary pro-
ceedings (Protection of Publication) Act which was on statute book since 
1956. This was a retrograde step and P.G. Mavlankar, an independent 
member said, " the record (of parliamentary proceedings) may 
have every thing for the future historians, but people of the present 
generation will not known what is taking place in parliament".^^ 
26. Raghvan, G. N ; The Press in India. A New History at p. 139 
27. Ibid 
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Beside repealig these Acts during emergency another enactment 
prevention of publication of Ojectionable Matter Act, 1976 was also 
passed ^^  for government's view, the press in India had been abusing 
its freedom by vil ifying high dignatories which reached at its climax 
after High Court judgement in elect ion case against Mrs, Gandhi. It was 
infact a reproduction of 1951 Act with some improvements with the 
requirement of Art. 19 (2) of the Constitut ion. 
In General Election of 1977, a coalit ion of various parties known 
as Janta Party defeated Congress and came into power. The muzzled 
Press viewed it as a indication of democrary. The Prime Minister Morarji 
Desai after assuming office, in an interview said "fundamental rights 
should never be touched v/hether, there is an emergency or not. 
They must be maintained under the Constitution." He translated this 
belief by proceeding to dismantle the provisions of emergency by in-
s t i tu t ing safeguard of press. 
The first step taken by his government was to repeal the Preven-
tion of Publication of Objectionable, Matter Act, 1976 by passing a 
repea l ing Act on 9th April, 1977. On the same day Parliamentary 
Preceedings (Protection of Publication) Act, 1971 which had been 
repealed by a repealing Act of 1976, was passed. A constitutional amend-
ment was also made by which Art, 361 - A was inserted which provided 
the constitutional protection to the aforesaid laws. Some other amend-
ments were also made in the provisions providing for emergency 
[These amendments are discussed in detail in Chapter 3{b)(ii)] 
28, Section 5 of the Act empowered a District Magistrate to direct that any matter 
relating a particular subject or class of subjects may not be published for a 
period of two months. 
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The next step which the Desai's Government took was passing oi 
The Press Council Act, 1978, with a more representat ion, composition 
and improved provisions, Desai's Government also appointed the Sec-
ond Press Commission to look into all aspects of press laws in India 
But this government could not last beyond July 1979 and in 1980 Mrs 
Gandhi again came into power. She re-constituted the Press Com-
mission in 1980. It sumbitted its report in 1982, however, no speciai 
legislation has been passed til l date in pursuance of the recommenda-
tions of this Commission. 
Though the press praised Mr. Desai for l iberating the press from 
shackles but it could not ignore the polit ical, economic and social chaos 
in the country. 
In the words of Prof. D.D. Basu, "Whatever may be the success 
or failure of Janta Government's rule for two years," he continues 
"the press ought to be grateful to them for removing all the fetters 
that had been imposed on the press during emergency regime".^^ 
Soon after Mrs. Gandhi sworn in as Prime Minister she was con-
fronted with quest ion of press censorship during emergency She gave 
the following reply. 
'Censorship Was a special remedy for a very severe, acute dis-
ease. We dont think that particular disease will hit the country again 
nor do we want to give the same medicine. 
29. Basu. D.D: Law of the Press at p. 261 
68 
Rajiv Gandhi started well with the press. In early days of his Prime 
Ministership he was of the opinion that press should be absolutely free 
and inturn expected the press to present the correct picture of the coun-
try to the people. However, Rajiv's cordial relations with press did not 
last long because of his two statements, f irst defending the emergency 
and reiterat ing that if the conditions as that of 1975 crop up again, he 
would not hesitate to impose the emergency and second, he categori-
cally rejected the idea of giving autonomy to radio and television and 
said that electronic media could not funct ion the way press behaved.^" 
His relations with the press further deteriorated after income tax 
raids on big business houses and Bofors scandal in later part of 1985 
and early 1986 leading scathing remarks by the press against the gov-
ernment. Rajiv Gandhi blamed that press had changed its attitude sud-
denly after the government began taking action against erring indus-
tr ial ists including the press barons. A Bill was also introduced in the 
Parliament in 1988 known as Defamation Bill. This raised a great hue 
and cry in the press (as it was feared that when the Bill becomes the 
Act, it would be used frequently against the press). Consequently the 
Bill was withdrawn. 
Similarly during the period after independence in various states 
also either different laws are passed which affect the press or few Bills 
were introduced in different State Assemblies in the guise of maintain-
ing law and order. 
30. Op Cit note (23) at p. 65 
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During the regime of Mr. V.P. Singh, Mr. P.V. Narsimha Rao and 
H.D. Devegowda, th epress has so far been free from any notable re-
strictions. 
The above discussion makes it clear beyond any doubt that there 
has been no smooth sailing for the press from the earliest times. It has 
been tested time and again by different kind of laws which were felt 
necessary in pre-independence as well as in post - independence era 
by different regimes at different times. Nevertheless press has survivea 
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CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES 
Framing of Article 19 (1) (a) 
?' ven before India achieved her independence in 1947, the Con-
stituent Assembly had begun its del iberat ions. As the f i rst great 
achievement,the Assembly adopted the historic Objectives Resolution 
on 22nd Jan 1947 moved by Pt. Nehru. This formed the basis not only 
of various provisions of the Constitution but of its preamble also. The 
Assembly declared in its resolution its firm resolve to draw up a const i -
tut ion, guaranteeing, inter alia. Freedom of thought and expression.' ' 
After adopting the aforesaid resolut ion, on 24th Jan 1947, the Ad-
visory Committee on Fundamental Rights, Minorities etc came into 
existence by a resolution proposed by Pt. Govind Ballabh Pant who 
expressed the hope that the Advisory Committee would function keep-
ing in mind the ideals of humanity.^ 
The Advisory Committe in its first meeting on 27th Febraury 1947. 
setup f ive Sub - Committees including one on Fundamental Rights. 
Achariya Kriplani was elected the chairman of Sub - Committee^ 
1. C.A.DVol. latp.p. 58-59 
2. Rao, B.S. : The framing of India's Constitution Select Documents Vol II p.p. 58-63 
3. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, Mrs. Hansa Mehta, M.R. Masani, K.T. Shah, A.K. Ayyar,K.M. 
Munshi, Hamam Singh, Maulana A.K. Azad, BR. Ambedkar, Jairamdas Daulat Ram, 
and K.M. Panikkarwere the other members of the Sub-committee. 
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In its meeting on 24th March 1947 the Sub - Ctmmittee consid-
ered the various documents presented before it which consisted of all 
proposals, suggestions and memoranda on fundamental rights preparea 
by B.N.Rau and others members. The Sub - Committee decided to take 
up Munshi 's draft for consideration. Article (V) of the draft dealt with 
the freedom of expression. It provided: 
(1) Every cit izen within the limits of the law of the union and in accor-
dance therewith has : 
(a) The right of free expression of opinion; 
(2) The press shall be free subject to such restrictions imposed by the 
law of the union as in its t p i n i t n may be necessary in the interest 
of public order and morality.* 
The Sub-Committe resolved that the right should be extended only 
to the cit izens and accordingly the clause was revised and ran as fol-
lowing. 
There should be liberty for the exercise of followig rights, subject 
to public order and morality: (a) the right of the citizens to freedom o/ 
speech and expression. The publication or utterances of seditious, ob-
scene, slanderous libelous or defamatory matter shall be actionable or 
punishable in accordance with the law. 
B.N. Rau, on the basis of recommendations of the Sub - Commit-
tee prepared a draft report and submitted before it on 3rd April 1947 
4. Some other drafts were also presented before the Sub.Committee. Dr. Ambakdar's 
draft laid emphasis on fundamental rights, he did not feel it necessary to justify the 
inclusion of these rights in the constitution as he observed that their necessity and 
importance have received an express recognition in almost Contd ; 
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for i ts cons i de ra t i on . This annexure of draf t repor t conta ined two chap-
te rs ; the f i rs t chap te r enumerated j us t i c i ab l e r ights whi le the second 
chap te r i nc l uded non - jus t ic iab le r ights . The r ight to f reedom of speech 
and exp ress ion f i gu red as jus t i c iab le r ight under c lause (9) wh ich pro-
v i ded . 
"There shall be liberty for the exercise of following rights 
subject to public order and morality, (a) The right of every citizen 
to freedom of speech and expression. The publication or utterances 
of seditious, obscene, slanderous, libelous or defamatory mattei 
shall be actionable or punishable in accordance with law.^ 
The Sub - Commit tee dra f ted the r igh ts dur ing the ten meet ings 
Contd: every constitution of the world. 
Prof. K.T. Shah in his note stressed that the basic objective of the 
constitution was the protection or guarantee of life, liberty and persuit of happiness 
as the birth right of all the human beings. He categorised these rights as political, 
civil, economic and social. He placed the 'right of speech' written or by means ot 
press' under clause (9) of his draft as Political Right. To give the right more effective-
ness be under caluse (11) freed it from censorship by any public authority 
A.K. Ayyar concentrated upon the need for making a distinction between nghts 
which were justiciable and rights which were merely intended as a guide and directing 
objectives to state policy He was of the opinion that all the justiciable rights should be 
formulated in very general and comprehensive terms. 
Sardar Hamam Singh's draft on the other hand sought to give express recognition 
to the right to equality before the law and the freedom of the press. 
Thus all the members highlighted the importance of the fundamental rights and 
expressed the view that these rights must be given due constitutional recognition Bui 
simultaneously they opined that these rights can not be absolute in nature and restrictions 
may be placed upon them, whenever necessary. 
5. Commenting on the draft report Prof. Shah observed that freedoms guaran-
teed under Article 9 have been subjected to "public order and morality" He 
pointed out with the help of various instances that the term morality is very 
vague and its connotation changes from time to time, and in the guise of this 
'public morality' in various countries basic freedoms have been denied to the 
citizens. He stressed the need for defining the term suitably or to drop this 
exception Contd: 
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held in March - Apri l 1947. Early in the Apri l it passed its tentative conclu-
sions to the Sub-Committee on Minorities of the Advisory Committee. (It has 
already drafted its first report on 4th Apri l 1947). Therefore,, considering the 
recommendat ions made by Sub-Committee on Minorit ies and reconsidering 
their own draft report, the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights submitted 
its report on 16th April 1947 to the Advisory Committee.^ 
Contd: A.K. Ayyar drew the attention of the Sub -Committee towards the fact that few 
rights have been made subject to "public morality" while the others have not been 
subjected to this qualification. He pointed out that there may be circumstances 
ie. war time or a similar emergency where it would be difficult to bring such 
cases under public order and morality. In this regard he made a reference to 
the Defence of India Act as well as rules made thereunder and desired thai 
the words "Security and Defence of the state or National Security" be added 
to the words public order. Similarly with regard to freedom of speech and 
expression, he stressed the need of examining the provisions in the tight of 
Sec. 153 - A of Indian Penal Code. He pleaded for the inclusion of words or 
"calculated to promote class hatred" as he feared that in clause 9 (a) refer-
ence to "obscene, slanderous and libelous utterances" migh give an impres-
sion that preaching class hatred might not come under that clause 
6. Under this draft report the freedom of speech and expression was guaran 
teed under clause (10) in the following words: 
There shall be liberty for the exercise of the following rights subject to 
public order and morality or to the existence of grave emergency declared to 
be such by the Government of the Union or the unit concerned wherby the 
security of the Union or the Unit as the case may be, is threatened: 
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The Advisory Commit tee on Fundamenta l Right and Minor t ies met 
on 21 St Apr i l to d iscuss the recommenda t ions made by the Sub-Commit -
tee on Fundamenta l Rights.^ The Adv isory Commit tee submi t ted , its 
i n te r im repor t to the Const i tuent Assembly on 29th Apri l 1947 The 
Commi t t ee observed that it has g iven due c redence to the v iew that 
f u n d a m e n t a l r ights shou ld be made jus t i c iab le and laid s t ress on the 
need to make adequate p rov is ions to def ine the scope of the remedies 
for the enforcement of Fundamen ta l Rights. 
T. A.K. Ayyar conveyed his intention of moving certain amendments 
to the report submitted by the Sub - Committee. He wanted to include 
the words "likely to promote class hatred" in clause (10) of the draft 
report. He pointed out that most of the things enumerated are governea 
by penal code and, therefore, the words "class hatred have to be added 
because it was not covered under "defamation" or "sedit ion" failing 
which people may get l icence to promote class hatred.Shyama Prasad 
Mukherjee raised his apprehension about the viability of these words 
but C. Rajgopalachar i vehemently supported A.K. Ayyar as he was of 
the view that fundamental peace and orderly progress of the country is 
possible only when the communal peace and harmony exist in the coun-
try. 
K.M. Munshi while expressing a contrary view felt that the right 
of free expression which have the effect of promoting communal ha-
tred should be restricted only when it goes to the extent of causing 
violence or crime. Bakshi Tek Chand also lended his support to this 
view. Hence it was decided that it should be limited to the occassion 
when there was grave danger to public order and so the original clause 
was sufficient to cover the situation. The proposed amendment was 
lost and after redrafting by the committee the said right [(which till now 
was as clause 10)] was renumbered as clause 8 with amended provisio. 
Thus Clause 8 (a) providing for freedom of speech and expression ran into 
following words. 
There shall be liberty for the exercise of the following rights subject to 
public order and morality or to the existence of grave emergency declared to 
be such by the Government of the Union or the Unit, as the case may be, is 
threatened. 
(a) The right of every citizen to freedom of speech and expression 
Provisions may be made by law to make the publication or utterance 
of seditious, obscene, blasphemous, slanderous, libelous, or defamatory 
matter actionable or punishable. 
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In the Constituent Assemb ly , Pt. H. N. Kunzru r a i sed doub ts about the 
jus t i c iab le charac te r of ce r ta in r ights as the impos i t i on of var ious re-
s t r i c t ions on the exe rc i se of r ights destroy the i r j us t i c i ab le charactor 
He re fe r red as an examp le c lause (8) of the repor t . Some other mem-
bers also echoed the same view. At this Junc tu re Pate l d ispe l led the 
doubts of members say ing that it was only a cons i de ra t i on stage and 
the members were f ree to move amendments . ' 
The Cons t i t uen t Assemb ly after discussing the report sent it to the 
Constitutional Advisor B.N. Rau alongwith amendments to be incorporated in 
the Draft Consti tut ion and for further consideration by Drafating Committee 
which it appointed through a resolution which read as: 
8. Sardar Patel moved the clause (8) for the consideration of Con-
stituent Assembly but dropped the provision to the said clause Somnath 
Lahiri moved an amendment so that follwoing provision may be added 
to existing clause 8 (a). "Liberty of the press shall be guaranteed sub-
ject to such restrictions as may be imposed by law in the interest o/ 
public order or morality, (b) The press shall not be subjected to cen-
sorship and shall not be subsidised. No security shall be demanded foi 
keeping a press or the publication of any book or other printed matter. 
But the proposal was opposed by some members as in their view it was 
quite independent and might be considered later on." 
Lahiri's another proposed amendment sought the substitution of 
the words "defence of union" in place of the "security of the union" He 
also pleaded for the deletion of the word "sedit ion" from clause (8) He 
feared that it was very vague and may be abused by the Government 
but Patel pointed out that the word "defence" covered only an external 
aspect of the security and did not indicate any thing about the internal 
chaos, the amendment was put to vote and consequently lost. 
K.M. Munshi sought a change in the opening words of clause (8) 
and observed that the words "except in grave emergency" should re-
place the words "to the existence of grave emergency" as the words 
sought to be inserted sound a better sense Contd 
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To scrutnise the draft of the text of Constitution as prepared by 
the Constitutional Advisor, giving effect to the decisions, already taken 
by Constituent Assembly including ancilliary methods which should be 
provided in such a constitution, and to submit to the Constituent As-
0 
sembly the Draft Constitution as prepared by the Committee." 
The Drafting Committee after scrutinising the Draft Constitution and 
material before it prepared a draft of the revised Constitution of India 
and submitted it to the Constituent Assembly on 21st Feb, 1948. Under 
this Draft Const i tut ion the right to freedom of speech and expression 
fell under Art icle 13 which provided: 
(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Article, all citizens shah 
have the right (a) to freedom of speech and expression 
Contd: The amendment was accepted. Thus the Clause(8) as approved by the 
Constitutent Assembly after amendment provided. 
There shall be liberty for the exercise of follwoing rights subject to 
public order and morality and except in grave emergency declared to be such 
by the Government of the Union or the unit concered, as the case may be. is 
threatened: (a) the right of every citizen to freedom of speech and expres-
sion. 
Provision may be made by law to make the publication or utterance oi 
seditious, obscene balsphemous, slanderous or defamatory matter action-
able or punishable. 
9. Dr. B.R. Ambadkar was elected the Chairman of the Drafting Commit-
tee at its first meeting held on 27th October 1947. 
The Drafting Committee decided to revise sub - clause (1) of clause 
15 of Rau's Draft and suggested the omission of the reference to the "minori-
ties" from sub - clause (3) 
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(2) Nothing in sub - clause (a) of clause (1) of this article shall affect 
the operation of any existing law or prevent the state from making 
any law, relating to libel, slander, defamation, sedition or any other 
matter which offends decency or morality or undermines the au-
thority or foundation of the state."^^ 
10. This Draft Const i tu t ion prepared by Drafting Committee was pub-
lished and the copies were sent to each member of the Const i tuent 
Assembly, Provinc ia l Leg i s la tu re , Prov inc ia l Government, Federal 
Cour t and the High Cou r t s i nv i t i ng comments and sugges t ions 
After receiving comments and suggestions the Committee again mei 
to consider it. 
Jaya Prakash Narayan wanted the redrafting of Ar t ic le 13 as ac-
cording to him the rights guaranteed were taken away by subsequent 
restrictions. He also wanted to incorporate an independent provision 
guaranteeing the freedeom of press. His suggestions could not find 
favour as it was made clear by Dr. Ambedkar that freedom of press 
was implicit in the freedom of speech and expression. The Drafting 
Committee further decided to substitute the words "security of. or tends 
to overthrow" for the words "authority or foundation" in sub - clause (2) 
of Article 13. The Drafting Committee, therefore, prepared a revised 
draft in the light of comments and suggestions and presented to Con-
stituent Assembly for its considerat ion. 
Various amendments were proposed at this stage of consider-
ation by the Constituent Assembly. These amendments were moveo 
by Mihir Lai Chatopadhaya, K.T.Shah, Naziruddin, Bhopinder Singh Man 
and Seth Govind Das. Most of the proposed amendments were lost 
when put to vote. 
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This Draft Constitution, with the amendments adopted by Assem-
bly, was then referred again to Draft ing Committee with instructions to 
carry out such renumbering of the articles, clauses, and sub - clauses, 
such revision of punctuation and such revision and completion of mar-
ginal notes as might be necessary, and to recommend such formal or 
consequential or necessary amendments to the Constitution as might 
be required. Thereafter, it was revised and re-numbered as Article 19 
which provided:'''' 
(1) All citizens shall have the right-
(a) to freedom of speech and expression 
(2) Nothing in sub - clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the op-
eration of any existing law in so far as it relates to libel. 
slander, defamation, contempt of court or any matter which 
offends against decency or morality or which undermines the 
security of, or tends to overthrow the state". 
Finally the Draft Consti tut ion was adopted on 26th Nov. 1949 and 
the p res iden t of C o n s t i t u e n t Assemb ly Dr. Ra jendra P r a s a d 
authenciated it by putting his signature so that the Bill became an Act "''^  
The deliberations held during the entire drafting of the Constitu-
tion clearly show that almost at every stage the issue of a separate 
provision for the press was discussed. But the demand was not accepted 
as Dr. Ambedkar did not acceed their demand by saying that "Press is 
merely another way of stating an individual or a citizen. The press has 
11. When it was finally drafted, it contained 395 Articles and Eight Sched-
ules and was submitted to the President of Constituent Assembly Dr 
Rajendra Prasad on 3rd Nonvermber 1949. 
12. C.A.D. Vol. XI at p. 995 
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no special rights which are not to be given or which are not to be exer-
cised by the citizen in his individual capacity. The editor of a press oi 
the manager are all citizens and, therefore, when they choose to write 
in newspapers, they are merely exercising their right of expression ana 
in my judgement, therefore, no special mention is necessary of the free-
dom of press at all/*^ 
The freedom of speech and expression as enshrined under Ar-
ticle 19 (1)(a) unl ike other freedoms guaranteed under Article 19 was 
not made subject to the reasonableness of restr ict ions. The omission OT 
the world ' reasonable ' in Article 19(2) conferred wide powers upon the 
government leaving little scope for the courts to struck down the re-
striction even if the same was disproportionate than required. 
However,The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951,was 
made to remove diff icult ies arising Out of Supreme Court's decisions in 
Brij Bhushan and Romesh Thappar cases. The amendment beside re -
arranging the provision dropped the words ' l ibe l ' and slander' but in-
cluded other grounds namely public order, f r iendly relations with for-
eign states and incitement to an offence and also included the words 
"reasonable" and "in the interest of" before the restrictions. Thus, the 
amendment clearly brought out the intention of legislatures to empower 
the High Courts and the Supreme Court to interfere whenever the free-
dom is encroched on any ground not included under Article 19 (2),and 
protect this cher ished freedom of the cit izens. 
13. C.A.D. Vol VII at p. 780 
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The provision was again amended by Constitution (sixteenth 
Amendment) Act, 1963 which added one more ground ie. "the sover-
eignty and integrity of India" in clause (2) of Art ic le 19. And presently 
Article 19 run as following -
"19 (1) All citizens shall have the right-
(a) to freedom of speech and expression 
(2) Nothing in sub - clause (a)to clause (1) shall affect the operation 
of any existing law, or prevent the state from making any law, m 
so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exer-
cise of right conferred by the said sub - clause in the interests ol 
the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the state, 
friendly reltions with foreign states, public order, decency or mo-
rality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or mcitemenl 
to an offence" 
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SCOPE OF THE FREEDOM 
Constitution of India was enacted, adopted and given to them-
selves by the people of India with a view to constitute India into a sovereign 
democratic republic and to secure among other things, liberty of thought and 
expression for all its citizens.''^ 
Article 19 contained in part III of the Constitution guarantees the free-
dom of speech and expression into following words. 
Article 19 (1) "All citizens shall have the right 
(a) to freedom of speech and expression 
(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause(1) shall affect the operation of any 
existing law, or prevent the state from making any law. in so far as 
such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right 
conferred by the said sub-clause in the interest of sovereignty and 
integrity of India, the security of the state, friendly relations with for-
eign states, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to con-
tempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offence". 
A plain reading of Article 19 makes it clear that unlike American Con-
stitution, our Constitution does not contain any guarantee of freedom of press 
14. Preamble to the Constitution of India 
> 
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in express terms. The discussion on the Article 1 9 " in the Constituent As-
sembly as well as judicial decisions, however ""^  have proved it beyond any 
doubt that the f reedom of press is included in the right to freedom ot 
speech and expression. 
Article 19, therefore, on the one hand guarantees the freedom of press 
but simultaneously, also places reasonable restrictions on the exercise of 
this right on the grounds mentioned under Article 19(2). The freedom of press, 
thus isnot absolute under Article 19(1)(a) and may be curtailed on the grounds 
mentioned under Article 19(2). 
Apart from the restrictions which may be placed under Article 19(2)^ 
the right may be taken away, completely under Art icle 358 when a 
Proclaimation of Emergency is in force. Therefore, for the better understand-
ing of the subject the study may be undertaken as following. 
(A) Freedom during peace time; and 
(B) Freedom during emergency. 
15. The Article was numbered as Article 13 when Drafting Committee presented 
it before the Constitution Assembly. It appeared as Article 19 only in the 
final Draft Constitution. On 4th Nov. 1948 Dr. Ambedkar. Chairman of Draft-
ing Committee of the Constitution made it clear that the right to freedom of 
speech and expression includes the press when some members wanted to in-
clude an express provision guaranteeing the said freedom 
16. Right from the Romesh Thappar (AIR 1950 S.C. 124) to Auto Shankar Case 
(AIR 1995 S.C. 264) the Supreme Court repeatedly asserted that Article 19 
(1)(a) includes the freedom of press. 
83 
During Peace Time 
The freedom of press as Article 19 (l)(a) envisages, like any other 
freedom guaranteed under part llird of the Constitution, is not absolute but 
is subject to certain limitations that can be imposed by law. The test to as-
certain whether in a given case the freedom of press has been violated, 
is to see whether press is restricted unreasonably by the state action 
before or after the publication. 
In Romesh Thappar''^ and Brij Bhushan's''® cases the scope of Article 
19(1)(a)was raised, for the first time, before the Supreme Court. 
In the former case the entry and circulation of a journal "Cross Roads" 
printed and published in Bombay, was banned into the State of Madras un-
der Sec 9(1-A) of Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949 And in 
latter case an order was issued under Sec 7(1 )(c) of East Punjab Public 
Safety Act, 1949, which required from the editor printer and publisher of the 
weekly "organiser" published from Delhi, to submit for scrutiny before publi-
cation all matters i.e. news, views, caricatures etc. relating to Pakistan ex-
cept those provided by the official sources. 
Both the orders were challenged before the Supreme Court as viola-
tive of Article 19(1 )(a) of the Constitution. 
17. AIR 1950 SO. 124 
18. AIR 1950 SO. 129 
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The Supreme Court held that there can be no doubt that freedom of 
speech and expression includes freedom of propagation of ideas and that 
freedom is ensured by freedom of circulation. Liberty of circulation is as es-
sential to that freedom as the liberty of the publication. Indeed without circu-
lation the publication would be of little value. 
The Court in the later case too, expressed the similar views referring 
the Blackstone's Commentaries which say that, "Liberty of the press consists 
in laying no previous restraint upon publications and not in freedom from 
censure for criminal matter wlien published. Every freeman has undoubteo 
right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this is to 
destroy the freedom of the press". Consequently in both the cases orders 
interfering with the freedom of press were struck down 
It was in Express Newspaper Case"*^ when Supreme Court for the first 
time considered in detail the constitutional position regarding the liberty of 
the press. In this case validity of working Journalists Act, 1955, was chal-
lenged. The Act was enacted to regulate condition of service of persons 
employed in newspaper industry e.g. payment of gratuity, hours of work, leave, 
fixation of wages etc. It was contended that the Act would adversely affect 
financial position of newspaper which might be forced to close down or ana 
curtail circulation and thereby narrow the scope for dissemination of infor-
mation and hence violative of Article 19(1 )(a). 
Supreme Court, in the paucity of authority in India of precedents, made 
reference to American Cases. After a survey of such cases the Court summed 
up that in U.S.A; 
19. AIR 1958 SO. 578 
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(a) The freedom of speech comprehends the freedom of the press and the 
freedom of speech and press are fundamental personal rights of the 
citizens; 
(b) The freedom of press rest on the assumption that the widest possible 
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic source is 
essential to the welfare of the public; 
(c) Such freedom is the foundation of free government of a free people; 
(d) The purpose of such guarantee is to prevent public authorities from 
assuming the guardianship of the public mind; and 
(e) The freedom of the press involves freedom of employment or non-
empioyement of the necessary means of exercising this right or in other 
words, freedom from restriction in respect of employement in the edi-
torial force. 
Applying the aforesaid test, the Court said "the necessary corollary 
thereof is that no measure can be enacted which would have the effect ot 
imposing a pre-censorship curtailing the circulation or restricting the choice 
of employement or unemployement in the editorial force. Such a measure 
would certainly tend to infringe the freedom of speech and expression ana 
would, therefore, be liable to be struck down as unconstitutional". 
The Supreme Court on the point of taxing a newspaper industry said 
that while no immunity from general laws can be claimed by the press ii 
would certainly not be legitimate to subject the press to laws which take away 
or abridge the freedom of speech and expression or which would curtail 
circulation, or fetter its freedom to choose its means of exercising the right, 
or would undermine its independence by driving it to seek government aid 
Laws which single out the press for laying upon it excessive and prohibitive 
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burden which would restrict the circulation, impose a penalty on its right to 
choose the instrument for its exercise or to seek an alternative media, pre-
vent newspaper from being started and ultimately drive the press to seek 
government aid in order to survive, would, therefore, be struck down as 
unconstituional.^ 
In Hamdard Dawakhana V. Union of India^"*. The Constitutional validity 
of Drug and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisement) Act, 1954 was 
considered by the Supreme Court under Article 19(1 )(a). 
The Parliament had enacted the aforesaid law in order to control the 
advertisement of drugs in certain cases and to prohibit them for certain pur-
pose of remedies alleged to possess magic qualities. Sec.3 (d) empowerea 
the government to add any disease under Sec.3 " . And Sec. 8 of the Act 
empowered the seizure and detention of documents, article or things which 
in view of the prescribed authority were in contravention of the Act. " I t was 
challenged on the ground that the restriction on the advertisement was a 
direct infringment of the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by 
the Constitution. 
The Court said that when a provision is challenged as violating a fun-
damental right, it was necessary to ascertain its true nature and character 
exploring the history it observed "The object of the Act was to prevent 
self-medication and self treatment by prohibiting instrument which may 
IJQ. Id at p.p616-17 
21. A.I.R. 1960 SO. 554 
22. Sec. 3 - " Subject to the provisions of this Act no person shall take any part in 
publication of any advertisement referring to any drug Contd; 
87 
be used to advocate them or which tended to spread the evil, and not merely 
to stop all advertisements offending against morality and decency". As to the 
general nature of the advertisements the Court stated that an advertisement 
was no doubt a form of speech and expression, its true character was re-
flected by the objects for the promotion of which it was employed. It is only 
when an advertisement was concerned with the expression or propagation of 
ideas that it could be said to relate to the freedom of speech. And therefore 
when it took the form of a commercial advertisement which had an element 
of trade or commerce it no longer fell within the concept of freedom of speech 
for the object [(of Article 19 (1)(a)] was propagation of ideas social, political 
or economic or furtherance of literature or human thought; but in the present 
case it was the commendation of efficacy, value and importance in treatment 
of particular disease by certain drugs and medicines. 
Therefore, in every case one had to see what was the nature of adver-
tisement and what activity is falling under Article 19(1 )(a) it sought to 
Contd: in terms which suggests or are calculated to lead to the use of that drug for 
(d) The diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention or any veneral disease 
or any other disease or condition which may be specified in rules made under this 
Act." 
This rule making power is provided under Sec 16 of the Act which provide that-
1. The Central Government may by notification in official gazette, make rules for car-
rying out the purpose of this Act. 
2. In particular and without pre-judice to the generality of foregoing power such rules 
may -
a) Specify any disease or condition to which the provisions of Sec 3 shall apply; 
23. Sec 8 of the Act provides "Any person authorised by the State Government,in this 
behalf may, at any time seize and detain any, document, article, or things which 
such person has reason to believe contains any advertisement which contravenes 
any of the provisions of this Act and the court trying such contravention may direct 
that such document (including all copies thereof), article or thing shall be forfeited 
to the Government. 
NOTE - The aforesaid provisions have been amended since then by the Amend-
ment Act (42 of 1963). 
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further ^*. The advertisement of prohibited drugs and commodities of which 
the sale was not in the interest of general public could not be regarded as 
speech so as to fall within the concept of 'freedom of speech' under Article 
19(1 )(a). However the court found Sec 3(a) of the Act which empowered the 
government an impermissible delegation of legislative power and Sec 8^  im-
posing unreasonable restrictions as violative of Article 19(1)(a) and apply-
ing the doctrine of severablity struck down those provisions. 
In Sakal Paper V. Union of India " t h e newspaper was started in 1932 
and it claimed that its circulation was 52000 copies on week days and 56000 
copcies on Sundays in Maharashtra. The daily edition of the newspaper con-
tained six pages a day for five days. This edition was priced at 7 paisa. The 
Sunday edition consisted 10 pages and price at 12 paisa. about 40% of the 
space in the newspaper was covered by advertisements. 
The Newspapers (Price and Page) Act, 1956 and Daily Newspapers 
(Price and Page) order, regulated the price and pages of the newspaper Sec 
3 of the Act empowered the Government of India to regulate the price ana 
pages of the newspaper in relation to their size, prescribe the number of 
supplements to be published and prohibit the publication and sale of news-
paper in contravention of any order made under Sec. 3 of the Act^^. 
24. Supra note (21) at p. 563 
25. AIR 1962 S.C. 305 
26. Sub - Sec (I) of Section 3 empowers the Central Government, to regulate the price 
of newspapers in relation to their pages and sizes if it is of opinion that it is neces-
sary to do so for the purpose of preventing unfair competition among newspapers 
and in particular those published in Indian Languages. It also empowered the 
government to regulate the allocation of space to be alloted for advertising matter 
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The Act also provided the size and area of advertisement matter in 
relation to other matters contained in the newspaper. It was challenged be-
fore the Supreme Court as violative of Article 19(1)(a). 
It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that an increase in the 
price without increase in number of pages would reduce the circulation on 
the other hand any decrease in number of pages would reduce the column 
space for news, views and ideas. 
The respondent took the plea that the petitioner can increase the space 
for news by revising the prices and it would not adversely affect the circula-
tion of the newspaper and thus not violative of Article 19(1 )(a). 
Delivering the judgement, Mudhalkar, J; observed that, "effect of the 
commencement of the impunged Act and coming into force the order woulo 
certainly be that a newspaper which had a right to publish any number oi 
pages for carrying it's news and views would be restrained from doing so 
except upon the condition that it would have to raise the selling price as pro-
vided in the schedule to the order." The learned judge emphasised the im-
portance of the propagation of ideas, news and views when he said that. 
"The right to propogate one's idea was inherent in the concept of freedom of 
speech and expression. For the purpose of propagating his ideas every 
citizen had a right to publish them, to disseminate them and to circulate 
them." Further, the fixation of the minimum price for the number of pages 
which a newspaper was entitled to publish was obviously not for ensuring a 
reasonable price to the buyers of newspapers but for expressly cutting down 
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the circulation of some newspapers by making the price so unattractively 
high for a class of its readers as was likely to deter it from purchasing such 
newspaper, and thereby hampered the free propagation of ideas and thus 
violated the freedom." 
On the contention raised on behalf of the government that the object 
of the propagation of ideas could be achieved by reducing the advertise-
ments in the newspapers. In other words the newspaper would be able to 
devote more space for news and views if they reduce the advertisements 
The Court while rejecting the argument held that if the area for advertise-
ment was curtailed the price of the newspaper would be forced up. If that 
happened the circulation of the newspaper would inevitably go down This 
would be no remote but a direct consequence of curtailment of advertise-
ment^^. He was of the view that, "The advertisement revenue of a newspaper 
was proportionate to its circulation. Thus the higher the circulation of a news-
paper the larger would be its advertisement revenue. So if a newspaper with 
a high circulation were to raise its price its circulation would go down and 
this inturn would bring down the advertisement revenue. It would create a 
vicious circle where a newspaper would be left with no option but to closure 
of the newspaper. If on the other hand the space for advertisement was 
stated to be to prevent 'unfair' competition, it was thus directed against cir-
culation of newspaper. When a law was intended to bring about this result, 
there would be a direct infringement of the right of freedom of speech and 
expression.^" To determine the constitutionally protected areas of press freedom 
the Court talked of "essential part" of freedom of speech and expression but failed 
to disclose as to what constitute this"essential part" and how it is to be determined? 
The Court remained trapped in the language of 'direct and inevitable effect' and 
wanted to prevent "excessive and prohibitive" burden upon the press. 
27. Supra note (25) at p. 313 
28. Ibid 
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Once again the validity of price and size of a newspaper was raised m 
Bennett Coleman V. Union of India." Due to the shortage of indigenous news-
print in India, it has to be imported from foreign countries. But as country's 
foreign exchange position was not good, a liberal import of newsprint was 
not possible to fulfill India's newsprint requirement. In order to achieve that 
goal some rules were laid down by the Government of India as Newsprint 
Policy for 1972-73. The new import policy was contained in the Newsprint 
Control Policy (1972-73), effectuated by the Newsprint Control Order 1972 
passed under Section 3 of Essential Commodities Act. The main features of 
the impunged policy which was under consideration were: 
(a) No newspaper or a new edition be started by a common ownership 
even within authorised quota of newsprint; 
(b) The maximum number of pages were limited to ten and no adjustment 
was permitted between circulation and the pages so as to increase the 
pages; 
(c) no interchangeability was permitted between different papers of com-
mon ownership units or different editions of the same paper; and 
(d) allowence of a twenty percent increase in the page level up to maxi-
mum of ten had been given to newspapers with less than ten pages 
The policy was chanllenged as violative of Article 19(1 )(a) of the Con-
stitution. 
The government contended that the newprint policy did not "directly 
and inevitably" deal with the right mentioned in Article 19(1 )(a). And that 
29. AIR 1973 SO. 106 
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incidental restrictions of newsprint quota policy for newspaper did not con-
stitute any violation of freedom of speech and expression. 
It was observed by Justice Ray, delivering the majority opinion for Sikri 
C.J., Reddy J, and for himself, that, "Under the policy the newspaper within 
the ceiling often pages could get 20% increase in the number of pages They 
required circulation more than the number of pages. They were denied the 
circulation, on the other hand the big English dailies which needed to in-
crease their pages were not permitted to do so. These features were noi 
newsprint control but really newspaper control in the guise of equitable distri-
bution of newsprint. Where a quota is fixed newspaper control could be saia 
as post-quota restrictions. The freedom of press is both ^qualitative' and ^quan-
titative'; the freedom guarantees both ^circulation' and ^content '^° The news-
paper must be left free to determine their pages, their circulation, and their 
new editions within their quota of what has been fixed fairly.^'^ 
The Court further observed that,"The individual requirements of the 
different dailies render it entirely desireable in some cases to increase the 
number of pages than circulation. Such adjustment was necessary to main-
tain the quality and the range of the readers in question. The denial of such 
flexibility would hamper the quality, range and standard of the dailies and to 
affect the freedom of speech. Therefore, the restrictions on the petitioners 
that they could use their quota to increase circulation but not the page num-
ber was violative of Article 19(1 )(a)." 
30. Id at p. 130 
31. Id at p. 129 
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It was also pleaded by the government that reduction to page level to 
ten pages was not only because of shortage of newsprint but also because 
the big newspaper devoted high percentage of space to the advertisements 
and if the same is curtailed the adjustment could be made where news ana 
views would not suffer. Rejecting the argument Ray, J., (As he then was) 
pointed out that advertisements are not only the source of revenue but also 
one of the factors for circulation. Once circulation is lost, it would be very 
difficult to regain its old level. Because as a cut in page level the space for 
advertisement would be less, and this will affect the financial position of the 
press on the other hand if advertisements are not sacrificed it will leave not 
enough place for news and views. But the loss of advertisement not only 
entail the closing down but also affect the circulation and consequently im-
pinge on freedom of speech and expression. 
Another issue raised on behalf of the government was that the peti-
tioners were companies, and therefore, could not claim any protection under 
Article 19(1){a). Rejecting the contention the Court held that, "No doubt a 
corporation can not enjoy the freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). 
nevertfieless the editor, printers and publishers or the share holders all are 
citizens and in that capacity they werp entitled to enjoy the freedom." 
The government further pleaded that the impunged legislation would 
be able to break the monopolistic nature of the press and to create an open 
society where there would be a greater freedom of speech and expression 
Justice Ray, however rejected the argument even without really considering it 
The Court, thus took the view that any rule or policy which seeks 
to regulate newspaper publication by eihter fixing the price or the size 
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of the newspaper having the affect of hampering the growth of press is 
violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
Thus, Ray J. adopted the 'broad effect theory* that is what in substance 
is the loss or Injury caused to the citizen and alongwith the manner and method 
adopted by the State in placing restrictions. 
Mathew J. in his dissenting opinion went into wider policy implications 
and approved the policy of the Government. In his view ten pages were suf-
ficient to express its views and publish the news and that the petitioners 
moved to the Court not because their freedom was abridged , but because 
they were deprived of a part of revenue earned by them as profit from com-
mercial advertisements. 
The issue of taxing a newsprint industry once again was raised before 
the Supreme Court in Indian Express news paper V. Union of India ^^  where 
the import duty was imposed under Sec. 25 of the Custom Act, 1962 ^^  
The petitioner contended that imposition of such duty has the direct 
effect of crippling the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by the 
Constitution as it has led to increase in the price of newspaper and inevi-
table consequence of reduction of their circulation. 
Venkataramiah J., for himself, Chinnappa Reddy and A.P.Sen J J con-
sidered thoroughly the question of freedom of press vis-a-vis the state's power 
of taxation. Referring various decisions from American Supreme Court and 
other literature on the subject, the Court said that, "Newspaper industry en-
joys two of the fundamental rights namely the freedom of speech and ex-
pression guaranteed under Article 19(1 )(a) and the freedom to engage in 
any profession, occupation, trade or business, guaranteed under Article 
32. AIR 1986 SO. 515 
33. Sec 25 (1) of the Custom Act, 1962 provides that, "If the Central Govt, is satisfied 
that it is necessary in the public interest to do so, it may by notification in the Offical 
Gazette, exempt generally either absolutely or subject to such conditions (to be 
fulfilled before or after clearance) as may be specified description from the whole 
or any part of the duty of customs leviable thereon." 
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19 (1) (f), the first because it is concerned with the field of expression 
and communication and second because of communication has become an 
occupation or profession while there can be no tax on the right to exercise 
the freedom of expression, tax is leviable on profession, occupation, trade, 
business and industry. Hence, tax is leviable on the newspaper industry" 
However, the Court also made it clear that, "When such tax transgress into 
the field of freedom of expression and stifles that freedom, it becomes un-
constitutional. As long as it is within reasonable limits and does not impede 
freedom of expression, it will not be contravening the limitation of Article 19(2). 
The delicate task of determining when it crosses the area of profession, oc-
cupation, trade, business or industry into the area of freedom of expression 
and interferes with freedom is entrusted to courts ^*. 
On the question of advertisements Supreme Court examined its ear-
lier decisions alongwith the American Case law. Reiterating that though the 
commercial advertisement do not form part of freedom of speech and ex-
pression, the court observed that, "It is no doubt true that some of the obser-
vations made in Hamdard Dawakhana case go beyond the need of that case 
and tend to affect the right to publish all commercial advertisements." "The 
Supreme Court, therefore, expressed the view that all commercial advertise-
ment can not be denied the protection of Article 19(1)(a) merely because 
they were issued by the businessmen. 
34. Supra note (32) at p.p. 538 - 39 
35. Id at p. 548 
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The Supreme Court's view seems to be that though the commercial 
advertisements vy^ere not the part and parcel of the right guaranteed 
under Article 19(1)(a), nevertheless that right could not be denied to 
the advertisements if they directly affect the right by raising price or 
curtail ing circulat ion, unless they fall under Art icle 19 (2). 
The question of levying a tax on newpaper was once again be-
fore the Supreme Court for its consideration in Printers (Mysore) Ltd 
V.Asstt. Commercial Tax Officer.^^The facts of the case are following -
Before the amendment of the definition of the expression goods" in 
Section 2 ( d ) " by the 1958 (Amendment) Act, the publisher of newspa-
pers [Who held the certif icate of registration contemplated under Sec 
8(3)(b)]^ 'were issuing Farm ' C [a declaration under section 8(4)(a)]^^ 
and on that basis the selling dealer was co l l ec t i ng from them the 
Centra l Sales Tax at the concessional rate of 4% (in case of non declared 
goods). After the amendment newspapers were excluded from the perview 
36^  (1994) 2 S.C.C. 434 
37. Sec 2-ln this Act, unless the context otherwise requires 
(d) "good" includes all materials, articles, commodities and all other kinds of 
movable property, but does not include newspaper, actions, claims, stokes, 
shares, and securities; 
38. Section 8(3). The goods referred to in clause (b) 
(b) are the goods of class or classes specified in the certificate of registration of 
the registered dealer purchasing the goods as being intended for resale by 
him or subject to any rules made by Central Govt, in this hehalf, for use by 
him in the generation or distribution of electricity or any other form of power 
39. Section 8 (4) provides - provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to any 
sale unless the selling dealer furnishes to the prescribed authority in the 
prescribed manner a declaration duly filled and signed by the registered 
dealer to whom the goods are sold containing the prescribed particulars in a 
prescribed form obtained from the prescribed authority. 
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of the goods. Thereafter the newspapers were disabled from issuing 
Farm'C'hence they became liable to pay tax at the higher rate of 10% on 
goods (non declared goods) purchased by them as raw material for produc-
ing (manufacturing) their newspapers. The publishers of the newspaper, there-
fore, questioned the action of Central Sales Tax Authorities before different 
High Courts who expressed different opinion. Finally the matter was brouhgt 
before the Supreme Court. 
The Court whi le developing a new approach and taking into ac-
count the spirit of the amendment of the def in i t ion "goods" rather than 
the form of law prescribed therein concluded that no sales tax can be 
imposed on the sale of newspaper in the country. The Court, neverthe-
less, made it clear that it does not mean that the press is immune ei-
ther from taxation or from the general laws of industrial relations or 
from the state regulation of the condit ion of service of its employees 
Nor is it immune from the general law of the land. The prohibition is 
upon the imposit ion of any restriction directly relatable to the right to 
publish, the right to disseminate information and to the circulation of 
newspaper.*" 
In Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. V. Union of India *\ The petitioners 
were engaged in the business of printing and publishing the national news-
paper Indian Express (Delhi Edition) from the Express building constructed 
at plot no's 9 & 10 Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg. New Delhi, held through a 
40. Supra note (36) at p. 442 
41. AIR 1986 S.C. 872 
98 
perpetual registered lease under Sec. 3 of Government Grants Act 1895 *^ in the 
year 1958 from Union of India. In the year 1980, petitioners received a no-
tice of re-entry upon forfeiture of lease for violating the terms of the lease 
deed. Another notice was served upon them to show cause as to why the 
Express building should not be demolished (Under Sec. 343 & 344 of D.M.C 
Act, 1957) as being unauthorised construction. 
The contention of the petitioners was that impunged notices directly 
constitute violation of Article 19(1 )(a) of the Constitution. 
The apex court allowing the plea held that, "the impunged notices of 
re-entry upon forfeiture of lease and the threatened demolition of Express 
building are intended and meant to silence the voice of the Indian Express 
and, therefore, the impunged notices constitute a direct and immediate threat 
to the freedom of the press and thus are violative of Article 19(1)(a)."*^The 
Court reminded that "the permissible restrictions on any fundamental right 
guaranteed under part III of the Constitution have to be imposed by a duly 
enacted law and must not be excessive ie. they must not go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve the object of the law under which they are sought to be 
imposed". The Court further observed the power to impose the restrictions 
on fundamental rights is essentially a power to 'regulate' the exercise of those 
rights and not to 'extinct' those rights. 
42. Sec. 3 provides that - All provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations 
contained in any such grant or transfer as aforesaid shall be valid and take 
effect according to their tenor, any rule of law, statute or enactment of the 
legislature to the contrary notwithstanding. 
43. Supra note (41) at p. 909 
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The issue before the Supreme Court in Reliance Petrochemical Ltd V 
Indian Express Newspapers Bombay ** was to what extent press is free to 
report on the matters of public importance pending before the Court. The 
Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd; the petitioner company issued the Public Is-
sue of 12.5% Secured Convertible Debentures of Rs 200/- each for cash at 
par aggregating to Rs 539.40 crores (inclusive of retention of 15% excess 
subscription of Rs 77.40 crores). It was claimed by the petitioner that the 
debentures were issued after obtaining the consent of the Controller of Capital 
Issues on the basis of schedule indicated therein, and after complying with 
all the requirements of the Companies Act and otherwise. 
Several writ petitions were filed in different High Courts challenging 
the validity of the grant of consent or sanction for the issuence of aforesaid 
debentures. The petitions were transferred to the Supreme Court and an 
order was made that the, "Issue of Secured Convertible Debentures be pro-
ceeded with, without let or hindrance, notwithstanding any proceeding insti-
tuted or may be instituted before any court or tribunal or other authority 
alongwith the order that any direction, order or injunction of any court, tribu-
nal or any other authority which had already been passed or may be passed, 
the operation of the same, is suspended till further orders of this Court " 
Later on the respondents published an article claiming that the Con-
troller of Capital Issues had not acted properly and legally in granting the 
sai.ction to the issue for various reasons stated therein and it was further 
stated that issue was not a prudent or a reliable venture. 
i l A.I.R. 1989 SO. 190 
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The petitioner contended that the said article by commenting on a 
matter which is sub-judice amount the contempt of court and prayed that the 
respondents be prohibited from publising any other article or material on the 
subject. The Court issued an order of injunction, restraining all the 
respondents from publishing any article, comment, report or editorial in any 
of the issues of Indian Express or their related publication questioning the 
legality or validity of any of the consents, approval or permissions of control-
ler of Capital Issues. Later on the respondents approached to the Supreme 
Court for the vacation of its order. 
The plea raised on behalf of the respondents was that the pre-stop-
page of newspaper article or publication on matters of public importance 
was uncalled for and contrary to the freedom of press enshrined in our Con-
stitution. On the other hand it was also true that the administration of justice 
must be unimpaired. Therefore, the Court was required to balance between 
the two interests of great public importance that i.e. freedom of speech and 
administration of justice. 
The Supreme Court while ignoring the contempt application due to 
procedural infirmity, adopted the balancing approach and as the issue had 
already been over subscribed even before the expiry of last date vacated the 
order and held that issue is not going to affect the general public nor any 
injury is involved, it would be proper and legal, on an appraisal of ttie bal-
ance of convenience between the risk which will be caused by the publi-
cation of the article and damage to the fundamental right of freedom of knowl-
edge of the people concerned and the obligation of the press to keep people 
informed that the injunction should not keep continue any further^^. Misra, J. 
45. Id at p. 203 
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in his concurring opinion held that press may be prevented from publishing 
any material (Article, Report, News) in case if the publication had the ten-
dency to defeat the earlier order but only till the time it is necessary and not 
beyond that period. Thus in the opinion of the Supreme Court once the commer-
cial interest of the party is protected even before the expiry of deadline, the press 
could not be restrained from expressing its views till the date of closure of issues 
In L.I.C. of India V. Manubhai D. Shah.*^Supreme Court was provided 
with another opportunity regarding the scope of right in respect of a citizen 
guaranteed under Article 19(1){a). An executive trustee (The respondent) of 
the Consumer Education & Research Centre (C.E.R.C) Ahmedabad, after 
undertaking research into the working of Life Insurance Corporation pub-
lished a study paper captioned "A Fraud on Policy Holders - A Shocking 
Story." The study paper portrayed the discreminatory practice adopted by 
the LLC. by pointing out that unduly high premiums were charged by L I C 
from those taking out life insurace policies and thereby denying access to 
insurance to a vast majority of people who can not afford to pay the high 
premiums. The paper was based upon statistical information and it was widely 
circulated. A member of LIC wrote a counter article "LIC and its policy hold-
ers" which was published in The Hindu, a daily newspaper refuting the alle-
gations made by the respondent. The respondent again got published a re-
joinder in The Hindu. The member of LIC then prepared and published his 
own counter article in Yogakshema, a LIC house magazine. The respondent 
thereupon requested the LIC to publish his own rejoinder also in the said 
magazine but his request was turned down by LIC on the ground that it was 
a house magazine circulated only among the subscribers who were policy 
holders. The respondent filed a petition before Delhi High Court and got a 
favourable verdict. 
46. (1992)3S.C.C. 637 
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Before the Supreme Court LIC raised the same plea that the magazine 
was a house magazine. Rejecting the petitioners argument the Court ap-
proved the view taken by the Delhi H.C. which turned down LIC contention 
that 'Yogakshema' was a house magazine and not put in the market for sale 
to general public on two grounds -
(i) It is available to anyone on payment of subscription; and 
(ii) members of the public are invited to contribute articles for publica-
tion *^. 
The Court observed that the contention of the petitioner that the re-
joinder of respondent has become out dated and hence has lost relevance 
can not be accepted as the respondent thinks that the views raised by him 
regarding high premium rates were still relevant. The Court further held that 
"LIC was under an obligation to publish the rejoinder since it had publishea 
the counter to study paper The respondent's fundamental right clearly en-
title him to insist that his views on subject should reach those who read the 
magazine so that they have a complete picture before them and not a one 
sided or distorted one*^ 
The Court however, simultaneously made-it clear that merely because 
the L.I.C. is a state and running a magazine with public funds it is not under 
an obligation to print any matter that any informed citizen may forward for 
publication. The view has been taken keeping in view the peculiar facts of 
the case.** Stating the scope of Article 19 (1 ) (a) the Court observed that, 
47. id at p. 653 - 54 
48. Id at p.655 
49. Ibid 
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"It must be broadly construed to include the freedom to circulate one's views 
by the words of mouth or in writing or through audio-visual instrumentalities 
It, therefore, includes the right to propagate one's views through the print 
media or through any other communication channel e.g. the radio and the 
television. Every citizen of this free country, therefore, has right to air his or 
her views through the printing and/or the electronic media subject of course 
to permissible restrictions imposed under Article 19(2) of the Constitution'° 
The immense value of the verdict lies in the fact that it recognised the qualified 
privilege of respondent's right to reply. 
Once again whatever the Indian Express case has forcefully hinted, 
TATA Press Ltd V. Mahanager Telephone Nigam Ltd. brought out in express 
terms that a commercial speech is protected under Article 19(1)(a).*'' The 
Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. under rule 458 made under section 7 ot 
the Indian Telegraph Act was the sole authority to publish the telephone di-
rectory. Later on when under rule-458 it entrusted the work of printing the 
telephone directory to private parties, it allowed them to publish the adver-
tisements under rule 459 in order to meet out the cost of the directory. 
The appeallant was also publishing Tata-Pages, a buyers guide com-
prising of a compilations of advertise-ments given by businessmen, traders, 
professionals duly classified according to their trade business or profession 
alongwith their telephone numbers. 
The publication of Tata-Pages was challenged as contrary to the rule 
457, and 458 and 459 of the Indian Telegraph Rules 1957 made under sec-
tion 7 of Indian Telegraph Act 1885." 
50 id at p. 656 
51. A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2438 
52. Rule-458- Except with the permission of the Telephone Authority no person shall 
publish any list of telephone subscribers. 
Rule-459 "The Telehone Authority may publish or allow the publication o1 
advrtisements in the body of telephone directory. 
10^ 
It was contended on behalf of the appeallant that the said rules were 
violative of Article 19(1)(a) as the right to commercial speech is protected 
under the aforesaid provision of the Constitution. 
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Tata-Pages was a 
telephone directory within the meaning of Rule 458 or was a Buyers Guide in 
a broader constitutional aspect and whether "commercial advertisement" fall 
within the concept of "freedom of speech and expression" guaranteed under 
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
The Court took into the consideration its earlier verdicts and concluded 
that "commercial speech" is a part of freedom of speech and expression guar-
anteed under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution. Examining the aspect 
from another angle it observed that "the public at large tias a right to receive 
the commercial speech. Article 19(1)(a) not only guarantees freedom oi 
speech and expression, but it also protects the right of an individual to listen. 
read and recieve the said speech. So for as the economic needs of the citi-
zens are concerned, their fulfilment has to be guided by information dissemi-
nated through advertisements. The protection of Article 19(1)(a) is available 
to the speaker as well as to the recipient of the speech."^^ 
Making difference between appeallant and the respondant's directo-
ries, the Court said that the former's was a Buyer's Guide while latter's was a 
telephone directory having a certain format and criterion different from 
appeallant's. 
The judgement is bound to give further boost to the freedom of press 
by enabling it to reach a large number of people as the additional revenue 
generated through the advertisements would help in reducing the price ot 
the newspapers. The present position, therefore, is that even an advertise-
ment which is purely commercial in nature is protected under Article 19 (1 )(a) 
sz. ibid 
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and the press could not be prevented to publish such an advertisement unless it 
falls under clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution. 
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PERMISSIBLE RESTRAINTS: 
e foregoing discussion gives a general impression that whenever 
the Supreme Court has been approached, to pretect the freedom of Press, it 
has responded favourably. But simultaneously the Supreme Court made it 
clear that a freedom however important, may never be an absolute dogma 
In Express Newspapers V. Union of India, Sen J., rightly observed that, "How-
ever precious and cherished the freedom of speech is under Article 19(1) (a), 
this freedom is not absolute and unlimited at all times but is subject to the 
restrictions. That must be so because unrestricted freedom of speech ano 
expression which includes the freedom of press and is wholly free from re-
straints, amount to uncontrolled licence which would lead to disorder ano 
anarchy and it would be hazardous to ignore the vital importance of our so-
cial and national interest in public order and security of state."" 
The Costitution under Article 19(2) itself provides for the restrictions 
which may be imposed upon the press. Let us examine these restrictions 
54. Supra note (41) at p. 909 
107 
Sovereignty and Integrity of India 
e ground sovereignty and integrity of India was inserted to clause 
(2) to Article 19 by the Constitution (16th Amendment) Act, 1963, on the 
recommendations of the Committee on National Integration and Region-
alism. The amendment conferred powers on the government to impose re-
strictions against those individuals or organisations who want to make se-
cession from India or the disintegration of India. India is a federation of states 
and being union it is indestructible. Though the country and the people may 
be divided into different states for the convenience of administration, the 
country is one integral whole; its people a single people living under a single 
imperium derived from a single source. Accordingly, any expression prejudi-
cial to the sovereignty and integrity of India may be punished by law whose 
constitutionality can not be jeopardised because of the new ground of re-
striction. 
Though any judicial pronouncement by the apex court is yet to come 
but in a significant judgement by the Andhra Pradesh High Court", where 
the registration of the 'Telugu Desam' party with the election commission 
was challenged under sec. 123 of Representation of People Act and particu-
larly sub-clause (6) to clause (3) of Election Symbols (Reservation and Allot-
lotment) order, 1968 ^ On the ground that the name of the party tends to 
55. V.R.V. Sree Rama Rao V. Telgu Desam a Political Party AIR 1984 A.Pat 
p.353 
56. Sec. 123 (3) of Representation of People Act provides. "The appeal by a 
candidate or his agent or by any other person Contd: 
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propagate secessionist tendency by the use of the word "Desam" and it is 
bound to go contrary to the preservtion and maintenance of sovereignty and 
integrity of India as envisaged by Article 19(2) of the Constitution. 
The Andhra Pradesh High Court however, did not accept this conten-
tion and held that naming the party as "Telgu Desam" did not violate Article 
19(2) of the Constitution or any law. It expressed the view that since Telgu is 
one of the fifteen official languages in the state and happens to be language 
of the majority of the people in Andhra, any party such as Telgu Desam Party 
which emphasises linguistic character of the state can not be deemed to be 
acting contrary to the intendment of the Constitution including Article 19(2) 
thereof. An appeal for the all round development of Telgu language can not 
be deemed to be antinational or an activity calculated to disrupt the integrity 
or sovereignty of India as envisaged by Article 19(2) of the constitution. 
The judgement of the Court seems not to be consistent with section 
123(3) of R.P. Act, 1951, though there is no doubt that an appeal to the ail 
round development could not be deemed to be anti-national yet the same 
appeal would form a corrupt electoral practice by seeking vote on the ground 
of language (very cleverly in the guise of development of a language which 
is constitutionally recognised), under the aforesaid provisions of the Repre-
sentation of People Act, 1951. The decision of the Court is not laudable on 
the issue of corrupt practices under the Act. 
Contd: with the consent of the candidate or his election agent to vote or refrain 
from voting on the ground of his religion, race, caste, community or language or the 
use of, or appeal to religious symbols or the use of or appeal to national symbols 
such as the national flag or the national emblem, for the furtherence of the pros-
pects of the election of that candidate or for prejudicially affecting the election of 
any candidate. 
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Security of State 
"Sthe original Article 19(2) as enacted by the Constituent Assembly in-
cluded the words "undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow the state". 
But when the First (Constitutional Amendment) Act, 1951 amended the afore-
said Article, it beside delet ing as well as adding few words, re-drafted the en-
tire Article 19(2) and " Security of State' was added as a ground of restriction on 
the freedom of speech and expression. 
The first two cases which came before the Supreme Court when the Con-
stitution was enforced were Brij Bhushan V. State of Delhi " a n d Romesh Thappar 
V. State of Madras." 
In Brij Bhushans case a weekly paper organiser was asked by the Chief 
Commissioner of Delhi under Sec 7(1 )(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 
1949''. To sumbit for scrutiny before publication ti l l further orders all com-
munal matter and news and views about Pakistan, including photographs 
and cartoons except received from official agencies. The aforesaid order 
was challenged before the Supreme Court as violat ive of Article 19 (1 )(a) 
of the Constitution. 
57 Supra note 18 
58. Supra note 17 
59. Sec 7 (1) (c) of East Punjab Public Safety Act provided that, "The Provincial 
Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf, if satisfied that such 
action is necessary for preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to public 
safety or the maintenance of public order may by order in writing addressed to a 
printer, publisher or editor require that any matter relating to a particular subject 
or class of subjects shall before publication be submitted for scrutiny. 
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Since there is no provision under the Constitution prohibiting prior cen-
sorship, the Supreme Court followed common law principle, it rejected the con-
tention of the State that the law was saved by Article 19(2), and said that, "There 
can be no doubt that the imposition of pre-censorship on a journal is a 
restriction on the liberty of the press, which is an essential part of the 
freedom of speech and expression declared by Article 19(1)(a)" and held 
that pre-censorship of journal fell outside the scope of constitutional provision, 
and therefore, not only the order but also the law under which the order was 
made, was unconstitutional. 
Once again in Romesh Thappar V. State of Madras where a weekly jour-
nal Cross Roads publishd and printed from Bombay was denied entry into, or 
the circulation, sale or distribution in the State of Madras under Sec. 9 (1 -A)**of 
Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act 1949. The said Act was challenged as 
violative of Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution. The Court struckdown the 
impunged provision on the ground that unless the law restricting the free-
dom of speech and expression is directed solely against the undermining 
the security of the state or at overthrowing it, such law could not fall within 
The reservation clause (2) of Article 19 even though the restrictions it sought to impose 
may have been conceived generally in the interest of public order. It further observed 
that the impunged law which authorises imposition of restrictions for the wider purpose 
of securing public safety or the maintenance of public order fell outside the scope of 
authorised restrictions under clause (2), and was, therefore, void the unconstitutional 
60. Sec 9 (1A) of the Madras maintinance of Public Order Act, 1949, authorised the 
Provincial Government to prohibit or regulate the entry into, or the circulation 
sale or distribution in, the province of Madras any document or class of docu-
ments for the purpose of securing the safety or the maintenance of public order 
in the province. 
I l l 
In both Romesh Thappar and Brij Bhushan cases the issue be-
fore the Supreme Court was the constitutional validity rather than the 
executive action taken thereunder. The Court held that the expression 
"public order" and "public safety" covered much voider fields than were 
contemplated by the use of the words, "undermines the security of, or 
tends to overthrow the state. The Court expressed the view that in many 
circumstances and on most occassions a danger to public order or pub-
lic safety would also be a danger to the security of the state, but that 
many acts prejudicial to public order or public safety would not be as 
grave as to endanger the security of the state. The constitutional provi-
sion justifying legislative abridgement of freedom of expression would 
cover only those grave offences against public order which would en-
danger the security of the state and not all offences against public or-
der. 
Thus the ratio decidendi of the judgement would seem to be that 
unless the danger that the exercise of the right was likely to create 
would be so serious as to undermine the security of state or to tends to 
overthrow it, restrictions on the right to freedom of speech and expres-
sion could not be justified. 
However, the observations expressed by Fazal All J. in his dissenting 
opinion could not be ignored. He while recognising the importance of the right 
given to a citizen, said that liberty of press is not to be confused with its 
"licentiousness". The Constitution itself has prescribed certain limits for the 
exercise of the freedom of speech and expression and this Court is only called 
upon to see whether a particular case comes within those limits. In my opin-
112 
ion the law impunged (East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949) is fully saved by 
Article 19(2). *'' It is, therefore, clear that in Fazal All's J. opinion the term 
undermining the secutiry of or tends to overthrow the state includes "public dis-
order" though it may not be grave enough as to undermine the security or 
tends to overthrow the state. 
Placing emphasis on the word "solely" in the judgement, some of the 
High Courts " interpreted that the impunged law would be invalid unless it 
was directed solely against the freedom of speech and expression undermin-
ing the security of the state or tending to overthrow it. But later on when the 
Supreme Court decided the Press Bharti Case®^ it pointed out that the deci-
sions in Romesh Thappar and Brij Bhushan have been more than once mis-
applied and misunderstood and have been construed as laying down a wide 
proposition that restriction of a nature imposed by Sec. 4(1 )(a) of the Indian 
Press (Emergency Powers) Act,**or of a similar character are outside the 
scope of Article 19(2) of the Constitution as much as they are conceived gen-
erally in the interest of public order. The Court while upholding the constitu-
tional validity of this section, further observed that, "expression on the part 
of an individual inciting to, or encouraging the commission of violent 
offences like murder could not but be matters which would undermine 
the security of the state or lead to its overthrow and fall within the ambit 
of a law permitted by the Article 19 (2)." 
61. Supra note (57) at p. 133 
62. A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 12, A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 70. A.I.R. 1951 Pun. 18, A.I.R.1951, 
Saura. 09 
63. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 329 
64. The Sec. 4 (1)(a) of Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931 dealt with 
words or signs or visible representation which incite to, or tend to incite or 
encourage the Commission of any offence of murder or any congnizable of-
fence involving violence. 
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Explaining the difference between Romesh Thappar and the present 
case, Supreme Court said that in earlier case the question was whether the 
impunged Act (Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949), authorising 
the Provincial Government to take certain s teps" to secure the public safety 
and maintenance of public order was a law relating to any matter which un-
dermined the security of or tend to overthrow the state (which in the Court's 
opinion was not, as public safety and public order had wider concept than 
undermining the security of or tends to overthrow the state). But the restric-
tions imposed by sec 4 (1 )(a) of Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act,on the 
freedom of speech and expression are solely directed against the undermin-
ning the security of state or the overthrow of it and are within the ambit of 
Article 19(2) of the Constitution. 
Thus in the light of the Supreme Court's interpretation a legislation 
restricting the freedom of speech and expression in relation to incitement to 
aggravated forms of prejudicial activity or commission of violent crimes like 
murder which would undermine the security of the state is protected under 
Article 19(2), however the same provision could not protect a legislation cov-
ering the large field of public order and incitement to crimes, not of an aggra-
vated nature and which may not undermine the security of State*®. 
The Constitutional Amendment Act, 1951, not only introduced public 
order as a ground under Article 19(2) but two other subjects namely friendly 
relations with foreign states and incitement to an offence with retrospective 
effect. In other words the amendment enalrged the sweep of legislative 
abridgement of this right. In addition, the qualifying word "reasonable" was 
added to the legislative restrictions. As a result of this amendment the re-
strictions to be imposed must be reasonable, which means that the courts will 
be entitled to examine whether restrictions imposed by law are reasonable or 
not. 
65. Supra note (63) 
66. J. Minattur: Freedom of Press in India at p. 44 
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Friendly Relations With Foreign States 
(-|3lt is the need of the time that in the close but disturb world of today 
the friendly relations with foreign states should be established and maintained 
in the national and international interest of political stability, economic devel-
opment and world peace. Therefore, this ground as reasonable restriction 
was added by the First Amendment Act, 1951." 
Clause (2) of the Constitution (Declaration as to Foreign States) Order, 
1950 was interpreted by Supreme Court in Jagannath Sahu V. Union of In-
dia.®* The petitioner was detained under Sec. 3 of the Preventive Detention 
Act, 1950 ®*as he was likely to act further in a manner pre-judicial, inter alia, 
to the relations of India with foreign powers. The allegation against him was 
that he used to sent for publication to a foreign newspaper despatches of 
news and views containing false, incomplete, one sided and misleading in-
formation about the state of Jammu and Kashmir. These despatches were not 
only pre-judicial to the Government of India vis-a-vis Pakistan but obviously 
67. Under Article 367of the Constitution the word Foreign States has been defined The 
Article provides that "for the purpose of this Constitution 'foreign state' mean any 
state other than India, provided that, subject to provisions of any law made by Parlia-
ment, the President may by order declare any state not to be a foreign state for such 
purpose as may be specified in the order." 
Exercising the power as provided under Article 367, the Constitution(D6elaration as 
to Foreign States) Order 1950 was issued. Clause (2) of the order provides that 
"subject to a law of parliament, every country within the commonwealth would not be 
foreign state for the purpose of this Constitution. 
Sa. AIR 1960S.C. 625 
69. Under Sec.3 of the Act the Central Govt, or the State Govt, if satisfied with respect to 
any person, with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner pre-judicial to 
the defence of India, the relation of India with foreign powers or the security of India, 
make an order directing that such person be detained, if it thinks it necessary to do 
so. 
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to the relations of India with foreign powers in general. The detention was 
challenged inter alia that Pakistan being a member of a Commonwealth is not 
a foreign state within the terms of the order, and therefore, there is no ques-
tion of his acts being pre-judicial to the relations of India with foreign powers. 
Rejecting the argu ment the Court expressed the view that though for the pur-
pose of the Constitution, in view of the order, Pakistan was not a foreign state 
but a distinction had to be made between a country not being regarded as a 
foreign state for the purpose of Constitution and that a country being a for-
eign power for other purposes. In their relations with each other and coun-
tries out side Commonwealth, the member of Commonwealth must be regarded 
as foreign powers-their affairs between themseleves were foreign affairs. 
Again, the expression "foreign affairs" under item 9 in list I of Seventh Sched-
ule of the Constitution includes the relation of India with foreign powers In 
this context, Pakistan though a member of commonwealth, was a foreign power 
for the purpose of the Act. Accordingly the order of 1950 was not applicable 
in the case of the petitioner.^" 
70. It was explained by Dr. Ambedakar in the Parliament when moving the 
1st Amendment that it was simply the extention of another ground namely 
the 'defamation' then it would cover only the heads of the states, their 
families and their representatives. Again if it wanted to protect Paki-
stan from malicious propaganda by press it was not possible as in view 
of Constitution (Declaration as to Foreign States) Order, 1950 it was 
not a foreign state. The amendment was sharply criticised as it was felt 
that the language was very wide and could be exploited for preventing 
or curbing even legitimate criticism of foreign policies of Government. 
This view was also supported by the Press Commission. In case if it is 
an aspect of Government's foreign policy and the inclusion of this sub-
ject in Article 19 (2) tends to help the Government in silencing or re-
straining criticism of their policy, the provision can not be regarded as 
being in consonance with the concept of freedom of press. 
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PubllcOrder 
^ l a r m e d by the decisions of the different High Courts in the light of 
Supreme Court's judgements in Romesh Thappar and Brijbhushan cases, the 
first Constitutional Amendment was made without waiting to hear from apex 
court any thing about the appeals against the decisions of the High Courts. 
The amendment inserted 'public order' as a ground upon which restrictions 
might be imposed on the press. 
In Ramji Lai Modi V. State of U.P ^^  the editor, printer and publisher of 
a monthly magazine Gaurakshak v^as convicted for publishing an article with 
the deliberate and malicious intention of out raging the religious feelings of 
Muslims. The question before the Court was whether Sec 295-A^^of Indian 
Penal Code could be supported as a reasonable law saved by Article 19(2). 
The plea rased on behalf of the appeallant was that the law in question had 
no bearing on the maintenance of public order or tranquility and consequently 
it could not claim protection of saving clause under Article 19(2). But the 
Supreme Court v^ i le upholding the constitutional validity said that funda-
mental rights guaranteed under Articles 25 & 26 are expressly subject to 
public order. It could not, therefore, be predicted that freedom of religion should 
71. AIR 1957 SO. 620 
72. 8.295 - A - Provide that," vi4x) soever with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging 
the religious feefings of any dass of citizens of India, by words either spoken or written, or by 
signs or visible represerrtations or otherwise, insults or attempts to insult tfie religious beliefs 
of that dass, stiaJl be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which 
may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both." 
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have some or no bearing whatever on the maintenance of public order or that 
a law creating an offence relat ing to religion could not, under any cir-
cumstances, be said to have been enacted in the interest of public or-
der. Thus the Supreme Court came to conclusion that the impunged law 
had a bearing on the maintenance of public order and law of the nature 
of the impunged provision could be enacted in the interest of public 
order. The Court further observed that the law penalises only aggra-
vated forms of insult to rel igion which are perpetrated with a deliberate 
and malicious intention of outraging the religious feel ings of a class of 
cit izens, when such insult have a tendency to disturb public order. 
The bold and broad view expressed in Brij Bhushan's Case came 
under the cloud in Virendra V. State of Punjab " where in mid 1957 a 
'Save Hindi Agitation' was started in Punjab and the peti t ioners began 
pub l i sh ing cr i t ic isms and news concern ing the ag i t a t i on in two 
newspapers,Viz, Daily Pratap and Vir Arjun, published simultaneously 
from Jullandhar and New Delhi. The first petitioner was editor, printer 
and publisher of the paper publ ished from Jullandhar and second was 
editor, printer and publ isher of the paper publ ished f rom New Delhi. 
As the ag i ta t i on g a i n e d m o m e n t u m some u n w a r r a n t e d i n c i d e n t s 
took p lace . The Government of Punjab, therefore, issued notif ica-
t ion against the f irst pet i t ioner p roh ib i t i ng him f rom p r i n t i ng and 
publ ishing news and other mat ters re lat ing to the ag i ta t i on for a 
period of two months under Sec. 2 (1) (a) of Punjab Spec ia l Powers 
73. AIR 1957 S.C. 896 
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(Press) Act, 19567*The first step was taken to combat calculated and persis-
tent propaganda carried on in the two newspapers publ ished from Jalladar 
The government also issued to the second petitioner two identical notifica-
tions under Section 3(1) of the aforesaid Act, ^* prohibiting the entry into 
Punjab, of the newspaper published from Delhi 
The crucial issue in this case that fall for the consideration before the 
Supreme Court was that whether the State Government was the proper au-
thority to determine whether circumstances at any given point of time require 
some restrictions to be placed on the freedom of press and to what extent i.e. 
whether Sec. 2(1) (a) of the said Act imposed reasonable restrictions on the 
freedom of press. 
74. Sec 2 (1)(a) of the Act empowered the State Government or any named au-
thority to issue an order to the printer, publisher or editor prohibiting the printing 
or publishing of any matter in any document or classs of documents relating 
to a particular subject or class of subjects for a specified period or in a par-
ticular issues of a newspaper or periodical for the purpose of preventing and 
combating any activity prejudicial to the maintenance of communal harmony 
affecting or likely to affect public order. It also provides for the period of two 
months during which the said order may remain in force along with a right to 
presentation against the order within ten days of making such order The 
section also authorised the Government, or any named authority to modify, 
conform or rescind the order 
75. Sec. 3(1) empowered the Government or any named authority to prohibit the bring-
ing into Punjab of any newspaper, periodical, leaflet or other publication for the 
aforesaid purpose. 
119 
Expressing agreement with state's plea the Court held (Das. C.J) 
that it was for the State Government, which was charged with the duty of 
preserving law and order in the state, to arrive at decision. Therefore, it had 
to be in possession of all material facts and whould be the best authority to 
investigate the circumstances and assess the urgency, the determination of 
the time and extent to which the restrictions should be imposed on the press 
must of necessity be left to the judgement and discretion of the State Govern-
ment. Thus the Court upheld the legislation and the exercise of this power 
after talking of the extensive influence of the press on the public order ^*. It 
(public order) was seen as being very important and it was not considered 
unreasonable to give it priority over the freedom of the press^^. 
The judgement thus extended the sweep of the restrictions. According 
to H.M. Seervai, this decision clearly shows that "restrictions more stringent 
than pre-censorship could be imposed in the interest of public order and the 
publication of certain matters could be totally prohibited for a limited period 
of time ''* Prof. D. K. Singh's view "censorship should be restored to only when 
the fabric of the society is in jeapardy ^^  is supported by Rajiv Dhavan who 
even though recognising the wide scale agitation expresses fear of emer-
gency like situation when he said "suppose the existence of such a state of 
affairs was not publicly known beyond a carefully guarded affidavit in court. 
For a short duration, the government could exercise absolute powers akin to 
those it can exercise during an emergency when civil liberties are threat-
ened. 
76. Supra note (73) at p. 899 
77. Rajeev Dhavan: The Press and the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech 
and Expression JILI \/ol.28 NO. 3, 1986 at p. 325 
78. Seervai, H.M: Constitutional Law of India vol. 1 at p. 365 
79. Singh D.K: Freedom of Expression and the Press"Press and the Law 10 (1968) 
P.I.I, publication. 
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The ground "public order" was graphically examined by the Supreme 
Court in Suprintendent, Central Prison V. Ram Manohar Lohia.*° where the 
cons t i tu t iona l va l id i ty of Sec. 3 of Uttar Pradesh Special Powers Act 
1932 '^was successfu l ly cha l lenged before the Supreme Court. 
The case arose out of Dr. Lohia's, (a prominent opposition leader) pros-
ecution on account of making two speeches instigating the audience not to 
pay enhanced irrigation rates to the government. The UP. Government had 
enhanced the rates for water supplied to cultivators and the Socialist Party of 
India under Dr. Lohia's leadership had resolved to start an agitation against 
the enhancement for the alleged reason that it was unbearable burden on the 
cultivators. 
The Supreme Court took into consideration the interpretations made 
by it in earlier decisions in Romesh Thappar and Brij Bhushan on the words 
"public order" alongwith the first constitutional amendment in Article 19(2). 
Subba Rao. J. delivering the opinion of the Court rejected the plea of the 
state of "public order" and observed that in Article 19(2) the wide concept of 
"public order" was split up under different heads. The amended clause (2) 
enables Parliament to impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the 
right to freedom of speech and expression in the interests of security of the 
state, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality 
or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. All 
80. A.I.R 1960 S.C. 633 
81. Sec. 3 of U.P. Special Powers Act provided "Whoever by words, either spo-
ken or written, or by signs or by visible represenatation or otherwise, instigates 
expressly or by implication, any person or class of persons not to pay or defer 
payments of any liability and whoever does any act, with intent or knowing it to 
be likely that any words, signs or visible representation containing such instiga-
tion shall thereby be communicated directly or indirectly to any person or class 
of persons, in any manner whatsoever, shall be punishable with imprisonment 
which may extend to six months, or with fine, extending to Rs. 250, or with both" 
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these grounds, said the Court, could be brought under the general head "public 
order" in its most comprehensive sense. But the juxtaposition of the different 
grounds indicate that they must be intended to exclude each other. Public 
order is something which is demarcated from the others. In that limited sense, 
it could be postulated that public order is synonymous with public peace, 
safety and tranquility. Another conclusion in the case derived by the Supreme 
Court was that any remote or fanciful connection between the impunged Act 
and public order would not be sufficient to sustain its validity and pointed out 
that in Virendra V. State of Punjab, the Court made a distinction between a 
law which expressly and directly purported to maintain public order and the 
one which did not but left it to be implied from it, and between a law which 
directly maintained public order and the one which indirectly brought about 
the same result. The distinction did not ignore the necessity of intimate con-
nection between the law and the public order '^. 
In view of the above observations, the Court held that the impunged 
section was of very wide sweep. Even innocuous speeches and writings were 
prohibited by threat of punishment. Nobody would accept that in a demo-
cratic setup there was no scope for agitational approach that if a law was bad 
the only course was to get it amended by democratic process and that any 
instigation to break the law was in itself a disturbance of public order. If this 
view is accepted without obvious limitations would destroy the freedom of 
speech and expression the very foundation of democratic way of life '^. 
It may be submitted that the decision in this case narrowed the sweep 
of Virendra's case and into the words of Setalvad, "It is refreshing to turn 
82. Supra note. (80) at p.p. 639 - 40 
83. Ibid 
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next to Ram Manohar Lohia's case" which in his opinion indicates, "a more 
liberal appraoch by the Court in judging of the validity of legislation compe-
tent under Article 19(2)."** However, the view of the Court that any instiga-
tion to break a law may not always be an offence is untenable. 
In Babu Lai Parate ** the constitutional validity of Sec. 144 of Code of 
Criminal Procedure'® was challenged on the ground that it places unreason-
able restriction on the right of freedom of speech and expression. It was held 
by the Court that this section read as a whole clearly showed that it was in-
tended to secure the public weal and order by preventing disorders, obstruc-
tions and annoyances and the orders that could pass under it by responsible 
magistrate were only of temporary nature. The Court also did not accept the 
plea of 'clear and present danger' evolved in Schenck V. United States '^ 
that previous restraints on the exercise of fundamental right were permis-
sible only if there was a clear and present danger, stating that it has no appli-
cation in India since the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) were not abso-
lute but subject to the restrictions under clause (2) of Article 19. Thus the 
Court once again followed the test expressed in Virendras case and allowed 
extensive preventive and other powers to local officials as long as some pat-
tern of control existed. 
84. Setalvad, M.C : The Indian Constitution at p. 72 
85. AIR 1961 B.C. 885 
86. Sec. 144 Or. PC. says a Magistrate, If he is of the opinion that there is sufficient 
ground for immediate prevention, can by a written order direct a person or persons 
to abstain from certain acts if he considers that such direction is likely to prevent a 
disturbance of pubic tranquility or a riot or an affray. 
87. Schenck V. U.S. 249 U.S. 47 (1919) 
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In Kedar Nath V. State of Bihar " . Once again the scope of public 
order was under consideration when the constitutional validity of Sec. 124-A 
and 505' 'was challenged. 
The Supreme Court, perhaps to point out that though the sedition un-
der Article 19(2) was not a ground upon which the restrictions could be placed 
on freedom of speech and expression, but the concept was not altogather 
dropped by the Assembly, referring several Indian and English decisions 
alongwith the opinion of Fazal Ali. J. (who expressed a dissenting opinion in 
Romesh Thappar and Brij Bhushan Cases) the Court also quoted the follow-
ing observations of Federal Court in N.D. Majumdar V.Emperor *". 
88. A.I.R 1962 SO. 955 
89. Sec. 124 - A of I.P.O. Provides: Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by 
signs, or by visible representation, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or con-
tempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards the Government estab-
lished by law in India, shall be punished with imprisonement for life, to which fine 
may be added, or with imprisonement which may extend to three years, to which 
fine may be added, or with fine. 
Explanation 1 
The expression "disaffection" includes disloyality and ill feelings of enmity. 
Explanation 2 
Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures of the Government 
with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, without exciting or 
attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an 
offence under this section. 
Explanation 3 
Comments expressing disapprabation of the administrative or the other ac-
tion of the Government without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, con-
tempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section. 
Sec. 505 of l.P.C makes it a punishable offence to make rumours or reports 
among the members of armed forces with intent to cause mutiny or an of-
fence against public tranquility, or to induce one class or community to com-
mit an offence against another. 
90. A.I.R. 1942 F.C. 22 
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The first and most fundamental duty of every government is the preser-
vation of order since order is the condition precedent to all civilisations and 
the advance of human happiness. This duty has no doubt been sometimes 
performed in such a way as to make the remedy worse than the disease; but 
it does not cease to be a matter of obligation because some on whom the 
duty rests have performed it ill. It is to this aspect of functions of the govern-
ments that in our opinion the offences of sedition stands related. 
It is answer of the state to those, who for the purpose of attacking or 
subverting it seek to disturb its tranquility, to create public disturbance 
and to promote disorder, or who incite others to do so Public 
disorder, or the reasonable anticipation or liklihood of public disorder, is thus 
the gist of an offence. The acts and words complained of must either incite to 
disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable man that this is their inten-
tion and tendency.*"* 
The Court in the light of above observations upheld the constitutional-
ity of Sec. 124 - A. The Court said that the expression "in the interest of public 
order" was of wide amplitude and much more comprehensive than the ex-
pression " for the maintenance of public order." In the opinion of the Court, 
Sec. 124 - A read as a whole alongwith the explanations appended to it leaves 
no doubt that the section aimed at making penal only such activities as would 
be intended, or have a tendency, to create disorder or disturbance of public 
peace by resort to violence. 
91. Quoted in AIR 1962 SO. 955 at p. 964. 
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The Supreme Court in view of above observations also upheld the con-
stitutionality of Sec. 505 I.P.C. It however, added that each one of the con-
stituent element of the offence under this section had reference to, and a 
direct effect on, the security of the state or public order. Hence its provisions 
did not exceed the bounds of reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech 
and expression and consequently saved by Article 19 (2).''^ 
The Court thus by adopting the well known principle severability, up-
held the section by restricting it to the narrower meaning propounded by the 
Federal Court (Which infact had been turned down decisively by the Privy 
Council). 
After Ram Manohar Lohia's Case the Supreme Court in Kishori Mohan 
V.State of West Bengal once again explained the term law and order, public 
order and security of state. The Court made it clear that in case if an indi-
vidual is affected, it would effect 'law and order' however another act though 
of a similar kind may have such an impact that it would disturb even the tempo 
of the life of the community in which case it would be said to affect 'public 
order' the test being the potentiality of the act in question. 
92. Id at p.p. 967 - 70 
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Decency or Morality 
he development of a society depends upon the high standards of 
decency and morality because without following them, it is bound to be af-
fected by lower instincts of the society. The Geneva Conference of 1923 on 
Suppression of Circulation, and Traffic in. Obscene Publication raised this 
issue with vigour. The need therefore, was felt to include the ground "de-
cency or morality" in Article 19(2), in the absence of which the freedom might 
have been frequently abused. 
Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution permits legislative abridgement 
of the right to freedom of speech and expression in the interest of decency or 
morality. The expression "indecency" apparently seems to be easily 
interchangable with "obscenity". However.there is some difference between 
the two. The indecency includes any thing which an ordinary man or woman 
would find to be shocking, disgusting and revolting where as the obscenity 
contains the prurient appeal as an essential element. It is evident, therefore, 
that indecency has a wider concept than obscenity. A horror movie may be 
indecent for a young person but not obscene, but an obscene object almost 
certainly must be indecent.*^ 
The law of obscenity in India is contained in S.s 292 to 294 of Indian 
Penal Code, 1860. The law under these sections make it an offence to sell,let 
~9Z. Basu D.D. : Law of the Press at p.p. 100 - 01 
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to hire, distribute,publicly exhibit, export, import any book, pamphlet, paper 
drawing, painting or participation in any activity as provided under the provi-
sions. 
In India, it was Ranjit D. Udeshi's Case ^ where for the first time the 
Supreme Court had an occassion to explain the meaning of obscenity when 
the constitutional validity of Sec. 292 of I. P. C. was challenged. The appeallant 
was convicted as he had exhibited for sale the unexpurgated edition of The 
Lady Chatteriey's Lover by D.H. Lawrence at his book stall. The plea raised 
on his behalf was that Sec. 292. I.PC. is violative of Article 19(1){a) as the 
meaning of the term "obscene" was too vague, or as at any rate, it applied 
only to the writings, pictures etc. intended to arouse sexual desire. The mere 
treating with sex and nudity in art or literature was not per se, evidence of 
obscenity. 
The Supreme Court while upholding the constitutional validity of the 
impunged law adopted the Hicklin's test laid down by Cockburn C.J.in Queen 
V. Hicklin which runs into following words.*' 
"Whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave 
and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into 
v^ose hands a publication of this sort may fall It is quite certain that it 
would suggest to the minds of the young of either sex, or even to persons of 
more advanced years, thoughts of most impure and libidinous charcter.®* 
94. AIR 1965 SO. 881 
95. (1868) 3 Q.B. 360 
96. Quoted in AIR 1965 B.C. 881 at p. 887 
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The Court was of the view that in judging a work stress should not be 
laid upon a word here and a word there, or a passage here and a passage 
there. Though the work as a whole must be considered, the obsence matter, 
however must be considered by itself and seperately to find out whether it 
was so gross and its obscenity so decided that it was likely to deprave and 
corrupt those v^ose minds were open to the influences of this sort. Where 
obscenity and art were mixed. The art must be so preponderant as to throw 
obscenity into a shadow or the so trivial and insignificant that it could have 
no effect and might be over looked. 
The judgement of the Supreme Court traversed a substantial corpus of 
authority, English®^ as well as American^ . Ultimately Hidayatullah, J. rested 
his decision upon the authority of Hicklin, though he acknowledged the con-
tinuing shift in standards and values. He did not, however, enquire deeply 
into the uncertainities of meaning in the words 'deprave and corrupt' and 
strongly emphasised the relevance of contemporary community standards 
The issues decided by the Court may be summarised as following. 
1) The Hicklin test is still correct test to be applied in establishing ob-
scenity and it should continue to apply. 
2) The test was the tendency to deprave and corrupt and not the intention 
or the knowledge, as they are not mentioned in the section. 
3) Though the expertopiniDn is adm 3ssi)]e butnotconcias ive because 
97. a) Queen V. Hicklin (1868) 3 Q.B. 360(b) R.V. Curl (1708) 11 Mod 142 Case 
No. 205 (0) R.V. Reiter (1954) Q.B. 16, (d) R.V. Martin Seeker and Warburg Ltd. 
(1954) WLR, 1138 
98. a) Roth VU.S. (1957) 354 U.S. 478 (b) Manuel Enterprises Inc VJ. Edward 
Ray (1962) 370 U.S. 478 (c) Nico Jacobellis V. State of Ohio (1964) 112 Penn. L. 
Rev 834. 
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the offending novel and the portions which are subject to charge must 
judged by the Court in the light of section 292 IPC and the provisions of 
the Constitution and not in the light of the expert opinion. 
4) A balance should be maintained between freedom of speech and ex-
pression and decency or morality. But when the latter was substantially 
transgressed, the former must give way. 
The Hicklin test and the observations made there- under were fol-
lowed in Chandrakant Kakodkar V.State of Maharashtra*® where the appeallant 
was the author of a story 'Shama' published in a monthly Marathi magazine 
'Ramba' of Diwali issue in 1962. The story dealt with the relationship of three 
women who came into the frustrated life of the male character, Nishikant. 
One of the women who entered into the life of Nishikant after realising that 
her love could not be consummated as her parents would not allow her to 
marry with her lover, encourages him to bring it to a culmination point. The 
story was adjudged obscene and the author was convicted under Section 292 
of Indian Panel Code. 
Before the Supreme Court the impunged section was challenged as 
ultra-vires to the Article 19(1 )(a) of the Constitution. The apex court once 
again following the Hicklin's test observed that. In obscenity cases the courts 
were bound to see whether alleged material caused the likely reader to suf-
fer in their moral outlook or depraved them on reading it or arouse Impure 
and lecherous thoughts' in their minds. If it was so the impunged material 
could be judged as obscene." 
99. AIR 1970 SO. 1390 
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However, realising the changes through which the society at present is 
passing the Court further made some thoughtful observations on the 
issue involved in obscenity cases. 
"The concept of obscenity would differ from country to country de-
pending upon the standards of morals in contemporary society. What is 
considered as a piece of literature in France may be obscene in En-
gland and what is considered in both countries not harmful may be ob-
scene in our country. If the writers were always expected to write in 
accordance with the adolescents only, then they would be deprived of 
the opportunity to write for adults and, therefore, the Court finally de-
clared that it was only ^class of persons' and not isolated cases of 
young and adolescents' which should be taken at the time of deter-
mining the 'debasing and debauching' effect of any work. 
In Samresh Bose V. Amal Mitra""*", . A novel Prajapati, published 
in the annual Puja number of well known Bengali magazine 'Desh' had 
main character Sukhen depicted as a person who hates hypocracy, political 
leaders who thrive on others, teachers who do not devote themselves for the 
welfare of the students etc. It contained several obscene passages. The 
main theme of the book charged as obscene had the character and 
mental order of its hero Sukhen who because of his unhappy life at 
home of his parents turns restless causing him to be involved in a num-
ber of sexua l ep isodes which were described in the book in inhibited 
manner. In the novel Sukhen is shown involved in catching a butterfly but 
attempt was thwar ted by gir l Shikha lying in the bed with a scanty dress 
on. He no t i ces it.At this moment he remembers how few days back he 
had an affair with another girl about 14 years of age during a picnic. 
100. Samaresh Bose V. Amal Mitra AIR 1986 S.C. 967 
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His reminiscences of that affair were held obscene by trial court and the High 
Court. There were other episodes suggestive of sex ie. Sukhen and his 
friends's sister Manjari and affair of his brother with the maid servant's daugh-
ter. The author and the publisher were prosecuted under Sec 292 of Indian 
Panel Code, 1860. The Conviction and sentence was maintained by Calcutta 
High Court. 
The Supreme Court showing disagreement with the view of 
Calcutta High Court once again expressed its opinion in favour of dominant 
theme and held the book as not obscene. It opined that references to kissing, 
descriptions of the body and figures of female character in the alleged book 
with suggestions of acts of sex by themselves did not have the effect of de-
praving, debasing and encouraging the readers of any age to lasciviousness.''"^ 
However it was admitted by the Court that there were certain episodes sug-
gestive of sex but they were vulgar and could not be equated with obscenity. 
Making a distinction between vulgarity and obscenity the Court said vulgar-
ity arouse only feeling of 'disgust', 'revulsion', and 'boredom' and did not pos-
sess to have the effect of depraving, debasing and corrupting the morals of 
any reader, whereas the obscenity has a tendency to deprave and corrupt 
those whose minds were open to such immoral influences. Thus the Court 
once again affirmed the Hicklin's test.^°^ 
Another important point decided by the Court is the relevance of expert 
testimony . It was observed by Sen J. that though the Court was not altogather 
bound to rely on the oral evidence of experts but it may be necessary to rely 
upon to certain extent on the evidence and views of leading literati on that 
subject particularly when a book is in a language with which the Court is not 
conversant.^°^ However, it made it clear that such an opinion is a matter for 
its own subjective satisfaction. 
101. id at p. 983 
102. ibid 
103. Id at p. 984 
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Contempt of Court 
press plays a vital role in the administration of justice. It is the 
watchdog to see that every trial is conducted fairly, openly and abov board. 
Any misconduct in a trial is sure to receive notice in the press and subse-
quent condemnation by public opinion. The press itself is liable to make mis-
takes. The watchdog may sometimes break loose and have to be punished 
for misbehaviour.""** The contempt of court, therefore, is an area where a 
journalist has to tread warily. Oswald, an authority on the subject defines it in 
the following terms. 
"To speak generally, contempt of court may be said to be constituted 
by any conduct that tends to bring any authority and the administration of the 
law into disrespect or disregard or to interfere with or prejudice parties liti-
gant or their witnesses during the litigation."^•'^ 
The Indian Constitution empowers the Supreme Court under Article 
129 and the High Court udner Article 215 to punish a person for their con-
tempt.'"* Article 19(2), also permits the imposition of restrictions on the free-
dom of speech and expression in relation to contempt of court. 
104. Quoted in freedom of press in India by J. MInattur at p. 78 
105. Quoted in Press Law by Mudhalkar, J.R. at p. 49 
106. Article 129 :- The Supreme Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the 
powers of such a court including the power to punish, for contempt of itself. 
Article 215:- Every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the 
powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. 
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After the Constitution came into force Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 
was enacted. The aforesaid Act, however, did not define the word contempt, 
and, therefore, the courts in India had to import the English concept of the 
contempt. 
The Supreme Court in 1952 for the first time held the Editor, Printer 
and publisher of the newspaper Times of India' guilty of contempt for pub-
lishing an article, criticising its judgement in an objectionable manner. Beside 
other things, it was stated in the article that, "Politics and parties have no 
place in the pure region of law; and the courts of law would serve the country 
and the constitution better by discarding all exrtraneous considerations and 
uncompromisingly observing divine detachment which is the glory of law and 
guarantee of justice." The Court while dropping the proceeding on account of 
an unconditional apology tendered by the respondants, observed: No objec-
tion could have been taken to the article had it merely preached to the courts 
of law the sermon of divine detachment. But when it proceeded to attribute 
improper motives to the judges, it not only transgressed the limits of fair and 
bonafide criticism, but had a clear tendency to affect the dignity and prestige 
of this Court." 
In Hira Lai Dixit V. State of U.P.''°^ the party to pending appeal in the 
Supreme Court to which the state of U.P was the respondent, distributed in 
the court premises a printed leaflet which had the follwoing paragraph: 
"The public has full and firm faith in the Supreme Court but the sources 
that are in the know say that the government acts with partiality in the matter 
107. AIR. 1954 SO. 743 
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of appointment of Hon'ble judges as Ambassdors, Governors, High Commis-
sioner etc. who give judgement against government but this has so for not 
made any difference in the firmness and justice of Hon'ble judges." 
The apex court made it clear that the object of writing the above para-
graph and publishing it particularly at that time was obviously to affect the 
minds of the judges and to deflect them from the strict performance of their 
duties, thus tending to hinder or obstruct the due administration of justice. It 
was not a fair comment on proceedings but an attempt to prejudice the Court 
against the state and to star up public feeling on the very question pending 
for the decision. The Supreme Court, therefore, expressed the view that it 
were not only those activities which actually interfere in the administration of 
justice that constitute the contempt but even those activities which have a 
tendency of interfering with the administration of justice. 
in E.M.S. Namboodaripad V.T.N. Nambiar,'''** the appeallant was the 
Chief Minister of Kerala. He, in a press conference made certain critical re-
marks about the judiciary and described it as an "instrument of oppression" 
and judges as "guides and dominated by class hatred" instinctively favouring 
the rich against the poor. The remarks were reported in newspaper. The 
appeallant was convicted on a charge for contempt and sentenced to a fine of 
Rs 1000/- and in default to undergo imprisonment for one month. On appeal 
the Supreme Court held that the words constituted the contempt of court and 
were intended to weaken the authority of law and the law courts by having 
the effect of lowering the prestige of judges and the courts alike. Accordingly 
the Court dismissed the appeal but reduced the penalty up to Rs 50/. 
108. AIR 1970 SO. 2015 
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It was observed that "The courts in India are not sui generis. They 
owe their existence, form, powers and jurisdiction to the Constitution and the 
laws. The Constitution is the Supreme law and other laws are made by parlia-
ment. It is they that give the courts their obligatory duties, one such being the 
settlement of disputes in which the state (by which we mean those in author-
ity) are ranged against citizens. Again they decide disputes in which class 
interests are apparent. Explaining further its role the Court said. The Court as 
well as all the other organs and institutions are equally bound by the Constitu-
tion and the laws. Although the courts in such cases imply the widest powers 
in the other jurisdictions and also give credit where it belongs they can not 
always decide either in favour of the state or any particular class. There are 
inumerable cases in which the decisions have gone against what may be de-
scribed in the language of communism as the exploiting classes.'*^ 
Later on it was felt that the law on the subject was uncertain, undefined 
and unsatisfactory, a Committee was constituted under the chairmanship of 
Mr. H.N. Sanyal, the then Additional Solicitor General to scrutinise the exist-
ing law and make recommendations relting to the revision of contempt law 
v^ ich affected two important fundamental right namely freedom of speech 
and expression and personal liberty. On the recommendations of the Com-
mittee the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was enacted and section 24 of this 
Act repealed the contempt of Courts Act, 1952. However in the year 1976 an 
amendment was made in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 
The aforesaid Act classified contempt of court into two categories. A) 
Civil contempt which means and includes wil ful disobedience to any 
109. Id at p. 2023 
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judgement, decree, direction or order, and (B) Criminal contempt which means 
and includes publication whether by words spoken or written, signs, visible 
representation or otherwise and scandlising, lowering the authority of law 
and administration of justice. 
The question before the Supreme Court in A.K.Gopalan V. Noordeen 
was whether any publication regarding a case pending before it amounts to 
contempt.'''"' 
In this case a statement was made by the first appeallant charging one 
group of persons being guilty of conspiracy to commit murder. Some persons 
were subsequently arrested in connection with abov referred case. The said 
statement of first appeallant was also published in a newspaper edited by the 
second appeallant. They were convicted by the Kerala High Court for Com-
mitting contempt by making and publishing the said statement. They made an 
appeal to Supreme Court. The first appeallant was acquitted on the ground 
that it would be an undue restriction on the liberty of speech to lay down that 
even before any arrest had been made there should be no comments on the 
facts of any particular case. The Court however, confirmed the conviction of 
second appeallant who despite having knowledge of the fact that arrests have 
been made, published the statement. The Court took the statement published 
by the second appeallant regarding the case when it was pending before the 
Court as to prejudicing the case and consequently amounted interference in 
the administration of justice. 
In C. K. Daphtary V. O. P. Gupta^^^ where the first respondent had 
m AIR 1970 SO. 1694 
111. AIR 1971 SO. 1132 
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got printed published and circulated a pamphlet containing scurrilous criti-
cism of a senior judge of Supreme Court who sat alongwith another judge for 
deciding an appeal, using the words "dishonest judgement" "open dishon-
esty", "deliberately and dishonestly", and "utter dishonesty" etc. He also stated 
in the pamphlet that the senior judge cleverly asked the junior judge to de-
liver the judgement who toed to his line by writing v^at the senior told him to 
write. Proceedings for committing contempt were initiated against him but the 
respondent avoided the service till the senior judge retired. Thereafter he 
filed a counter affidavit containing an unconditional apology but also hurling 
fresh abuses against the senior judge. It was brought on record that proceed-
ing had been initiated against the respondent when the Senior judge was still 
on bench. The Supreme Court held that by avoiding the execution of warrant 
the he had tried to take advantge of his own wrong. And consequently con-
victed him on finding that the remarks in the pamphlet made against a judge 
were wholly unjustified. The Court based its judgement on the fact that con-
tempt proceedings had already been initiated before the senior judge retired 
but failed to take into notice the fact that since he had already retired the 
administration of justice could not have suffered. 
In Barad Kanta V. Registrar Orissa High Court^" the Supreme Court 
considered the scope of Article 235"^ in context with a criminal contempt of 
112. Barda Kanta V. Registrar Orissa High Court AIR 1974 B.C. 710 
113. Language of Article 235.provides "The control over dis-
trict courts and courts subordinate there to including posting and promotion, 
of and the grant of leave to , perosns belonging to the judicial service of 
state and holding any post inferior to the post of district judge shall be vested 
in the High Court, but nothing in this articles shall be construed as taking 
away from any such person any right of appeal wich may have under the law 
regulating the conditions of his service or as authorising the High Court to 
deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service 
prescribed under such law." 
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court under section 2(c) of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.''^^ Barad Kanta 
was a subordinate judicial officer who refused to follow the decisions of 
the High Court. His conduct was considered by the Supreme Court as 
fal l ing within the preview of law of contempt. He also complained against 
the Chief Justice and other judges of Orissa High Court. 
The Supreme Court observed that no comprehensive definition of "ad-
ministration of justice" had been brought to the attention of the Court. It pointed 
out that the administration of justice did not consist merely in the adjudication 
of disputes between parties.Article 235 entrusts the High Court of disiplinary 
control over the subordinate judiciary and exercise of this jurisdiction was 
essential for the administration of justice. Consequently vilificatory criticism 
of a judge functioning even in an administrative or non-adjudicating matter 
amounted to criminal contempt. However if the alleged vilification of a judge 
takes the form of a complaint which is absolutely made in good faith to per-
sons in authority to prevent abuse in the administration of justice, would this 
amount the contempt? Seervai gives the answer correctly an obvious 'No' 
otherwise the disiplinary jurisdiction of the High Court can never be invoked 
without risking committal for contempt. 
Though the fair comment does not amount the contempt but on the 
other hand if the criticism exceeds the limit and tends to scandlise the admin-
114. Sec 2 provides : In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires. 
C) "Criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or 
written or by sings, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter 
or the doing of any other act whatsoever which -
i) Scandlises or tends to scandlise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, 
any court, or 
ii) Prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any jucidical 
proceeding, or 
iii) Interferes , tends to interfere with, or obstmcts or tends to obstnjct, adminis-tration 
of justice in any other manner 
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istration of justice or undermines the confidence which the public rightly re-
pose in the courts of justice or is likely to interfere with the administration of 
justice, the press becomes liable to contempt as its criticism no more, is based 
on public good. In Habeas Corpus Case""" during the Emergency the Su-
preme Court made a radical interpretation of the effect of a presidential order 
under Article 359 of the Constitution which took away the locus standai of the 
detenu to move the Supreme Court or the High Court to complain against the 
deprivation of his liberty. The denial of judicial review evoked a protest from 
the lovers of liberty prominently the lawyers from Bombay subscribed a docu-
ment of protest criticising the judgement in strong words and alleging that the 
judges who had decided the case had behaved in a cowardly manner. Chief 
Justice Beg explained and defended the judgement in that case and took the 
view that to say that it was a misdeed on the part of the judges in the case 
and that they should be 'ostracised' for such a perverse veiw, was 'irrational 
and abusive'and amounted contempt.''''* 
But the majority (consisting of Justice Untwalia and Kailasam), did not 
deal with the case and simply disposed of the matter on the basis that it is 
not a fit case where a formal proceeding should be drawn up^''^ they pro-
posed to drop the proceedings. Beg, C.J. also joined in the common order. 
Since it was a proceeding under Article 129 of the Constitution and the ma-
jority gave no reasons for their order, it is difficult to say on what ground they 
ignored what Beg, C.J. called 'irrational and abusive' contempt. Unless the 
majority differed from the finding of the fact of Chief Justice, it must be said 
115. AIR 1976 S.C.1207 
116. In Re Sham Lai AIR 1978 S.C. 489 
117. Id at p. 493 
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that 'irrational and abusive' contempt is not a fair comment, an exception to 
contempt of court. However, whatever may be the reason for dropping the 
case, it clearly demonstrates the risk which a journalist faces by merely re-
producing the signed document on a judgement, made by eminent persons. 
On the other hand in Indian Express Case known as in re Mulgaonkar'''" case, 
Chief Justice Beg was willing to drop proceedings even though the judges 
had been criticised and in which he was also attacked for framing a code of 
ethics for judges. He talked of the responsibilities of judges and lawyers and 
hoped that "the seperate statement of reasons for dropping the proceedings 
(would) succeed in at least emphasising that they would not have been in 
vain^^®. The Supreme Court laid down certain norms regarding publication in 
newspapers which may be summarised as under. 
"National interest requires that all criticism of judiciary must be strictly 
rational and sober and proceed from the highest motives without being coloured 
by partisan spirit or tactics. The judiciary can not be immune from criticism. 
But when that criticism is based on obvious distortions or gross misstatement 
and made in a manner which seems designed to lower the respect for the 
judiciary and destroy public confidence in it, it can not be ingnored. The court 
must harmonise constitutional values of fair criticism and need for fearless 
curial process and its presiding functionary - the jugde. To criticise a Judge 
fairly, albeit fiercely, is no crime but a necessary right. Where freedom of 
expression subserves public interest in reasonable measure, public justice 
can not gag it or manacle it. But if the Court considers the attack on the judge 
or judges scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory or malicious beyond condonable 
limits the strong arm of law must strike a blow on him who challenges the 
118. AIR 1978 SO. 727 
119. Id at p. 735 
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supremacy of the rule of law by fauling its source and stream. 
The Supreme Court once again examined the scandlising jurisdiction 
in Umaria Pamphlet Case^^^where pamphlet accused the magistrate of being 
'wayword' and having a predisposition to convict. He was alleged to have 
misinterpreted the evidence and the case v^as reversed on appeal. The au-
thor of the pamphlet took the plea of fair comment and non-interference with 
the due course of justice. Under the Act of 1971, the plea of fair comment is 
available only when case is not pending, since an appeal was possible in the 
case, justice Desai was of the view that it can not be raised, but even then 
Supreme Court allowed it to take the plea as the High Court had allowed the 
same. Justice Desai relying upon pre -1971 Supreme Court and English cases 
observed that contempt jurisdiction was not obsolete. 
Whether a statement in a press affecting trade when the case is pend-
ing would amount to contempt was before the court in Naraindas V, State of 
M. P. Bhagvati J,•'^''took the view that the effect of press release at the most 
night have affected the business interest of the appeallant but it was quite 
different as the said press release could not have prejudiced the writ petition 
pending before a Court which is essential in contempt jurisdiction. 
It seems that Bhagvati J, gave a restrictive interpretation of contempt 
jurisdiction because in this case the reason for getting the injunction was to 
protect the business interest of the complainant. Therefore, if the Press Note 
adversely affected very business which the interim injunction was designed 
to protect it was an interference with the due administration of justice hence 
amounted the contempt of the Court. 
120. RamDayal V. State of U. P. AIR 1978 SO. 921 
121 (1974) L.J. 924 
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In National Textile Worker's Union's Case"^, Supreme Court explained 
the extent of fair comment. According to the facts of the case, contemner had 
made serious allegations which were published in the press against a judge 
of Madras High Court. The allegations could not be proved. The Supreme 
Court while holding him guilty observed that, while commenting on matters 
pending in courts, the press should bear in mind that the parties to case have 
as much right to get redress and the hands of Court uninfluenced by external 
pressure as the press has its right to publish news and comments. Funda-
mental rights are guaranteed to all citizens and their enjoyement is possible 
only when every citizen respects the rights of others. 
The Supreme Court vA^We admitting that courts may not be always cor-
rect and that fair criticism though strong is not contempt added one more 
observation that allegation of improper motive without any justification can 
not be ignored. Though the court did not explain as to what constitute the 
improper motive but the language if taken in the light of aforesaid observa-
tion makes it clear that only those allegations which could not be justified 
were allegations with improper motive, and therefore, any allegation which is 
proved in a court of law would be treated as fair criticism. 
The same interpretation was adopted in M.R. Parashar V. Farooq 
Abdulla where it was alleged that the Chief Minister had made certain state-
ments which amount the contempt of court. Chief Minister in an affiavit de-
nied the allegations. It was not clear under the circumstances to hold as 
to who (Editor or Chief Minister) has committed the contempt of court. 
Under such situation chandrachud, J. choose the general principle of 
criminal law and held that in the cases of criminal contempt the charge 
122. National Textile Worker's Union V.P.R. Ramakrishinan AIR 1983 SO. 
759 
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of contempt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. He, in the course of 
his judgement rightly observed that if a high dignitory wish to avoid the risk of 
being charged with contempt of court, it was pre-eminently desirable that the 
speech should be reduced to writing or a script prepared soon after, or what 
is now customary, that a tape recording should be made.' '" 
Thus the fact that the decisions of the courts are reversed by higher 
courts and the highest court reviews its own judgement itself shows that they 
may not be always correct. But while fair criticism, even if strong, may not be 
actionable, attributing improper motives to judges without justification tend-
ing to bring them to ridicule, hatred and contempt can not be ingnored. This 
is not so because individual judges should be protected but because courts 
as institutions of national importance should be protected so that they may 
be able to discharge their duties prescribed by the Constitution and the laws. 
123. A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 615 at p. 617 
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D e f a m a t i o n 
^ 
^ e f a m a t i o n is an injury to a man's reputation which is regarded 
as his property while insult is an injury to one's self respect. In other 
words a person is defamed when his reputation is lowered in the esti-
mation of others.•'^^ 
In India, the liability for defamation is two fold: (a) Civil, and, (b) 
Criminal. Defamation, when viewed as a civil wrong may be defined as 
the publication by a defendant to a third party of a false statement which 
tends to lower the plantiff in the estimation of right thinking members of 
the society or which causes him to be shunned or avoided by such mem-
bers. On the subject of civil liability for defamation there is no codified 
law in India and the rules that are applied by our courts are mostly 
hose borrowed from the common law. Under common law there is com-
plete immunity from liability not only in respect of defamatory state-
ments of fact if those statements are true, but also in respect of 
defamatory statements of opinions which are fair comment on matter of 
public interest. A number of occassions are privileged, some absolutely 
priviledged ie. speech of a member in the parliament etc. so that no 
action can lie under any circumstances and some of qualified privi-
leges so that no action can be without proof of malice that is ill-will. 
Ti l Op Git note (93) at p. 112 
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However, the law of criminal liability is codified and contained under 
Sections 499-502 of Indian Penal Code. The offence requires the mensrea 
and the section 499 of the Penal Code provides defences which exhaust al-
most all the traditional defences. 
It has been established by the decisions of the apex court that the free-
dom of journalist is an ordinary part of the freedom of a citizen and the press 
does not enjoy any special privilege. The press, therefore, is bound by Ar-
ticle 19(2) which places reasonable restrictions on the ground of defamation 
upon the freedom of press.""^"^ 
Since the word 'defamation' has not been defined under the Constitu-
tion and the civil law is not codified there remains the section 499 of In-
dian Penal Code which expressly defines the word 'defamation'. The section 
says that a person commits defamation when by words either spoken or in-
tended to be read, or by signs or visible representation, he makes or pub-
lishes any imputation concerning any person, intending to harm or knowing 
or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of 
such person unless the case falls under any of the exceptions attached to the 
section . Moreover the press possess all the rights enjoyed by a citizen the 
editorial good faith becomes a crucial factor in the determination of a crimi-
nal liability of a newspaper for defamation. In Sahib Singh's case ^ " a news-
paper kaliyug, published from Aligarh, contained defamatory statements 
against public prosecutors and assistant public prosecutors. From the tenor 
124-A. Article 361-A [forms an exception to Article 19(2)] exempts any person from any 
liability civil or criminal before any court of law in respect of any publication in a 
newspaper of substantiallly true report to the proceedings of either House of Parlia-
ment or State Legislataure provided it is not made with malice even if such publica-
tion is defamatory to others. The above provision therefore, also provides the consti-
tutional protection to the Parliamentary Proceeding (Protection of Publication) Act, 
1977 which also contains a similar provision. 
125. Sahib Singh V. State of UP AIR 1965 S.C. 1451 at p. 1454 
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of the article no evidence of an object of advancing the public good was es-
tablished and there was also no evidence to show the defamatory remarks 
have been made with due care and attention. The Supreme Court while stress-
ing the great power of the press in impressing the public mind held the press 
guilty of causing defamation. 
The issue of 'good faith' was one of the major factor in determining the 
freedom of press in relation to defamation in Sewak Ram Sobhani V. R.K. 
Karanjea."*^® During Emergency Sobhani, a top R.S.S. leader was lodged in 
Bhopal Central Jail. Another young lady Mrs. Uma Shukia was also lodged in 
the same jail. The jail rules do not allow free mixing among male and female 
inmates but the rules were not strictly followed. Mrs. Uma Shukia was found 
pregnant and underwent an abortion. An enquiry was conducted by a high 
rank official who in his report indicated that Mr.Sobhani was responsible for 
empregnating the young lady. The summary of the report appeared in 'Blitz', 
edited and printed by Mr. R.K. karanjia. When emergency was revoked, the 
appeallant filed a suit for defamation against the editor. The editor claimed 
exeption of Sub. Sec.(9) of Sec 499 iPC^^and insisted to produce the en-
quiry report to the magistrate before his statement is recorded. The Govern-
ment claimed the privilege and the prayer of the editor was rejected. He filed 
an appeal before the High Court and a copy of the report was supplied. The 
High Court on the basis of that report quashed the prosecution of the editor. 
126. Sewak Ram Sobhani V. R.K. Karanjia AIR 1981 SO. 1514 
127. Exception iX to Sec. 499 IPC provides that it is not defamation to make an impu-
tation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in 
good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any 
other person or for the public good. 
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Finally the matter came before the Supreme Court. 
The issue before the apex court was that whether or not the report was 
published in 'good faith' and 'public interest'. All the three judges (A.P. Sen, 
J., O.Chinnoppa Reddy J., majority and Bahrul Islam, J. minority) delivered 
the seperate judgements. 
A. P. Sen, J., answered in affirmative when he observed, "It was a pub-
lication of report for welfare of the society The balance of public 
benefit lay in its publicity rather than in hushing up the whole episode. The 
report further shows that the publication has been honestly made in belief of 
its truth and also upon reasonable ground for such a belief, after the exercise 
of such means to verify its truth as would be taken by a man of ordinary 
prudence under like circumstances."'*^^ But even then he opined that unless 
an enquiry report has been duly proved, it has no evidentiary value. More-
over, when there was nothing to show that accused has taken due care and 
caution and had acted in good faith. The High Court should not have used it 
for basing its conclusion. 
Chinnappa Reddy, J., however, was of the view that, "questions of ^good 
faith' and ^public good' are questions of fact and could be decided only after a 
regular trial is held and should not have been answered at the stage when 
even the accused was not examined. "^^ 
Bahrul (slam, J., however in his dissenting opinion observed that, In-
quiry was made by a highly responsible officer and submitted to Govern-
ment If the complaint and consequent inquiry report be for public good, 
and the respondents had reasons to believe its content to be true, they will be 
protected under exception 9 of Sec. 499 IPC. Even if the burden of proof of 
'good faith' be on the accused; good faith need not be proved beyond rea-
sonable doubt. Once this is done whether publication was for public good 
128. Id at p. 1517 
129. Id at p. 1520 
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would be a matter of inference."^^^ 
Though Sen J. admitted that report was made in good faith and for 
'public good' and that publication was honestly made in belief of being true 
but he made a self contradictory observation that there was nothing to show 
that accused has taken due care and caution and had acted in good faith. 
The stand point of majority view seems to be that question of 'good faith' and 
public good can be decided only after examining the accused and the gist of 
exception clearly lays down 'any defamatory statement if made in good faith 
and for public good would not amount defamation". Therefore, if once the 
Court concludes that a statement is based on an enquiry report which the 
accused reasonably believes to be true and for public good, benefit of ex-
emption is available to him and there is no need to prove the report before 
basing the conclusion upon it. It may, therefore, be submitted that the minor-
ity judgement of Bahrul Islam presents a correct view. 
The landmark judgement in Auto-Shankar Case,''^'' narrowed the sweep 
of the ground of defamation as a reasonable restriction on the freedom of 
press. In this case Auto-Shankar who was sentenced to death for committing 
six murders wrote autobiography in the jail. He gave it with the knowledge 
and approval of jail authorities to his wife to hand over the same to his advo-
cate with a request to publish it into the petitioners magazine 'Nakheeran'. 
The autobiography depicted a close nexus between the prisoner and some 
I.A.S. and I.P.S. officials. Some of whom were his partners in various crimes. 
When the magazine announced its publication in serial, the news sent shock 
waves among the officials as they feared that they would be exposed. Thereafter 
130. id at p. 1523 
131. Rajgopal V. State of TN. AIR 1995 S.C. 264 
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Inspector General (Prison) wrote a letter to the editor that Auto-Shankar has 
denied of writing any autobiography and, therefore, the publication should be 
stopped. The editor moved to the Supreme Court. The question before the 
Supreme Court was whether public officials who apprehend that they or their 
colleagues may be defamed can impose a prior restraint upon the press to 
prevent such publications? 
Referring the New York Times V. U.S. popularly known as Pentagan 
Paper's Case that 'any system of prior restraint of (freedom of) expression 
comes to this court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional 
validity and in such cases the Government 'carries a heavy burden of show-
ing justification for the imposition of such a restraint' held that, "neither the 
Government nor the officials who apprehend that they may be defamed, 
have the right to impose prior restraint upon the publication of alleged 
autobiography of Auto-Shankar. The remedy to public official, public 
figures, if any, will arise only after the publication and will be governed 
by principle indicated herein" or in other words such official could take 
action for damages after publication, if they prove that the publication was 
based on false and published without any reasonable verification of facts.^ ^^ 
The Court however, made it clear that as a general rule no remedy is 
availabe to public officials if they are defamed due to any act done by 
them in discharge of their official duty but if they are defamed in their 
individual capacity they are free to seek remedy under the civil law or 
the criminal law like any other individual. 
132. Id at p. 277 
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The Court in the same case further extended the scope of freedom of 
press by holding that even the person whose own biography is to be pub-
lished or being published can not restrain the press if it is based on public 
record including the court record. Nevertheless, it also warned at the same 
time that if published beyond that ie. life story then unless it is published with 
the consent of the person concerned it would be an invasion on his privacy 
and the press in that case would be liable to the consequences.^" 
133. Supra note 131 (at p. 276) 
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Incitement to an offence 
j ia i lost countries consider incitement to an offence to be an offence 
irrespective of the results of such incitement. For exmaple, in England a per-
son who solicits or incites another to commit a felony or misdemeanour is 
liable to indictment at common law, even though the solicitation or incite-
ment produces no effect. Thus where the addressee does not read the letter 
containing incitement, the writer is guilty of the offence of incitement. In United 
States incitement to commit a crime is punishable and it has been held by 
the court that if the act, tendency of the act and the intent with which it is 
done, are the same, there is no ground for the saying that success alone 
warrants making the act a crime.'''* 
in India, amendment to Article 19(2) of the Constitution permits re-
strictive legislation on the right of freedom of speech and expression in rela-
tion to incitement to an offence. Under Article 367 the word "offence" has 
been assigned the same meaning as is given to it under Section 3(38) of 
General Clause Act, 1897 . " ' 
Thus the term is of very wide connotation and only redeeming feature 
is the judicial review of the fact that as to under what particular circumstances 
an act constitutes the incitement to an offence? so that a reasonable restric-
tion may be placed upon the right. 
n*. Schenck V. U.S. 249 U.S. 47 (1919) 
135. Under Sec 3(38) of General Clause Act the "offence" has been defined as 
an omission made punishable by law. 
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In State of Bombay V. Balsara"*. The Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutional validity of section 24(1) (b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949''". 
But simultaneously struck down the validity of Sec. 23(b) holding it so wide 
and vague that it would be difficult to define or limit the scope. Therefore, in 
order to be saved by the clause (2) to Article 19, the legislation must be 
levelled against a "definite" offence and a vague restriction is not a valid 
restriction. 
It is also essential that incitement must relate to a pre-existing of-
fence meaning thereby the incitement in order to be punishable, must be an 
act already an offence under any law for the time being in force. Consequently 
a person is not liable for any act of instigating or advocating for any activity 
which is not an offence or where a law is declared ultra vires to Article 19 no 
person may be punished under such law.^^ Again where an act is not an 
offence to ask the people to bring a change in the existing system by valid 
means (ie, In a democracy to change the Government through election), an 
appeal in newspaper to the aforesaid effect could not be said to have consti-
tuted the incitement to an offence. No restrictiion, therefore, could be placed 
upon the press to desist from publishing such appeals. 
136. 1951 S.C.J. 478 
137. Sec. 24 (1) - "No person shall print in any newspaper, newsheet, book, leaf-
let, booklet, or any other single or periodical publication or otherwise display or 
distribute any advertisement or other matter 
(b) which is calculated to encourage or incite any individual or class of individu-
als or the public generally to commit an offence under the Act, or to commit a 
breach or to evade the provisions of any rule, regulation or order made there-
under or the conditions of any licence permit, pass or authorisation granted 
thereunder. 
138. A. I. R 1960 S.C. 633 
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D urinq Emergency 
^ h o n Milton's Aeropagatica (1644) was primarily directed against the 
power of the licensor, when he said, 
"Give me liberty to know, to utter and argue freely according to 
conscience, abov all liberties ; whoever knew truth put to the 
worse, in a free and open encouter." " ^ 
This freedom of speech and expression has always held pride of place 
in civilised socities and has been humanity's ideal in times, ancient and mod-
ern. Its importance is reflected in 'The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights'"**" which lays down certain essential freedoms that mankind should 
have, of which freedom of speech and expression is one of the most impor-
tant. The right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and re-
gardless of frontiers. 
The founding fathers of our Constitution attached great importance to 
freedom of speech and expression and freedom of press, and therefore, they 
provided for ample freedom of speech and expression, yet as men of wis-
dom and vision they knew that nothing is more certain than the prin-
ciple that there are no absolute. Whilst recognising that wi thout a free 
press there can be no free society, they also rea l i se that freedom of 
139. Quoted in Law of Press Censorship in India By Sorabjee, S.J. at p. o3 
140. Article 19 of the Declaration provides that, "Every one has the right to free-
dom of opinion and expression, this hght includes freedom to hold opinions 
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers" 
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press was not an end in itself but a means to the end of a free 
society. This freedom of press did not imply the freedom from re-
sponsibi l i t ies for its exercise and without a disciplined sense of 
responsibi l i ty, a free press which is an inestimable privilege may 
well become the 'scourage of the Republic'. 
The founding fathers were also aware of the fact that there 
may arise some extreme situations which may throw the entire na-
tion out of gear and such situations may only be tackled through 
certain drastic steps. They have anticipated such situations as a 
force of tradit ion and experience with the working of colonial stat-
utes. To deal with such situations, therefore, the Constitution en-
visages the emergency provisions under Art icle 352 to Article 360. 
Here it would not be out of context to mention that Democracy and 
the rule of law are the concepts al ien to the Indian history and 
society. Indians became familiar of these concepts after the Brit-
ish rule was f i rmly establ ished and western-s ty le educat ion 
changed the mind of the people though it seems that the British 
policies themselves preferred a strong rule rather than rule of law. 
The British rulers enforced and perpetuated this double standard 
and exploited the people behind the facade of constitutionalism 
and ru le of law, as they were we l l aware of the fact that 
authoritarianism was embeded in Indian history, society and cul-
ture. 
The emergency provisions under the Constitution of India are the 
result of a compromise between the principles of Constitutinal Govern 
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merit and strong and effective government. When one attempts to re-
construct the intentions of the founding fathers, the other becomes en-
tangled in all sorts of ambiguties The Granvil le Austin rightly observes 
that, "It is clear that even in the minds of individual members of 
Constituent Assembly there existed considerable tension between 
three competing concerns: (1) The desire for personal freedom nur-
tured by the experience with oppressive despotic colonial rule; (2) 
The drive for social reform and building up a welfare society; and 
(3) The fear of disruption and instability arising from the divisive 
forces or region, provinces, language, community, ethnicity and 
extremist political ideologies.^*^ 
Thus the framers of the Constitution of independent India though com-
mitted to the liberal democratic ideals were nevertheless prisoners of tradi-
tion. They built the structure of emergency powers, even enlarged and 
rationalised it, to serve a regime which was no longer colonial in character or 
merely regulatory in function. 
An emergency under Article 352 can be proclaimed by the President of 
India, if he is satisfied that a grave emergency exist whereby the security of 
India or any part thereof is threatened due to war, external aggression, or 
armed rebellion The Article also makes it clear that emergency can be de-
clared before the actual occurance of aforesaid grounds^*^ So for as the satis-
faction of the President is concerned, it IS now well established that it means 
141 Granville Austin. The Indian Constitution. Cornerstone of a Nation at 
p p 105-6 
142 Article 352 [Explanation-A Proclamation of Emergency declaring 
that the secunty of India or any part of the Contd 
156 
satisfaction of the cabinet. A Proclaimation of Emergency may be issued un-
der Article 352 (on the ground of war, external aggression and armed rebel-
lion), 356 (failure of constitutional machinery in a state), and 360 (Financial 
Emergency). But it is only the emergency declared under Article 352 which 
affects the freedom of press. 
The Proclaimation of Emergency under Article 352, as a consequence 
affects the freedom of press to a great extent. Under Article 358 while a 
Proclaimation of Emergency is in operation the state may make any law or 
take any executive action infringing the rights guaranteed under Article 19 of 
the Constitution. But any law so made shall cease to have effect as soon as 
the Proclaimation of Emergency ceases to operate except as respects things 
done or omitted to be done before the law ceases to have effect.''*^ 
Conted territory thereof is threatened by war or by external ag-
gression or by armed rebellion may be made before the actual 
occurence of war or any such aggression or rebel l ion, if the Presi-
dent is satisfied that there is imminent danger thereof]. 
143. Article 358(1) [While a Proclaimation of Emergency declar-
ing that the security of India or any part of the territory thereof is 
threatened by war or by external aggression is in operation], noth-
ing in article 19 shall restrict the power of the state as defined in 
Part III to make any law or to take any executive action which the 
State would but for the provisions contained in that Part be com-
petent to make or to take, but any law so made shall , to the extent 
of the incompetency , cease to have e f fec t as soon as the 
Proclaimation ceases to operate except as respects things done 
or omitted to be done before the law so ceases to have effect 
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Thus the first fetter on the power of Parliament breaks down in emer-
gency and a law made under Article 358 curtailing the freedom of press or 
any of the right under Articel 19 of the Constitution can not be challenged so 
long as emergency is in force. Similarly under Article 359 the fundamental 
rights guaranteed under part III of (except rights provided under Article 20 
and 21) the Constitution can be curtailed when a Proclaimation of Emergency 
under Article 352 of the Constitution is in operation/*** 
A Proclaimation of Emergency under Article 352 has far reaching ef-
fect under Article 250 when the parliament becomes empowered to legislate 
on the subjects enumerated under list 11^ ** and under Article 353 where the 
power of union extends to giving executive directions to the states.''** prior to 
44th amendment to the Constitution upon a Proclaimation of emergency by 
the President of India, Article 358 had automatic operation whereby the rights 
guaranteed under Article 19 were automatically suspended. 44th Constitu-
tional Amendment Act, 1978, however. Amended Article 358 and now under 
this Article as soon as the proclaimation of emergency is issued under Ar-
ticle 352 on the ground of war or external aggression only and so long it 
lasts, Article 19 stands suspended in view of Article 358 and the executive 
power of the state to that extent widened. But when the Proclaimation is is-
sued on the ground of armed rebellion, Article 19 will not be affected nor the 
power of the state shall be enlarged in that respect. More over any law which 
curtails the freedom must contain a recital to the effect that it is in relation to 
the proclaimation of Emergency in operation when such law is made. 
The justification of provisions is that during emergency state needs 
more power than in normal times and the actions of the state taken to meet 
emergency should not impeded by protacted litigation as to its reasonable-
ness. 
144. Article 359 (1 A): While an order made under clause(1) mentioning any of ([the rights 
conferred by part III (except articles 20 and 21)1 is in operation, nothing in that Part 
conferring those rights shall restrict the power of the state as defined in the said Part 
to make any law or to take any executive action which the state would but for the 
provisions contained in that Part be competent to make or to rake but any law so 
made shall, to the extent of the incompetency, cease to have effect as soon as the 
order aforesaid ceases to operate, except as respects things done or omitted to be 
done before the law so ceases to have effect]. 
145. Article 250....(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, Parliament shall, while a 
Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, have power to make lav« for the whole or any 
part of the territory of India with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List. (2) A law made by Pariiament which Parliament would not but for the issue of a Procla-
mation of Emergency have been competent to make shall, to the extent of the incompe-
tency, cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of six months after the Proclamation 
has ceased to operate, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the 
expiration of the said period. 
146. Article 353- while a proclaimation of Emergency is in operation, then notwith standing any-
thing in this Constitution, the executive power of the Contd: 
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Before 1978, every law enacted or the executive action taken dur-
ing emergency which infringed Art icle 19 was protected and immune 
from challenge before any court of law. But if any law was made or ac-
tion taken before the issuence of proclaimation of emergency, such laws 
or act ion were open to be chal lenged on the ground of violat ion of Ar-
t icle 19 even during the emergency.""^^ 
The same view was affirmed in B.C. & Co. V. Union of India^*' 
where the Supreme Court held that the News Print Policy of 1972-73 
which was a continuation of old policy made before the Proclaimation 
of Emergency was not protected even during the Emergency from at-
tack under Article 19. It held that executive action which is unconsti tu-
t ional at the time its being taken, is not immune from being chal lenged 
in a court of law during the emergency. Proclaimation of Emergency 
wou ld not author ised the tak ing of de t r imen ta l e x e c u t i v e act ion 
dur ing that per iod af fect ing Art ic le 19 w i t hou t any l e g i s l a t i v e 
Contd: Union shall extend to the giving of directions to any State as to 
the manner in which the executive power thereof is to be exercised; 
Part (b) of Article 353 is similar to Article 250. However, in view of Ar-
ticle 365, if any state fails to comply with the executive directions given 
by the Union as to manner in which such power is to be exercised, it 
may be hold by the President that a situation has arisen when the Gov-
ernment of the State can not be carried on in accordance with the pro-
visions of Constitution and this may led to President rule in the State. 
147. State of MP. V. Bharat Singh AIR 1967 S.C. 1170 
148. B.C. & Co. V. Union of India AIR 1973 S.C. 106 at p. 116 
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authority or in purported exercise of power conferred under any pre-
emergency law which was inval id when enacted.There is no reported 
case by the Supreme Court on press censorship during emergency.' '* ' 
Therefore, in the absence of such decision reference may be made of 
the two unreported decisions del ivered by the Bombay High Court on 
the freedom of press during emergency to have an idea of ambit of cen-
sorship on the press. 
The first case was of Minoo. R. Masani, a well known f igure in the 
f ield of politics and journal ism. In view of the provisions of censorship 
order Masani submitted for scrutiny of the censor at Bombay certain 
material which were sought to be published in the issue of 'Freedom 
First' for the month of August. This consisted of material the publ ica-
tion of which had been previously allowed as well as some fresh mate-
rial. The Censor prohibited the publication of several items. 
Another veteren journa l is t Y.D. Lokurkar also f i led a pet i t ion 
against the Bombay censor, Mr. Binod Rao, as two art icles submitted 
by him for scrutiny were banned on flimsy grounds. His pet i t ion reached 
at hear ing stage before the Masani 's and came up before Justice 
R.P.Bhatt. 
The plea of the government that petit ion was not maintainable 
becuase of the Proc la imat ion of Emergency and the Presidential 
order dated 27th June 1975 passed under Article 359, was rejected. On 
149. Though four judgements were delivered by the apex court during that period 
on personal liberty but in Habeas Corpus (AIR 1976 S.C. 1207), the judge-
ment was banned by censors. 
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the merits the Court struck down the action of the censor and held that he has 
misdirected himself in law and had taken into consideration extraneous mat-
ters. This was the first judgement of its kind after the fresh Prociaimation of 
Emergency and the censorship order. 
Masani's petition came up for hearing in the last week of Nov. 1975 
and once again the Court held that there was nothing objectionable in any of 
the eleven articles which had been banned by the censor on the ground that 
he had acted without the authority of law and exceeded the power vested in 
him under the censorship order. 
An appeal was made against this judgement which was heard by a Di-
vision Bench consisting of Mr. justice D.P.Madan and Mr. Justice H. Kania. 
The appeal court rejected the preliminary contention that the writ petition 
was not maintainable and held "Inspite of Prociaimation of Emergency and 
the Presidential orders a citizen is free to say, write and act as he likes 
so long as he does not transgress the law. What the respondent was 
doing by his writ petition was not to seek to enforce any of his common 
law rights or any rights under part-Ill of the Constitution but to chal-
lenge the legality of the action by the appeallant on the ground that it 
was without the authority of law. "The guidelines issued under clause 
(3) of censorship order do not have any: statutory authority" and that 
"guidelines issued under clause (3) of censorship order must be read in 
conjunction with the purpose for which the said order was made, and 
any provision thereof which may at the first blush appear to be too wide 
must be interpreted in the light of purpose and object of censorship or-
der. " 
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The immense value of the judgements lie in the fine balance it has 
achieved between two important social interests, liberty of thought and ex-
pression and public safety. The judgement has done a great service by 
recognising that even in times of emergency the right of dissent is essential 
for the welfare of the society. It has re-assured every right thinking person 
that he need not to fear of speaking and writing in praise of it. 
In the light of the above discussion the scope of freedom of press may 
be summarised into following words. 
In Constituent Assembly when the provision relating to freedom of 
speech and expression was being discussed, several members raised vari-
ous apprehensions and insisted for a seperate provisions guaranteeing the 
freedom of the press. But their demand was not acceeded as Dr. Ambedkar, 
the Chairman of Drafting Committee declared that the freedom of press is 
included within the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Ar-
ticle 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The aforesaid view of Dr. Ambedkar was 
affirmed by the Supreme Court in Romesh Thappar and Brij Bhushan Cases 
when it held that freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of 
press. It can neither be subjected to pre-censorship nor the government can 
stop the circulation of any newspaper or publication of any matter. 
The press though does not enjoy any immunity from the laws of gen-
eral taxation but the same can not be levied upon it in such manner v^^ich 
adversely affects the freedom of press. The government can not take any 
action to elimenate the unfair competition between big and small newspapers 
in the guise of Press Commission recommendation by implementing news-
print policy. Similarly it can not take any punitive action to muffle the voice of 
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the press. 
The press on the rule of balance of convenience may be stopped from 
publishing any matter if it comes in conflict with other's fundamental rights. 
However, considering the importance of press, it can not last beyond the 
period than actually required under the circumstances of a particular case. It 
is not that only the press can claim its freedom against the state as a funda-
mental right, under exceptional circumstances even an individual may claim 
the publication of his views in a magazine maintained out of public funds to 
enable the readers to have a complete picture upon which his opinion is 
formed. 
The advertisements have always been a major souce of revenue for 
the newspapers and it becomes available to public at reasonable price. 
Advertisments not only bring down the price of a newspaper but also fulfill 
the economic needs guided by information and disseminated through print 
media. Therefore, the press can not be denied the freedom to publish adver-
tisements unless they fall within the ambit of Article 19(2) of the Constitution. 
Unlike U.S. Constitution, ( where the courts have evolved noble rules 
of restrictions) the Constitution of India expressly provides certain grounds 
under Article 19(2) upon which reasonable restrictions may be placed on the 
press. Therefore, press can not publish any matter it pleases. It has no free-
dom to publish any material which may endanger the sovereignty and intergrity 
of country neither it may be allowed to carrry out any matter which is likely to 
put the security of the country at risk. But it is the public disturbances of 
unmanagable magnitude and not of purely local significance which may pose 
any risk to the security of the state. Public peace and tranquility is essentialto 
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the development of the country and the press, therefore, may be restrained from 
acting in such a manner which may disturb the public peace. Reasonable re-
strictions may also be placed on the press to prevent it from publishing any 
material which may debase and debouche the mind of young and adolescent 
readers. Simlarly the freedom is not available to express one's views in such 
manner that amount the contempt of courts. Nor it is at liberty to defame any 
person and if any person is defamed because of any publication the press can 
not escape from the liability. It is also universally recognised principle that free-
dom of press may not extend to a limit where it amounts the incitement to of-
fence; and therefore, press may be subjected to reasonable 
restrictions on the aforesaid ground. 
By virtue of Article 358 of the Constitution, the freedom of speech and 
expression remains suspended during emergency promulgated under Article 352 
on the ground of external aggression and war. The press under such circum-
stances may be subjected to pre-censorship and has no right to claim the free-
dom as a fundamental right. But it may be restrained only in respect of aims and 
objects intended to be achieved under the censorship order and not beyond 
that. 
CHAPTER: IV 
REASONABLENESS OF RESTRICTIONS 
A) Substantive Reasonableness 
B) Procedural Reasonableness 
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REASONABLENESS OF R E S T R I C T I O N S 
First (Constitutional Amendment) Act, 1951 amended the Ar-
ticle 19(2). The amendment beside adding three new grounds namely Public 
order, Friendly relations with foreign states and incitement to an offense, also 
added the word 'reasonable' before the restrictions envisaged under Article 
19(2). Consequently to restrict the freedom of the press, it is not enough that 
the restriction was saved by Article 19(2), but it must also be reasonable 
This was an attempt to strike a proper balance between the freedoms guar-
anteed under Article 19(1) (a) and the social control permitted by the other 
clauses of the Article. The word 'reasonable' precedes the word restriction' 
in the clause (2) to (6) has not only limited the scope of legislative abridge-
ment but has also made the reasonableness a justiciable one. 
It is beyond controversy that the term 'reasonable' was intended to give 
and is actually used by the courts to exercise the power to review the laws 
restricting the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19 of the constitutiticn it-
self, the courts have to decide the actual scope of such review, or in other 
words it may be said that the Constitution is silent on the issue of what is and 
what is not a reasonable restriction? Hence it has been left to the courts to 
determine the standard of reasonableness to be adopted while scrutinising 
the validity of any impunged law. It is not an easy task and the view ex-
pressed by Madras High Court in V.G. Row V. Stae of Madras was affirmed 
by the Supreme Court when the case went in appeal.'' Patanjali Sastri C J; 
1. A.I.R. 1952 SO. 196 
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said that, 'It is not possible to think only in abstract. Several circumstances 
must be taken into consideration ie. (i) The purpose of the Act, (ii) The condi-
tions prevailing in the country at that time, (Hi) The duration of the restrictions, 
and (iv) its nature and the extent." 
The Supreme Court for the first time in Dr.N.B.Khare V. State of Delhi'' 
considered the scope of the reasonableness of the restrictions. The petitioner 
had challneged the restrictions imposed upon his right under Article 19(1) (d) 
to move freely throughout the country by externment order passed against 
him under East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949 
The grounds relied upon by the petitioners were mostly directed against 
the procedural aspect of impunged law. It was argued on behalf of the gov-
ernment that the Court could examine only the substantive law on the point 
and if the restrictions in their substance were found to be reasonable, the 
petition had to be rejected without going into the other aspects of the law 
The Court categorically rejected this narrow interpretation sought to be put 
on the term 'reasonable' to restrict the Court's power to consider only the 
substantive law on the point. It was observed, by Kania, C.J. in majority 
opinion. The law providing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right 
conferred by Article 19 may contain substantive as well as procedural provi-
sions. While the reasonableness of restrictions has to be considered with re-
gard to the exercise of the right, it does not necessarily exclude from the 
consideration of the court the question of reasonableness of the procedural 
part of the law. It is obvious if a law prescribe five years externment or ten 
years externments, the question whether such period of externments is rea-
sonable, being the substantive part, is necessarily for the consideration of 
2. 1950 S.C.J. 328 
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the Court under clause (5). Similarly, if the law provides the procedure under 
which the exercise of the right may be restricted, the same is also open for 
the consideration of the court. ^ 
Mukherjee, J. who delivered a dissenting judgement was agree with 
the majority opinion on the point that, in determining the reasonableness of a 
law all the relevant circumstances have to be taken into consideration and 
one can not dissociate the actual contents of the restrictions from the manner 
of their imposition or the mode of putting them into practice. The question of 
reasonableness may arise as much from the substantive part of the law as 
from its procedural por t ion* 
It is, thus, noteworthy that both majority as well as minority view 
of the Court held that reasonableness of restrictions meant reasonable-
ness of all the aspects of restrictions, and therefore, both the substan-
tive and procedural aspects of the restrictions were justiciable 
This distinction between the substantive and procedural aspect can 
best be explained in the following words. 
" We may view substantive due process as referring to the content 
or subject-matter of a law, an ordinance, whereas due process refers to 
the manner in which a law, an ordinance or an administrative practice, or 
a judicial task is carried out.^ 
The aforesaid distinction between substantive and the procedural as-
pects may also be traced in the judicial interpretation of the constitutional 
provision contained in Article 19 of the Constitution. 
J Id at p. 330 
4. Id at p. 335 
5. Abraham, H. J: Freedom and the Court at p. 110 
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SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENEvSS 
(-din the performance of its duty as the guardian of the Constitution 
the Supreme Court looks not only the form but also its real character and its 
reasonable and substantial affect on the rights which are alleged to be cur-
tailed on account of the restriction. 
In V.G. Row v. State of Madras.* Patanjali Sastri, C.J. observed that 
It is important to bear in mind the test of reasonableness, wtierever prescribed, 
should be applied to each individual statute impunged, and no abstract stan-
dard, or general pattern of reasonableness as applicable to all cases The 
nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose oi 
the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of evil sought to be rem-
edied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at 
the time should all enter into the judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive 
factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable in all the cir-
cumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the 
scale of values of judges participating in the decision should play an impor-
tant part and the limit to their interference with legislative judgement in such 
cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self restraint 
and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people 
of their way of thinking but for all, and that the majority of their elected repre-
sentatives of the people have, in authorising the imposition of restrictions. 
6. Supra note 1 
considered them to be reasonable ^ 
In Ramji Lai Modi V State of U P '. the Court held that the expression 
in the interest of has extended the scope of public order because a law 
may not have been designed to directly maintain public order and yet it may 
have enacted in the interest of public order If. therefore, a law penalising 
such activities having tendency to cause public disorder as an offence can 
not but to be held a law imposing reasonable restrictions The learned Chief 
Justice, Das, however, made it clear that the impunged section "only pun-
ishes aggravated forms of insult to religion when it is perpetrated with the 
deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of a 
class of citizens. The calculated tendency of the aggravated form of insult 
would clearly be to disrupt public order, and it has. therefore, been held that 
the section which penalises such activities is well within the protection of 
Article 19 (2), as being a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exer-
cise of the right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Ar-
ticle 19 (1) (a).^ 
The Supreme Court in Virendra V. State of Punjab ^°, struck down 
sec 3(1) of the Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956, on the ground 
that it was substantial ly objectionable because no limitation was im-
posed as to the duration of the ban on the importation of certain news-
papers. The Court observed, "The surrounding c i rcumstances in which 
the impunged law came to be enacted, the underlying purpose of the enact-
ment and the extent and the urgency of the evil sought to be remedied 
7. Id at p. 200 
8. A. I. R. 1957 8.0. 620 
9. Id at p. 623 
10. A.I.R. 1957 B.C. 896 
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have already been adverted to". The Court further observed, "The powerful 
influence of the newspapers for good or evil, on the minds of the readers, the 
wide sweep of their reach, modern facilities for their swift circulation to terri-
tories, distant and near, must all enter into the judicial verdict, and the rea-
sonableness of the restrictions imposed upon the press has to be tested 
against this background. It is certainly a serious encroachment on the valu-
able and cherished right of freedom of speech and expression if a newspaper 
is prevented from publishing its own views or the views of its correspondants 
relating to or concerning what may be the burning topic of the day." ''^  
The Supreme Court while applying the aforesaid test however, held 
sec 2 (1) (a) of the same Act valid as the conferment of wide powers upon 
executive with proper safeguards of time and opportunity of representation 
was nothing else but the imposition of permissible reasonable restriction on 
the exercise of the freedom, guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a)''^and which 
may extend to amount prohibition if required under the circumstances for cer-
tain period. 
In Supt. Central Prison V. Dr. R. M. Lohia,''^the Supreme Court 
however, did not follow the extending approach of restrictions where 
under the impunged section any instigation by words or visible repre-
sentat ion not to pay or defer any payment of tax or even contractual 
dues to the government authority or land owners was made an offence 
11. Id at p. 900 
12. Id at p. 902 
13. A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 633 
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and which also included even an innocuous utternace. Emphasising the need 
of proximate relation betwen the action and restriction it held that, "The limi-
tations imposed in the interest of public order to be a reasonable re-
striction, should be one which has a proximate connection or nexus with 
public order but not one farfetched, hypothetical or problematical or too 
remote in the chain of its relations with public order." Thus a restriction 
which has no proximate relation with public order is not a reasonable one and 
bound to be struck down by the Court. 
The Court interpreted the decision in Virendra's case differently. In the 
words of Subba Rao. J; "The Court in that case was only making a distintion 
between an act which expressly and directly purported to maintain pub-
lic order and one which did not expressly state the said purpose, but left 
it to be implied therefrom; and between an Act that directly maintains 
public order and one that indirectly brought about the same results.^^ 
Whether a law which prohibits an advertisement from being published 
is an unreasonable restriction or not, was taken into consideration in Hamdard 
Dawakhana V. Union of India,''* where the law prohibited the advertisement 
relating to the sale of certain drugs and medicines as they might have led to 
injurious practice of self medication. Considering the object, the purpose, the 
intention, the mischief aimed at and the expert opinion in order to upheld the 
validity. Kapoor, J; observed, "An advertisement is no doubt a form oi 
speech but its true character is reflected by the object for the promotion 
of which it is employed. 
14. Id at p.p. 639 - 40 
15. A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 554 
1 7 1 
it can not be said ttiat every advertisement is a matter dealing with the 
freedom of speech nor it can be said that it is an expression of ideas. In every 
case one has to see what is the nature of the advertisement and what activity 
falling under Article 19 (1) (a) it seeks to further". 
The Court further observed, "when the proximate relations with the 
object of law had been established, it could not be said that the defini-
tion of the word ^advertisement' was too wide. Had it not been so broad, 
it would have defeated the very purpose for which the Act was brought 
into the existence." Consequently the Supreme Court did not find the re-
strictions arbitrary or imposing unreasonable restriction. Nevertheless It struck 
down Sec. 8 of the impunged Act [Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable 
Advertisement) Act, 1954] where no limitation was placed on the right to search 
and seizure of any document which in the opinion of authority contained any 
advertisement contravening the Act, as arbitrary, excessive and for beyond 
the purpose of the Act, and therefore, amounting to an unreasonable restric-
tion.''^ 
Another view for determining the reasonbaleness of a restriction seem 
to have been developed in Gopalan's case, where Kania, C.J., said that "the 
true approach is only to consider the directness of the legislation and 
not what will be the result of the detention, otherwise valid, on the mode 
of detenues life.^'' 
16. Id at p. 568 
17. A.K. Gopalan V. State of Madras A.I.R. 1950 SO. p.235 
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The aforesaid view to adjudge the reasonableness of a restriction was 
further developed by Patanjali Sastri, in a case while upholding the preven-
tive detention of the petitioner under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, 
said that, "The direct object of the order was the preventive detention ano 
not the infringement of the right of freedom of speech and expression which 
was merely conseQi/enf/a/."'"Therefore, the inevitable result of the decision 
is that the object and form of state action became the determining test to 
ascertain the violation of the right. 
Relying on Ram Singh's Case Bhagavati, J, as he then was, formulated 
the doctrine of inevitable effect test in Indian Express Ltd, V, Union of India 
for adjudging the reasonableness of a particular law infringing the fundamen-
tal right. All the consequences resulted on account of the Working Journal-
ists (Condition of Services) and Miscelleneous Act, 1955, said Bhagvati. J 
would be remote unless they were the direct and inevitable consequence OT 
the measure enacted in the impunged Act. The Court observed; 
"All the consequences which have been visualised in this regard by the 
petitioners viz - the tendency to curtail circulation and thereby narrow the 
dissemination of information, fetters the petitioner's freedom to choose the 
means of exercising the right. Likelihood of the independence of the press 
being undermined by having to seek government's aid, the imposition of pen-
alty on the petitioner's right to choose the instrument for exercising the free-
dom or compelling them to seek alternative media etc. would be remote ano 
depend on various factors which may or may not come into play. Unless these 
were the direct and inevitable consequence of the measures enacted in the 
impunged Act, it would not be possible to strike the legislation as having ef-
fect and operation. A possible eventuality of this type would not necessarily 
18. Ram Singh V. State of Delhi A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 270 
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be the consequence which could be in the contemplation of the legislature 
while enacting a measure of this type for the benefit of the workmen con-
cerned.^^ 
In Sakal Newspaper V. Union of India ^° where the upshot of all the 
restrictions in the order would have effected the circulation of newspaper ana 
violate the constitutional guarantee of free speech, the Court took the view 
that there was a link between price, size, advertisements, price of advertise-
ment and circulation. The Supreme Court, speaking through Mudhalkar J , 
did not appreciate the Government policy and made a priori statement that 
the freedom of a newspaper to publish any number of pages was an integral 
part of the freedom of speech and expression. The freedom would be directly 
infringed when some integral aspect of it was sought to be curbed. The 
impunged Act and order were intended to affect the circulation of newspaper 
and hence, were void as being unconstitutional. The contention of the gov-
ernment that price - page ratio was adopted from the recommendations of the 
Press commission which in so far as took into account all the relevant factors 
acted fairly and reasonably was not considered by the Court as a sufficiently 
weighty or sufficiently clear purpose to justify such interference with the lib-
erty of press. 
The similar question, once again was raised before the Supreme Court 
in Bennett Coleman V. Union of India ^\ where newsprint control order, 1962 
made in the exercise of the powers conferred under the Essential Commodi-
19. A.I.R. 1958 S O . 578 at p. 620 
20. A.I.R. 1962 S O . 305 
21. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 106 
174 
ties Act, 1955 was imposed which consequently was affecting the circulation 
of the newspaper. 
The Court asserted that freedom of press was both qualitative and 
quantitative. In other words it comprised of free, unhindered circulation and 
free unspecified volume of news and views. The Court was of the opinion that 
it was not for the government to say which newspaper should grow in page 
and circulation and which were not to grow in a specified direction. The Court 
further explained that once the quota of newsprint fixed for a newspaper, ii 
should have been left to the concerned newspaper as to how it should be 
used. The newspaper might have consumed it within months or utilise it for 
the whole year. Consequently the majority did not approve the aim of impunged 
policy as reasonable in trying to reduce the advertisement revenue of bigger 
dailies because it operated like a double edged weapon." 
Mathew. J; in his dissenting opinion follwed the observations made by 
Bhagvati. J. in Indian Expressand expressed the view that measures which 
are directed at other forms of activities but which have secondary, indirect or 
incidental effect upon expression do not generally abridge the .freedom un-
less the content of speech itself is regulated and therefore "if the scheme ol 
distribution brings the smaller newspapers at equal footing with the news-
papers enjoying greater circulation that would not, in any way, be made 
a ground as violation of Article 19 (1)(a)."y^e further observed that "It is 
because newsprint is scare that it is being rationed Ex - hypothesi, 
newsprint can not be distributed according to the needs of every con-
sumer". 
22. Id at p. p. 128 - 130 
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The freedom of speech does not mean a right to obtain or use unlim-
ited quantity of newsprint. Article 19 (1) (a) is not a 'guardian of unlimited 
talkat iveness'". In his opinion, therefore, a restriction would not be unrea-
sonable if it attempts to help the smaller newspapers to stand before the big 
newspapers. 
The test of direct and inevitable effect however, was not applied with 
the same vigour in Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. V. Union of India. Sen J 
though admitted that the freedom of speech was not absolute and unlimited 
at all times and under all circumstances but is subject to the restriction con-
tained under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. He referred to cases already 
been decided by the Court and relied upon the principles as laid down in 
Bank Nationalisation Case to determine the effect of impunged notice He 
observed that "we have only to substitute the word 'executive' for the 
word 'law' and the result is obvious. The impunged notices of re-entry 
upon forfeiture of lease and of the threatened demolition of Express 
Building are intended and meant to silence the voice of the Indian Ex-
press. It must logically follow that the impunged notices constitute a 
direct and immediate threat to the freedom of the press." Consequently 
the action of the government was held an unreasonable restriction upon the 
press. 
Venkataramiah & Misra J.J., however emphasised the point of arbi-
trariness which may be tested under Article 14 also and non application of 
mind rather than the effect of the impunged not ices." 
The shift towards concentrating upon the arbitrary action was once agian 
reiterated to ascertain the reasonableness of a restriction in Life Insurance 
23. Id at p. 134 
24. A.I.R. 1986 S O . 872 at p. 910 
25. Id at p. 953 
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Corporation V. Manubhai D Shah. ^^  Ahmedi. J (As he then was) in the 
course of his judgement observed that, "The attitude on the part of LLC can 
be described as both unfair and unreasonable." Explaining the reason the 
Court said, "unfair because fairness demanded that both view points were 
placed before the readers, however limited be their number, to enable them 
to draw their own conclusions and unreasonable because there was no logic 
or proper justification for refusing publication". The Court further said that. 'A 
monopolistic state instrumentality which survives on public funds can not act 
in an arbitrary manner on the specious plea that the magazine is an in house 
one and it is a matter of its exclusive privilege to print or refuse to print the 
rejoinder The respondent's funda-
mental right of speech and expression clearly entitled him to insist that his 
views on the subject should reach those who read the magazine so that they 
have a complete picture before them and not a one sided or distorted one " 
In respect of literature the Supreme Court is of the view that while re-
striction on a book which if taken as a whole may deprave and corrupt the 
minds of young persons into whose hands it may fall amounts a reasonable 
restriction. But the same restr ic t ion upon a book using vulgar lan-
guage to create an exact impact on the readers while exposing evil pro-
viding the society, could not be approved. The Court observed that the 
portrayal of characters by the author is not just figments of the author's imagi-
nation. Such characters are often to be seen in real life in society. The author 
has used his skill in focussing the attention of the readers on such characters 
in the society and to describe the situation more eloquently has used 
26. (1992)3S.C.C. 637 
27. Id at p. 655 
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unconventional and slang words so that in the light of author's understand-
ing, the appropriate emphasis is there on problems and we do not 
think that any reader on reading this book would become depraved debased 
and encouraged to lasciviousness. ^^'^ 
The judiciary has a pious duty to impart justice and , therefore, any 
restraint which aims to protect its impartiality and credit in the minds of ordi-
nary prudent man is nothing else but a reasonable restriction. It is also to be 
kept in mind that when people attack judges they can not defend themselves 
and the law of contempt of court is meant to provide such defence. The per-
sons who attack a judge must remember that they are attacking an insti-
tution which is indispensable for the survival of rule of law. However, the 
courts do not like to assume the posture that they are above criticism and 
that their functioning needs no improvement, and therefore, bonafide criti-
cism of any institution including courts to induce the administrators of the 
institution to look inwards and improve its image is left unimpared in the in-
terest of public institutions themselves. 
This concept of reasonableness is not static and vary according to the 
needs of an institution. In Express Newspaper Pvt. Ltd. V. Union of India, the 
Court while holding that press is not immune from the laws of taxation 
emphasised the fact that what can be a reasonable tax for other industries 
may not be reasonable for newspaper industry due to the special interest the 
society has therein. Venkataramiah J; expressed the view that it should be 
realised that imposition of a tax like newsprint is an imposition on knowledge 
27 -A AIR 1986 S.C. 967 at p. 983 
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and would virtually amount to a burden imposed on a man for being literate 
and for being conscious of his duty as a citizen to inform himself about the 
world around him." 
Explaining the point the Court said, "since the newsprint is closely linkeo 
with the freedom of press, the test for determining the vires of a statute taxing 
newsprint have, therefore, to be different from the test usually adopted for 
testing the vires of other statute." The Court further said that, "An ordinary 
taxing statute may be questioned only on the ground being confiscatory 
in nature or for using colourable device but an statute, taxing newsprint 
may be challenged simply on the ground being burdensome 
The view expressed in the aforesaid case was in verbatim repeated in 
Printers (Mysore) Ltd. V. Asstt Commercial Tax Officer where the apex coun 
laid down that no sale tax can be levied on the sale of newspapers in India 
while emphasising that press is not immune from the application of the taxing 
statute, at the same time it should not be to an extent which throttle the voice 
of the press.^'Therefore, in view of the apex court a tax on newspaper which 
is burdensome amount an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of press 
Recently the Supreme Court made another dig on the subject in R. Rajgopal 
V. State of Tamil Nadu when Justice Jeevan Reddy held that the press can 
not be restrained by state or its officials by an order having no force of law. 
Even while admitting that restrictions may be placed on the press on the ground 
of defamation contained under Article 19 (2), it curtailed the scope of the 
restriction. In view of Supreme Court judgement, Oierefore, a restriction would not be 
28^  AIR 1986 B.C. 515 at p.p. 539 - 40 
29. (1994) 2S.C.C.434atp. 442 
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treated as reasonable on the ground of defamation if the writing or the state-
ment is based upon the public record including the court record unless it is 
totally devoid o' the truth and published without reasonable verification of facts 
The Supreme Court in Tata Press Ltd. V. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam 
Ltd,^'' gave further boost when Kuldip Singh, J; said that freedom of speech 
and expression can be restricted under Article 19 (2) and not by creating a 
monopoly by state or any other authority. Publication of advertisement which 
is a "commercial speech" is an integral part of freedom of speech and expres-
sion which can only be restricted under Article 19 (2). The rule 458 made 
under Sec. 7 of Telegraph Act, 1885 simply prohibit the publication of "any 
list of telephone subscribers" and under no circumstances it can be equated 
with the "publication of advertisement". Hence rule 458 and 459 can not be 
interpreted so as to restrict the commercial speech.^^ and therefore, it did not 
declare the aforesaid rules unreasonable. 
30. A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 264 at p. 277 
31. A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2438 
32. Id at p. 2448 
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PROCEDURAL REASONABLENESS 
¥' rocedural reasonableness is concerned with the implementation of 
the restrictions contained under Article 19(2) of the constitution. A restriction 
though valid substantially, may fail to satisfy the requirements of procedural 
reasonableness. In such a case the restriction would be liable to be struck 
down. Therefore, in order to be a valid restriction, beside satisfying substan-
tive test it must fulfill the procedural requirement also. 
While examining the procedural reasonableness the Supreme Court 
laid emphasis that the procedure must be such as may yield an objective and 
fair decision by the authority administering the law and does not result into 
arbitrary curtailment of individual freedom. The principles of the administra-
tive law particularly of natural justice have considerably influenced the judi-
cial policy in this area. " 
In democratic countries wide powers are conferred upon the executive 
which leaves an individual sometimes upon their mercy. Under such circum-
stances the only safeguard available is the good sense of the administration 
itself which is quite rare. In practice it is the executive which controls the 
33. Misra, S.P: Fundamental Rights and the Supreme Court Reasonableness of 
Restrictions at p. 194 
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legislative bodies^ and, therefore, it is once again the judiciary, required to 
take judicial review of administrative action in order to save the rights of an 
individual. 
The Supreme Court in N.B. Khare V. State of Delhi *^ considered the 
reasonableness of a restriction based upon the subjective satisfaction of an 
authority. The Court held that "the legislature can confer on an executive of-
ficer the authority to make an order externing a person from a particular area 
on his subjective satisfaction without prescribing a judicial scrutiny of this sat-
isfaction. A law providing for externment is not bad because it leaves the 
desirability of making an order of externment to the subjective satisfaction ol 
a particular officer as an element of emergency requires taking of prompt 
steps to prevent apprehended danger to public tranquility and so the author-
ity has to be vested in executive officers to take appropriate action on then 
own responsiblity" In arriving to this conclusion the Supreme Court took into 
consideration all the aspects of concerned law i.e. 
(i) the law was of temporary nature. Its life was limited to two years so that 
no externment order could remain in force beyond that period, 
(ii) It gave the externee a right to be informed of grounds of restrictions it 
it was for more than three months, and 
(iii) an opportunity to externee was provided to make a representation to 
the Advisory Board. All these proper safeguards were taken into con-
sideration by Supreme Court in order to determine the procedural rea-
sonableness of the impunged law. 
34. Though in a democratic system the executive Is responsible to the legislature. But in 
practice it seems to be the executive who controls the legislature as they enjoy cer-
tain powers i.e. to recommend the dissolution of the House which most of the mem-
bers do not want to happen as they fear that they would loose their privileges and 
other facilities once they cease to be a member of the House. 
35. Supra note (2) 
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In Virendra's Case Supreme Court followed the same test while hold-
ing Sec 2(1) (a) of Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956 as both sub-
stantially as well as procedurally reasonable because proper safeguards were 
provided in case if the rights of any person were to be curtailed and on the 
same reasoning, in the absence of proper safeguards, struck down Sec 3 of 
the said Act while observing that it placed the whole matter upon the subjec-
tive determination of State Government and there was no provision even for 
any representation by the affected party. It thus violate the natural justice/'^ 
In order to make a restriction procedurally reasonable, it is also necessry 
that the opportunity afforded to a person affected must be real and effective 
It is, therefore, necessry that whenever a notification is made for the forfei-
ture of any book, newspaper or any other material which is prejudicial to the 
safety or security of India, it must state the representation from the book 
newspaper, or other material which offeneds the law," 
Whenever the freedom of an individual is sought to be restricted it must 
communicate the grounds of restriction failing which the order is liable to be 
struck down. In state of Madras V.V.G. Row it was held that adequate com-
munication is an important element of procedural reasonableness The 
Court observed, "No personal service on any office bearer or the member ol 
the association concerned or service by affixture at the office, if any of such 
association is prescribed nor is any other mode of proclaimation of the notifi-
cation at the place where such association carries on its activities provideo 
for. Publication in any official gazette, whose publicity value is by no means 
great may not reach the members of the association declared unlaw-
36. A.I.R. 1957 B.C. 896 at p. 902 
37. Narayana V. State of M.P. (1972) 1 S.C.W.R. 984 at p.p. 990 - 92 
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ful and if the time fixed expired before they knew of such declaration, their 
right of making a representation which is the only opportunity of presenting 
their case would be lost. Yet the consequences to the members which the 
notification involves are most serious for their very membership thereafter is 
made an offence under Sec. 17". ' * 
Again in Dwarka Prasad V. State of UP ^^  it was held that a law which 
only required recording of reasons for the action taken by the authority but 
made no express provision for the communication if there is no higher au-
thority to examine the propriety of those reasons and revise or review the 
decision,is not a good law. The reasons recorded in such case are only for 
the satisfaction of the authority making it. 
The priciple of reasonableness is not applicable to the subordinate 
legislation. In Express Newspapers Pvt Ltd. V. Union of Inida giving its 
verdict in negative the Supreme Court observed, "A subordinate legislation 
may be struck down as arbitrary or contrary to the statute if it fails to take into 
account very vital facts which either expressly or by necessary implication 
are required to be taken into consideration by the statute, or say the 
Consitution. This can however, be done only on the ground that it does not 
conform to the statutory or constitutional requirement that it offends Article 14 
or 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution. It can not, no doubt be done merely on the 
ground that it is not reasonable or that it has not taken into account relevant 
circumstances which the Court considers relevant."*^ 
38. Supra note (6) at p. 260 
39. 1954 S.C.J. 238 
40. Supra note (28) at p. 543 
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The Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation V. Munubhai D Shah 
held the action of L.I.C, violative of prinicple of natural justice and consequently 
unfair, unreasonable and arbitrary. It was observed that , "It is not the case 
of LLC. that the rejoinder contains any thing offensive in the sense that li 
would fall within any of the restrictive clauses of Article 19 (2) or that it is in 
any manner prejudicial to the members of the community, or that it is baseo 
on imaginary or concocted material. That being so on the fairness doctrine 
L.I.C. was under an obligation to . publish the rejoinder since it had pub-
lished counter to the study paper."^^ 
Reliance Petrochemical Ltd V. Indian Express Newspaper/^apex 
Court once again follov^/ed the principle of natural justice in the form of bal-
ancing of convenience and vacated the stay order on Express Newspapers to 
write anything about the debentures of petitioner company even before the 
expiry of the last date on the ground that the debentures had already been 
over - subscribed and there was no need to keep the stay order in force. The 
Court, therefore, expressed the view that once the purpose for which an in-
junction was granted, is fulfilled the continuance of the stay order would 
constitute an unreasonable restriction. 
It is, therefore, clear that to curtail the freedom of press, it is not suffi-
cient that restriction is based on any of the grounds enshrined under Article 19 
(2) of the Constitution but it is also essential that the restriction must be 
reasonable. The Constitution nowhere lays down what is and what is not 
41. Supra note 26 at p. 655 
42. A.I.R. 1989. S.C. 190 
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reasonable restriction. Hence it has been left to the courts to determine the 
standard of reasonableness to be adopted in judging the validity of a particular 
legislative restriction. It is necessary that a restriction to be a reasonable one 
must fulfill substantive as v^ell as procedural aspects of reasonableness A 
restriction would be substantially reasonable if it put the curbs with the sole 
purpose of achieving the objects included under Article 19(2). Further to stand 
the test of reasonableness the law must define expressly or by necessary impli-
cation the powers of an authority. The proceedural reasonableness requires 
that any opportunity provided to the party concerned must be real and effective 
The concept of equality and the principle of natural justice are the essential 
elements of proceedural reasonableness. It means that action of the authority 
must be based on equal treatment and equal opportunity to the parties unless 
thee is a justification for denying the same. 
CHAPTER : V 
PRESS AND PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES 
A) Privileges in England 
B) Privileges in India 
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PRESvS AND THE PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGEvS 
(Llhe Parliamentary privileges is one of the most sensitive area where a 
journalist has to tread warily. In democracy people have the right to know what 
their representatives are doing both inside as well as outside the Parliament 
The press in its efforts to keep the people informed about the matters being 
transacted by Parliament, its Committees and its members some times incroaches 
upon their privileges. This often leads towards a confl ict between the press 
and the parliamentary privi leges. 
The concept of parliamentary privileges has been defined by various emi-
nent jurists. May defines the privileges as, "The sum of peculiar rights en-
joyed by each House collectively as a constituent part of the High Court of 
Parliament, and by members of each House individually, without which they 
could not discharge their functions and which exceed those possessed by 
other bodies or individuals. Thus privilege though part of the law of the 
land, is to a certain extent an exception from the ordinary law".^ 
According to Halsbury's Law of England "Any act or Omission which 
obstructs any member or officer of the House in the discharge of their du-
ties, or which has a tendency to produce such a result would constitute 
contempt of legislature".' 
1. Ersklne May: Parliamentary Practice at p. 67 
2. Halsbury's Law of England, Vol. 28 at p. 465 
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Earl Jowitt, (Lord Chancellor of Great Britian since 1945-51) defines the 
privilege in the following words, "An exceptional right of advantage , an ex-
emption from some duty, burden or attendance to which certain persons 
are entitled, from a supposition of the law that the stations they fill or the 
offics they are engaged in, are such as require all their care, and that there-
fore, without this indulgence, it would be impractible to execute such of-
fices so advantageously as the public good requires". 
Thus the privileges may be called as those special rights which are es-
sential for the Parliament, its Committees and individual members for the smooth 
functioning of this institution. The Indian Constitution provides for the parlia-
mentary privileges on the pattern of British System, it is, therefore, essential to 
discuss the privileges, in brief, being enjoyed by the House of Commons. 
PRIVILEGES IN ENGLAND: The powers, privileges and immunities of the House 
of Commons in England have not been defined anywhere. They are a part of 
Common Law of England and have to be pieced togather from numerous prece-
dents. Historically speaking, the king of England claimed all the privileges and 
they were enjoyed by his servants who acted in his name. With the passage oi 
time, however, people wrested these rights from the King claiming them for the 
House of Commons. In the later period (Stuart Kings time) lawyers and judges 
were frequently punished for committing the contempt of the House who claimed 
to be the sole judge of the nature, existence and extent of privileges. But the 
courts in England did not concede this right. 
103 
The decisions of the court are not accepted as binding by the House in 
matters of privileges, nor the decisions of the House by the courts. This old 
dualism remained unresolved. The Ashby V. White, Stockdale V. Hansard and 
Bradlaugh V. Gosset are glaring example of such dualism'. This dualims. later 
on, was resolved amicably and has become a history. House of Commons ana 
the Courts now seldom encroach upon the sphere of others. 
The various privileges claimed by the House of Commons in earlier days 
have fallen into disuse and faded out of existence and till date, are not readily 
ascertainable. In his book 'Law Custom and Constitution' Anson points out 
that, "The rules of which they (the privileges) consists are not readily 
ascertainable, for they obtain legal definition when they are cast in statu-
tory form, or when a conflict between the House and the Courts have re-
sulted in some questions of privilege being settled by judicial decisions"." 
Neverthless, the House of Commons has certain well- known privileges 
These may be divided into two groups. The first group contains those privileges 
which are claimed by any member in the individual capacity of being a member 
of House of Commons. 
This include: 
a) Freedom of speech; 
b) Freedom from arrest; 
c) The right having most favourable construction placed upon its proceedings; and 
d) The hght of access to the Crown as well as other rights and immunities which 
have come to be recognised as part of the law and custom of Parliament. 
3. Op Git note (1)at p.p. 184-190 
4. Quoted by R.C.S. Sarkar in "Press and Privileges of Pariiament" in J.C.PS. Vol XV, 
1981 at p. 85 
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The second group consists of the privileges claimed by the House in its 
corporate capacity and include. 
a) The right to provide for the due composition of its body; 
b) The right to regulate its own proceedings: 
c) The right to exclude strangers; 
d) The right to prohibit the publication of its debates; 
e) The right to exercise penal jurisdiction and to punish breaches of privi-
leges and contempt.' 
Ibid 
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PRIVILEGES IN INDIA : India was ruled by English people for a long time For 
the proper functioning of the government, they made laws, while adopting their 
own pattern prevailing in England with certain modifications i.e. they made laws 
in accordance with situations and circumstances at that time. The system cop-
ied or based on English pattern exercised a great influence upon the members 
of the Constituent Assembly who drafted the Indian Constitution, so, naturally, 
this Constitution carries with it the British concept of Parliamentary privileges 
In India, the privileges, immunities etc. of Parliament and its members are 
provided under Article 105 ^•'^and that of State Legislatures under Article 194 of 
the Constitution '"^. The position under clause (1) & (2) of Article 105 is that 
subject to the provisions of the Constitution and the rules and standing orders 
regulating the procedure of Parliament, there shall be freedom of speech in the 
Parliament. And that no person can be made liable in respect of publication by 
or under the authority of either House of Parliament of any report, paper, votes 
or the proceedings of the Parliament or any Committee thereof. Similar provi-
sion exist under Article 194 Clause (1) & (2) which is applicable to the House of 
State Legislatures. Thus it is also clear clear that under clause (1) & (2) of the 
aforesaid Articles of the Constitution, full freedom is accorded to the commit-
tees and the members of the Parliament as well as State Legislatures. But at 
the same time it is also clear that such immunities are provided only when any-
thing is said inside the parliament. Secondly nobody can be made liable m a 
proceeding before a court of law in respect of the publication under the author-
ity of either House of Parliament or State Legislature. 
5-A. Article -105 Provides - (1) subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules 
and standing orders regulating the proceedure of Parliament, there shall be freedom 
of speech in Parliament. 
(3) In other respect, the powers, privileges and immunities of each House of Parlia-
ment, and of the members and the committees of each House, shall be such as may 
from time to time be defined by Parliament by law, and , until so defined shall be those 
of that House and of its members and committees immediately before the coming into 
force of section 15 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978]. 
5-B. Article 194 provides for identical provision using the word legislature in place of Parlia-
ment. 
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In other respects under clause (3) of Article 105 (As it stands today after 
44th Amendment of 1978) the powers, privileges and immunities of each House 
of Parliament and of its members and committees shall be such as may be de-
fined from time to time by Parliament and until so defined, shall be those of that 
House and of its members and committees immediately before the coming into 
force of section 15 of the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978. Article 194 
(3) contains identical provision in respect of State Legislature.^ 
Under Article 105(3) of the Constitution, therefore, the privileges of our 
Parliament are identical with those of the House of Commons as they existed 
on the Jan 26th 1950. The Supreme Court, however, in special reference no i 
of 1964 held that the Parliament can not claim all the privileges as enjoyed by 
the House of Commons at the Commencement of the Constitution. It can exer-
cise only those privileges of the House of Commons which are incidental to 
legislative functions.'^ 
As a House continues to enjoy the same privileges as it enjoyed at the 
commencement of the Constitution, the answer to the question that, what were 
the privileges of parliament and the State Legislature being enjoyed at the com-
mencement of 44 Amendment is that they enjoyed the same privileges which 
were being enjoyed by House of Commons at the commencement of Constitution 
6^  In 1976, 42nd Amendment to the Constitution was enacted by which Article 105 (3) and 
194(3) were amended. The net result of this amendment was that a House could have 
"evolved" its own privilege. Before this, it was possible only through a law to define 
privilege. 42nd Amendment done away with this need of passing any law to define the 
privilege. Consequently it also done away with the need of president's assent which is 
necessary, if a law is to be made. Moreover, It also authorised either House of the Par-
liament, as well as State Legislature, to evolve its privilege and it was no more neces-
sary that both Houses should be agree for evolving a new privilege. 
Later on in 1978, 44th Amendment was incorporated in the Constitution. This amend-
ment in the first place cancelled the amendments made by the Constitution (42nd Amend-
ment) Act, 1976. It then amended Article 105(3) and 194(3) so as to drop completely 
any reference to the House of Commons in future. But even this new phraseology did 
not bring any change in the circumstances. 
7. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 745. 
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This amendment, therefore, merely excluded the name or reference of the House 
of Commons from Article 105 and 194 but retained the same position to con-
tinue which was existing at the commencement of the Constitution. 
The parliamentary privileges restrict the freedom of press and while pub-
lishing the reports of proceedings of a House of Parliament or of its committees 
or on a conduct of a member or members inside or out side the House, a lot of 
caution is required to be undertaken by the press. 
The following privileges of the parliament affect the freedom of press. 
1) Right to Exclude Strangers;- The parliament has the privilege to ex-
clude the strangers'. 
The Speaker or Chairman, as the case may be, whenever, thinks fit under 
the rules of the House, may order the withdrawl of strangers from any part of the 
House, including the representatives of the press. The Parliament has not. yet 
exercised this rights. However, it may exclude press whenever holding a secrei 
session. Though such chances are quite rare. The Parliament is also empow-
ered to withdraw press cards of any particular journalist if any default is commit-
ted by him. The Lok Sabha has, infact, withdrawn press cards twice Once of a 
special corresponsent of Blitz and on another occassiosn of a special corre-
spondent of Hindustan New Delhi. Any person including a press representative 
8. The rule 387 - 387 - A made by the House of People provide for the expulsion 
Rule . 387 Says That the speaker may, when ever he thinks fit order the withdrawl of strangers 
from any part of the House. 
Rule . 387 - A - An officer of the Secretariate authorised in this behalf by the speaker shall 
remove from the priclncts of the House or take into custody, any stranger whom he may 
seem or who may be reported to him to be, in any portion of the pricincts of the House 
which is reserved for exclusive use of members, and also any stranger, who having been 
admitted into any portion of the pricincts of the House, misconducts himself or wilfully 
infringes the regulation made by the speaker under rule 386 or does not withdraw when 
the strangers are directed to withdraw under rule 387 while the House is sitting. 
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is excluded from the House under rule 248 of the House when It sits in a secret 
session.' 
2) Right to prohibit the publication of its proceedings: It is another 
important privilege which has been enforced by the Parliament on vari-
ous occassions with a specific intention, only to prevent malafid publica-
tion of any inaccurate report or expunged portions of any proceeding 
Unlike England, in India, there is no rule or standing order of the Parlia-
ment prohibiting the publication of its proceedings. In Searchlight case^° the 
question before the Court was whether the legislature is empowered to prohibit 
the publication of expunged portion of the proceeding of the House. The Su-
preme Court gave the answer in affirmative and held that Article 105 (3) and 
Article 194(3) confer all those powers and privileges on Parliament and State 
Legislature. 
3) Power to Commit for Contempt: One of the most important privileges 
available to Parliament is the power to commit for its contempt and also 
defined as the 'keystone of Parliamentary privilege'. The power is iden-
tical with that of House of Commons in England. The power to punish for 
contempt was not available to the legislature under the Government of 
India Act, 1919. For the first time. Government of India Act, 1935 con-
ferred such powers. The question that whether the existence of such pu-
nitive powers affects the freedom of press. To answer such question it is 
to be kept in mind the difference between the existence of power ana 
T Rule 248 (1) - On a request made by the leader of the House, the speaker shall fix a day 
or part thereof for sitting of the House in secret. 
Rule 248 (2) - When the House sits in secret no stranger shall be permitted to be present in 
the Chamber, Lobby or Galleries provided that members of the Council may be present 
in their Gallery:Provided further that persons authorised by the Speaker may be present in 
the Chamber, Lobby or Galleries. 
10. M.S.M. Sharma V. Sri Krishna Sinha A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 395 
194 
mind the difference between the existence of power and the exercise oi 
that power. In India, like the House of Commons, it has been the practice 
of each of the House to exercise privilege under great limitation and con-
ditions. In majority of the cases the Parliament though oversenstive to its 
privileges did not take any action when the editor or person making the 
defamatory statement as the case may be expressed his sincere regret In 
the Blitz case the editor of the newspaper was reprimanded by the Lok 
Sabha but the Privilege Committee recognised the right of fair commeni 
and observed as following. 
"Nobody would deny the members or as a matter of fact, any citizen, the 
right of fair comment. But if the comments contain personal attack on individual 
members of parliament on account of their conduct in Parliament, or if the lan-
guage of the comment is vulgar or abusive, they can not be deemed to come 
within the bounds of fair comment or justifiable criticism '''' 
It is, therefore, clear that the privileges of the Parliament as discussed 
above are of extreme importance for the smooth and proper functioning of the 
parliament and State Legislatures and whenever, these privileges are violated 
by the press, it would be guilty of committing contempt of parliament or State 
Legislature. Under the following circumstances the press has been held guilty 
of committing the contempt: 
1) Comments in a newspaper casting reflections on the character or proceed-
ings of the House, or of its committees, or member or members collec-
tively and thereby lowering their prestige in the eyes of the public 
2) Pre - mature publication of a motion tabled before the House and of pro-
ceedings of a Committee of a House or the proceedings of a meeting thereof 
11. Quoted in "Press and Parliament" by A.N. Grover in J.C.PS. VXII11984 at p 141 
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by a newspaper before the committee completes its task and presents its 
report to the house. 
3) Publication of proceedings of a committee of a House before it is pre-
sented to the House concerned. 
4) Misreporting of the proceeding of the House, or of a report of a Parlia-
mentary Committee or, of a member of the House by newspaper 
5) Casting aspersions on the impartiality of the speaker attributing malafides 
to him in discharge of his duties in the House. 
6) Publication of expunged portion of the proceedings of a House 
7) Publication of a document or paper presented to a committee before the 
committee's report is presented to the House. 
8) Comments on the officers of the House casting reflections 
The position of the parliamentary privileges when they are in conflict with 
the freeedom of press has been settled in re-under Article 143 of the Constitu-
tion of India. The advisory opinion of the Supreme Court in this case however 
has made Article 105 (3) quite ambiguous in its approach as if and when a law 
is made defining the privileges it would be subject to Article 19 (1) (a) but in 
case if no law is made then the same provision would yield to parliamentary 
privileges. However, inspite of the fact that freedom of press is subject to privi-
leges of the House, there are certain enactments which give protection to press 
against a third party if substantial and true report of the proceeding of either 
House is published. In 1956 Parliamentary Proceedings (Protection of Publica-
tion), Act was passed. Under the Act, no liability, Civil or Criminal, attaches to 
the publication of proceedings of either Hosue, provided it is true and without 
malice and also for public good. This Act was repealed in Dec. 1975 during 
Emergency but re-enacted in April 1977 and currently is the law relating to the 
publication of proceeding of either House of Parliament. The law also extends 
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to the radio broadcasts. The Act of 1977 therefore, provides immunity from any 
civil or criminal liability for publishing any proceedings of either Hosue of Par-
liament, if the following conditions are fulfilled, 
i) The report of the proceedings is substantially true; 
ii) It is not made with malice; and 
iii) It is made for public good. 
The protection thus, extended by the aforesaid Act is confined not only to 
the wrong or offence of defamation but also comprehedns any other wrong or 
offence which might possibly be caused by such publication, eg, obscenity, in-
citement to an offence, sedition etc. notwithstanding that they are otherwise 
punishable under Indian Penal Code or any other law in force, 
in the year 1978 Article 361 - A was inserted into the Constitution through 
the 44th Constitutional Amendment. The amendement provided the constitu-
tional protection to the Parlimentary Proceedings (Protection of Publication) Act, 
1977 and to the similar state enactments.''^ 
Article 361-A, therefore, extends to the press absoslute immunity from 
any leal proceedings, civil or criminal under the following conditions. 
a) The first condition, the press is required to fulfill in order to protect itself 
against any civil or criminal proceeding in respect of a publication is that 
it must be related to the proceedings of either House of Parliament or 
State Legislature. 
12. Article 361 - A provides that, (I) " No person shall be liable to any pro-
ceeding, Civil or Criminal, in any court in respect of the publication in a news-
paper of a substantially ture report of any proceedings of either house of Parlia-
ment or Legislative Assembly, or as the case may be, either House of Legisla-
ture of a state unless the publication is proved to have been made with malice. 
Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to the publication of any 
report of the proceddings of a secret sitting of either House of Parliament, or 
the Legislative Assembly or, Contd. 
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The word "proceedings" has not been defined either in India or England 
itself but the Select Committee in Duncan's case explained the expression as 
" it covers both the asking of a question and giving written notice of such 
question, and includes everything said or done by a Member in a committee oi 
either House, as everything said or done in either House in the transaction oi 
parliamentary business. "^^ 
It is therefore, clear that in order to constitute the proceeding it must re-
late to some business of the House. The Supreme Court in Tej Kiran's case""* 
has held that the absolute immunity of a Member for 'anything said' in the legis-
lature, under Article 105 (2) or 194 (2) extend to everything said by a Member 
during the course of business in a House of Legislature while it was sitting and 
its business was being transacted, even though what was said might not be 
relevant to business before the House. Consequently if the report of such speech 
is published it is immune from any liability civil or criminal provided the other 
conditions are also fulfilled. 
Though the Clause (2) of Article 105 and Clause (3) of Article 194 use 
both the words 'House' and its 'committees' but Article 361 - A mentions only 
the 'House' and consequently the constitutional protection can not be claimed 
in respect of the proceedings in a committee of a House of Legislature however 
bonafide and correct it might be. The only remedy, therefore, under such cir-
cumstances would be the precedents of the British House of Commons as 
adopted with supplement or modification by Indian precedents, if any. 
Contd; as the case may be, either House of the Legislature of a state 
2) Clause (I) shall apply in relation to reports or matters broadcast by means of wireless 
telegraphy as part of any programme or service provided by means of a broadcasting 
station as it applies in relation to reports or matters published in a newspaper 
Explanation: In this Article "Newspaper" includes a news agency report containing 
material for publicatin in a newspaper 
13. Quoted in Law of the Press by Basu D.D. at p. 189 
14. Tej Kiran V. Sanjeevan, A. AIR 1970 S.C. 1573 at p. 1574 
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In order to seek the protection under Article 361-A it is essential that the 
publication must be a report which is the narration of the proceedings as they 
took place in the House. No other material i.e. article, comment etc. is there-
fore, protected under the aforesaid provision. 
C) The publication of the report of the proceedings must be substantially true 
and must not be made with malice. Consequently if any publication is 
false, no protection is available. Similarly if the publication is actuated 
with malice, it is not protected though the report might be true, 
d) The report must not be of any proceedings of a secret sitting of the House. 
Any newspaper who publishes report of a secret sitting of a House of 
Legislature can not claim protection under Article 361 - A as the report of 
said sittirFg has been expressly excluded from the protection of aforesaid 
provision of the Constitution and would constitute a breach of privilege of 
the House under rule 252.''* 
The immunity provided under Article 361 - A would thus be available even 
in the cases where speech or other material forming part of the proceeding in 
the House offends against. 
a) The Official Secret Act; 
b) The law of defamation; 
c) The law of sedition; 
d) Other offences provided under IPC, eg. obscenity. 
The protective umbrella of Article 361-A whether provides any immunity 
in respect of contempt of Supreme Court or of the High Court as their power to 
15- Rule 252 Provides " disclosure of proceedings or decisions of a 
sercret sitting by any person in any manner shall be treated as a gross breach of 
privilege of House. 
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punish for contempt are recongised under Article 129 and 215 respec-
tively of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has held that there may be 
proceedings which are neither civil nor criminal such as proceeding for 
the contempt of the court.""^ The jurisdict ion conferred by Article 129 and 
215 of the Constitution is a special jur isdict ion and, therefore, not gov-
erned by the criminal procedure code. 
The net result in this regard is that v\/hile no proceeding can be initiated 
by the Supreme Court or a High Court for any speech made inside the Parlia-
ment because the expression any proceeding in any court under Article 105 (2) 
or 194 (2) would confer immunity from the 'proceeding' far contempt of court as 
well, nevertheless a proceeding may be initiated under Aritcle 129 and 215 of the 
Consitutiton if the same speech is published outside Parliament and Article 
361 - A would not confer any immunity. 
The Indian Constitution thus adopts a mean between the two extremes 
the American system of judicial supremacy and the English principle which pro-
vides for the ascendency of Parliament. Kania, C.J in re Delhi Acts observed: ' 
The principal point of distinction between British Parliament remains and that is 
the Indian Parliament is the creature of the Constitution of India, and its powers, 
rights, privileges and obligations have to be found in the relevant articles of the 
Constitution of India. It is not a sovereign body, uncontrolled, with unlimited pow-
ers. The Constitution of India has conferred on the Indian Parliament powers to 
make laws in respect of matters specified in the appropriate place and sched-
ules, and curtailed its rights and powers under other articles and in particular by 
the articles found in Chapter llird dealing with the fundamental rights. "^^ 
16. Naryanan V. Ishwar A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 66 at p. 67. 
17. In re Delhi Laws Acts (1951) S.C.R. 747 at p. 765 
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The first case in which the Supreme Court dealt with such issue was 
Nafisul Hasan's case."" The facts of the case are following. In September 1951 
issue the Blitz a Bombay Weekly, had published a news item which contained 
certain derogatory aspersions on the speaker of U.P. Legislatuve Assembly 
He was served with a notice by the Committee of privileges of the House to appear before it 
and explain the position. The editor, however, neither appeared before the committee of the 
House nor sent any reply The Committee found that the editor was guilty of breach of privilege 
of the House. Legislative Assembly by a resolution authorised the Speaker to issue a warrant of 
arrest against the editor. He was arrested and taken into custody but not produced before a 
Magistrate within twenty - four hours of his arrest and was in detention of Speaker's custody On 
his behalf a writ of habeas corpus was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution on the ground 
that the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 22(2), which says that any person ar-
rested must be produce before a Magistrate within 24 hours of his arrest has been violated The 
Supreme Court upheld the contention and declared the action as a clear breach of provision ot 
Article 22 (2) and ordered his release. 
Arising out of the above case as a sequel the matter went to the Bombay High Court 
because after his release the editor was again served with a notice by the speaker to appear at 
the bar of the House and again he failed to comply But no further action was taken in the matter 
by the Legislative Assembly On the other hand the editor Mr. Mistry filed a civil suit in Bombay 
High Court claiming damages for wrongful arrest and detention agaisnt the speaker of U P. 
Legislative Assembly contending that the speaker had no authority to issue a warrant of arrest 
agaisnt him. The Bombay High Court, however, dismissed the suit on the following grounds 
1) The power to punish for contempt is expressly conferred under Article 194 (3) and the 
House is a sole judge or on a question of admitted privilege. 
2) In pursuant to Article 194, by virtue of the resolution passed by the Legislatures under 
Article 212 (2) of the Constitution, the protection is provided to the speaker who signed 
the warrant as an officer of the House and in performance of his duties arising in con -
18. Gunupati Keshavram Reddy V. Nafisul Hasan AIR 1954 SO. 63 
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nection with the internal affairs of the House. This immunity is ab-
solute even if the warrant is wrongfully executed by others/"^ 
3) The privileges of the State Legislatures can be exercised against every 
citizen of India, therefore, it can not be imagined that this power can be 
exercised only within the state, as in such case any person living outside 
the state would be free to assail the dignity of the House. 
In Search Light Case ^° the Speaker of a House of Bihar Legislature 
had directed certain parts of the speech made by a member, to be expunged 
The newspaper 'searchlight' ignored this order and published the entire speech 
including the expunged portion. A notice was, therefore, issued to him by the 
House to show cause why steps should not be taken against him for the breach 
of privilege of the House prohibiting publication of certain parts of its proceed-
ing. The editor moved to the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitu-
tion. He contended that under Article 19 (1) (a) he was at liberty to publish 
whatever he wanted and any restriction upon his right can be imposed only by a 
law enacted under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. In support of his case, the 
editor referred the case of G.K. Reddy V. Nafisul Hasan where the Parliamen-
tary privilege yielded to the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 22 (2) 
of the Constitution. It was, therefore, on his behalf contended that on the same 
analogy Article 19 (1 )(a) could be held applicable to the area of legislative privi 
19. Article 212 (2) provides. 
" No officer or member of the Legislature of a state in whom powers are vested 
by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure or conduct of business, or 
for maintaining order, in the Legislature shall be subject to the jurisdiction of 
any court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers. 
20. Supra note. 10 
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leges. By a majority the Court ruled that privileges enjoyed by a House of Par-
liament or a State Legislature under Article 105 (3) and 194 (3) respectively on 
the analogy of the House of Commons in England, were not subject to Article 
19 (1 )(a). The House, therefore, has the full authority to prohibit the publication 
of any report of its debte or proceeding though the same may contravene the 
fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution. It was 
pointed out by the Court that any inconsistancy between Article 105 (3) or Ar-
ticle 194 (3) and the Article 19 (1) (a) could be and ought to be resolved by 
harmonious construction and consequently Article 19(1) (a), being a provision 
of general nature must yield to the special provisions of Article 105(3) or Article 
194 (3). The Court, however, made it clear that if Parliament or State Legisla-
ture enacted a law under aforesaid provision then such a law would be subject to 
Article 19(1 )(a) of the Constitution. 
The Court also rejected the plea of Article 21 on the ground that rules of 
the House are supposed to be in accordance with the requirements of Article 21 
of the Constitution. 
K. Subba Rao, J. however, adopted dissenting view. In his opinion in case 
of a conflict between Article 19 (1) (a) and the Article 105(3) or 194(3), the 
privilege must yield to the extent it violates fundamental right as, if and when 
any law is made to define the privileges of parliament or state legislature it 
would be subject to fundamental rights. He observed, "I would not have ven-
tured to do so, but for the conviction that the reasoning adopted therein 
would unduly restrict and circumscribe the wide scope and content of one 
of the cherished fundamental rights Viz; the freedom of speech in its ap-
plication to the press". 
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It may be submitted that the present case is not decided on merits On the 
question that whether House of Commons, at the commencement of the Consti-
tution, was having the privilege of prohibiting a true report of the proceedings, 
the majority answered in positive. Once it is established, the House was well 
within her right to punish the contemner under Article 194(3) of the Constitu-
tion. 
The most important case which came before the Supreme Court, invotv 
ing the freedom of press and parliamentary privilege is Keshav Singh's case, 
where he alongwith few others printed and publishd, a pamphlet against a mem-
ber of the House. While being administered a reprimand, he behaved in an 
objectionable manner. In accordance with the decision taken by the Housfe later 
on the same day, the speaker directed that Keshav Singh be jailed for seven 
days for committing contempt of the House. Jhis led to a number of events On 
19th March 1964 an advocate, Mr. M.B. Soloman presented a habeas corpus 
petition before the Allahabad High Court on behalf of Keshav Singh. He was 
ordered to be released on bail. The House pre-emptorily passed a resolution 
holding that Keshav Singh, the advocate Soloman and the two judges who had 
made the orders had committed its contempt and they should be brought before 
it in custody. The two judges filed the petition before the High Court under Ar-
ticle 226 of the Constitution contending that resolution of the House was uncon-
stitutional and violative of Article 211 of the Constitution '^' and that resolution 
passed by the Legislative Assembly amounted to the contempt of the Court 
21. Article 211 says that no discussion can take place in a state legislature with respect to 
the conduct of a Supreme Court or a High Court judge in the discharge of his duties 
except when a motion for removal is under consideration in a House. 
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A full bench of Allahabad High Court consisting all the twenty-eight judges or-
dered the stay of implementation of resolution of the House till the disposal of 
the petition. 
On the same day the House passed another resolution making it clear 
that the House does not intend to dispose of the charge of privilege against the 
High Court judges without providing them an apportunity of explanation as pro-
vided under the rules (Under Article 208 of the Constitution) ""'^. There after, the 
House withdrew the arrest warrants issued against the judges but they were 
placed under the obligation to appear before the House and explain why the 
House should not proceed agaisnt them for its contempt.'The bench of twenty 
three judges again granted stay of the resolution passed by the House This 
brought face to face judiciary and the legislature. At this stage the president of 
India referred the matter to Supreme Court for its advisory opinion under Article 
143 of the Constitution."/ 
The main issues before the Supreme Court were whether the House is 
the sole and exclusive judge of its privilege and whether it is competent to pun-
ish a person for its contempt taking place out side the four walls of the House'' 
And whether if in enforcement of its decision the House issues a general or 
unspeaking warrant, is the High Court empowered to entertain a habeas corpus 
petition challenging the validity of the detention of the person sentenced by the 
House? 
The Court gave its opinion 6 :1 . The majority opinion delivered by 
Gajendragadkar, C.J, held that House of Commons enjoyed the privilege to 
commit a person for its contempt by a general warrant, which is non-justiciable, 
21-A. Article 208 (1) provides that a House of the Legislature of a State may make 
rule for regulating, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, its proceedure 
and the conduct of its business. 
22. In re under Article 143 of the Constitution of India AIR 1965 SO. 745 
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as a Superior Court of Record and not as a legislature. Even if the House 
of Commons has this privi lege as a legislative organ, the legislature can 
not claim it as Indian Consti tut ion also envisages fundamental rights and 
doctrine of judicial review, particlualrly. Article 32 and 226 impose a duty 
to enforce the fundamental rights by Supreme Court and the High Court 
respectively. Thus the House can not claim those privi leges existing in 
the House of Commor^ at the Commencement of Constitution as a Supe-
rior Court of Record. But only those powers of House of Commons which 
are integral part of its privi leges and which are incidental to legislative 
function. Whether a part icular privilege exist or not, it is for the courts to 
give definitive answer by f inding out if such a privi lege was being enjoyed 
by House of Commons at the commencement of the Constitution. Once it 
comes to conclusion that such privilege exists, then it is for the House to 
judge the occassion and manner of its exercise and the courts would not 
sit in judgement over the way the House has exercised its privilege 
On the question whether High Court is empowered to entertain a 
habeas corpus peti t ion against the detention order passed by the House 
Supreme Court said that the searchlight case excluded the application ot 
Article 19 (1) (a) so as to control the legislative privi leges, but it did not 
exclude the possibil i ty of application of Article 2 1 . Referring the afore-
said case the Chief Justice observed, " Therefore, we do not think it woula 
be right to read the majority decision as laying down a general proposition 
that whenever there is a conflict between the latter part of Article 194(3) 
and any of the provisions of the fundamental rights guaranteed by part III. 
the latter must always yield to the former. The majority decision, there-
fore, must be taken to have settled that Article 19(1) (a) would not apply, 
Article 21 would."^^ 
23. Id at p. 765 
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Regarding the contempt of House by a judge it was held that Article 226 
confers on High Court the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus. A person may 
complain, under Article 21 that he has been deprived of his personal liberty not 
in accordance with law but for capricious or malafide reasons. The Court will 
then be bound to look into the matter. Similarly Article 211 of the Constitution 
debars the State Legislature from discussing the conduct of a High Court Judge 
for anything done in the discharge of his duties. The net result of Article 226 
and 211 is that,"Judicial conduct can never become the subject matter ot 
contempt proceedings under the latter part of Article 194(3), even if it is 
assumed that such conduct can become the subject matter of contempt 
proceeding under the powers and privileges passed by the House of Com-
mons in England."^* 
The opinion given by the Supreme Court, thus may be summarised as 
following. 
1) The legislature has the sole and exclusive power to punish anyone for its 
contempt, but the order of the legislature can not be non-justiciable 
2) The order of committee for contmept of House is not subject to Article 
19 (1) (a), but under Article 21 and 22, the court can review such order 
(Thus the scope of judicial review is very limited). 
3) No action can be taken against a judge of a High Court on the plea of 
contempt for anything done in official capacity. 
The Allahabad High Court on the basis of the advisory opinion of the 
Supreme Court disposed off the petition on merits. Based on the observations it 
was argued on behalf of petitioner that though the House of Commons enjoy the 
privilege to commit anyone for its contempt by a general warrant which is non-
justiciable such privi leges can not be claimed in India as the power is vested 
24. Id at p. 770 
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in the House of Commons as a Court of Record and not as legislative organ But 
the Allahabad High Court ignored this plea by saying that once it is established 
that particular privilege existed in the House of Commons at the commence-
ment of the Constitution, then whatever is its origin the state legislature also 
possess the same privilege The Allahabad High Court, therefore, adopted only 
in part the opinion of the Supreme Court that House of Commons enjoyed privi-
lege of committing any person by general warrant, which is non-justiciab^e. but 
ignored the other part that these privileges can not be claimed in India as the 
House IS not a Court of Record 
The advisory opinion of the Supreme Court in re under Article 143 of the 
Constitution reaffirmed the view taken in search light case that whenever there 
is a conflict between the provisions contained under Article 19(1 )(a) and Article 
105(3) or 194(3), the provisions of Article 19(1) (a) which are general in nature 
had to yield to the special provisions of Article 105 (3) or 194 (3) and it is a well 
settled law But the earlier view of the apex court in Search Light case and 
Allahabad High Court in Keshav Singh's case that a person, committed for con-
tempt under the rules of the House can not claim the protection of Article 21 as 
such rules are supposed to stand the test of fairness enshrined under the con-
stitutional provision has come under the shadow of doubt after Maneka Gandhi's 
case. 
The Eanadu Privilege issue ^' once again brought the judiciary and the 
legislature face to face. The Chief Editor of a Telgu Newspaper was found guilty 
of contempt of Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council for publishing an item 
"Peddalu Golaba" (elders's commotion) and was ordered by the House to ap-
pear before it for admonition. Instead of complying with the summons, the editor 
25. The Hindustan Times, March 30, 1984 
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approached the Supreme Court for relief who issued a show cause notice to the 
Council and also passed an interim order to the effect that editor is not to be 
arrested in pursuance of any process or warrant, if issued against the editor 
The House ignored the Supreme Court's order and directed the Police Commis-
sioner to produce the editor before the House on March 28. Then on March 25 
the Supreme Court passed an order directing the Police Commissioner not to 
arrest, and should not cause to arrest to be made. The Police Commissioner 
under such circumstances sought the clarification of the House who reiterated 
its earlier stand. The controversy was diffused for the time being as the Gover-
nor on the advice of the Chief Minister prorogued the Council on March 30. 
1984. Consequently the motion lapsed. 
The experience in India shows that our Houses, like the House of Com-
mons do not exercise these powers except in gross cases. The aforesaid epi-
sode clearly demonstrtes that our legislature are oversenstive in the matter of 
their privileges. By not complying the Supreme Court's order the House simply 
showed the lack of patience since the apex court has issued only an interim 
order. There was no harm had the House waited till the Court decided the mat-
ter on merits. 
The Parliamentary privileges thus, are special rights available to legisla-
tive organ of the Government at Centre as well as in the states, their commit-
tees and the individual members. Such rights have been conferred to enable 
these bodies to play their role effetively. The privileges at present, being en-
joyed by Parliament and State Legislature are identical to the privileges the 
House of Commons enjoyed at the commencement of the Constitution. In India 
the courts are empowered to look into the existence of a particular privilege but 
once it is affirmed then only the Parliament or State Legislature are competent 
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to decide whether commission or omission of any act amounts breach of privi-
lege or not. The Parliamentary privileges are not subject to Article 19 (1)(a) of 
the Constitution. The press, therefore, can not publish any matter relating to 
Parliament or State Legislature if it is in conflict with the legislative privileges 
neverthless, Article 21 may be invoked on the ground that the act of the legisla-
ture is malafide capricious, perverse or violative of natural justice. The press 
though protected under certain circumstances from any liability civil or criminai 
before any court of law can not claim immunity against the legislatures itself 
under the same circumstances. Further any proceeding under Article 129 or 
215 which is neither civil nor criminal in nature is not saved under Article 361-A 





iS^nlike the American Constitution which guarantees the freedom ot 
press in express terms through First Amendment, the Constitution of India 
does not guarantee the same freedom expressly. The Judicial decisions 
however, have made it amply clear that it is guaranteed under Article 19(1 )(a) 
of the Constitution. The ambit of the freedom of press, therefore, largely 
depends upon the judicial approach. In the last few decades since the Con-
stitution came into force a sufficient body of case law has grown up upon the 
subject. These cases show that how the state often tried to make the press 
less active by adopting various methods, i.e. legislative and administrative 
claiming that the grounds were saved by Article 19 (2) of the Constitution 
In Romesh Thappar's case, Patanjali Sastri J. delivering the major-
ity opinion observed: 
"The Constitution has placed in a distinct category these of-
fences against public order which aim at undermining the security of state or 
over throwing it, and made their prevention the sole justification for legisla-
tive abridgement of freedom of speech and expression, that it is to say, noth-
ing less than endangering the foundations of the state or threatening its over-
throw could justify curtailment of right to freedom of speech and expression"' 
1. A.I.R. 1950 s o . 124 at p. 128 
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The Supreme Court expressed the opinion that a statute seeking to 
restrict the freedom of speech and expression for maintaining the public or-
der or ensuing public safety could not be considered valid in as much it pur-
ported to impose restrictions for a more comprehensive and wider purpose 
than contemplated by the constitutional provisions which delimited the sphere 
of legislative abridgement by words, "undermines the security of or tends to 
overthrow the state". 
The Court, thus made it clear that only the serious and aggravated 
forms of public disorder calculated to endanger the security of state and not 
the relatively minor breach of peace of purly local significance upon which 
the freedom of speech and expression may be curtailed. 
While considering the laws dealing with the problem of public order 
the Supreme Court in earlier cases adopted a broader view. In Ramji Lai 
Modi, the Supreme Court interpreted the words 'in the interest of public 
order' as wider than 'for the maintenance of public order' and , therefore, 
a law providing for curbing the activities which have a tendency to cause 
public disorder, is valid.^ 
The broad approach was questioned in Virendra's case where the pub-
lic order was considered of extreme importance and was given priority over 
the freedom of the press. The Court observed: "Quick decision and swift ana 
effective action must be the essence of these powers and exercise of it 
must, therefore, be kept to the subjective satisfaction of the Government 
charged with the duty of maintaining law and order. To make an exercise oi 
these powers justiciable and subject to judicial scrutiny will defeat the very 
2. Ramji Lai Modi V. State of U.P. A I R . 1957 SO. 620 
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purpose of the enactment.^ 
But in R.M. Lohia,s case the Supreme Court did not follow its own 
view and narrowed the sweep of public order as a ground of reasonable 
restriction so as to exclude normal 'law and order' and 'security of state' 
situations and include only such situations where there were threats to pub-
lic safety and tranquility, Subba Rao, J; stated that the words of Das, C.J. in 
Virendra V.State of Punjab did not indicate that any remote or fanciful con-
nection between the impunged Act and the public order would be sufficient 
to sustain its validity. The Court proceeded to state that "The learned Chief 
Justice was only making a distinction between an Act which expressly and 
directly purported to maintain public order and one which did not expressly 
state the said purpose but left it implied therefrom, and between an Act that 
directly maintained public order and one that indirectly brought about the 
same result. The distinction does not ignore the necessity for intimate con-
nection between the Act and the public order sought to be maintained by the 
Act.'"* 
It is difficult to state precisely what Subha Rao, J., meant to say in an 
eleborate analysis of the amended Article 19(2): he certainly did not dispute 
the distinction made by the Supreme Court between the expressions "For 
the maintenance of public order" and in the "interest of public order". But it 
is submitted that contrary to the terms of those decision, he held that distinc-
tion was only this, that where as the expression "for the maintenance of pub-
3. Virendra V. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 896 at p. 901 
4. Suptt. Central Prison V. Ram ManoharLohia A.I.R 1960 SO. at p.p. 
639 - 40 
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lie order" meant that the restrictions directly referred to such maintenance 
"in the interest of public order" meant that it was merely implied. The judicial 
opinion is contrary to well settled principles laid down by the Supreme Court 
itself, and ought to be over ruled as being clearly wrong and productive of 
public mischief.' 
The constitutionlal position is, therefore, visited with a vulnerable lack 
of clarity where on the one hand in Ramji La! Modi's case wider interpreta-
tion of the phrase 'in the interest of public order' is insisted but the same was 
not followed in Virendra's case on the other hand Lohia's case suggested 
that there are some criterion for testing the validity of state action. The 
evoluatlon of such test is politically necessary because sedition had an 
imperical history. But such cases are rare and the apex court by and large 
has supported the government's plea for almost a blanket power to deal with 
these situations. 
Bhagavati J., in Express Newspaper's case developed a new approach 
of "direct and inevitable effect" test in order to test the validity of a law im-
posing restrictions upon the freedom of press. The Court opined that "All the 
consequences which have been visualised in this regard by the petitioners 
viz. the tendency to curtail circulation and thereby narrow the dissemination 
of information fetters the petitioners freedom to choose the means of exer-
cising the right, likelihood of independence of the press being undermineo 
by having to seek alternative media etc. would be remote and depend on 
various factors which may or may not come into picture. Unless these were 
the direct and inevitable consequences of the measures enacted in the 
impunged Act it would not be possible to stike down the legislation as having that 
5. Searvai, H.M : Constitutional Law of India at p. 620 
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effect and operation."^ It appears that the Court wanted the 'direct and 
inevitable effect' test to be operated in such way that where the infringe-
ment was brought about by the likely occurance of some connected 
social, economic, political or other event than the one formally stated 
in the statue, the effect will not be direct and inevitable because that 
event, even if likely to happen, may or may not happen. 
This test of 'direct and inevitable effect' was followed in Sakal 
Newspaper's Case ' . Rejecting the state's plea that drop in the circulation 
was only an indirect consequence and that reasonableness of the restriction 
should be considered under Article 19(1){g) and clause (6) and not under 
Article 19(2), the Supreme Court observed that, "the fixation of minimum 
price for the number of pages which a newspaper is entitled to publish 
is obviously not for ensuring a reasonable price to the buyers but foi 
expressly cutting down the circulation. The restraint on the freedom to 
publish any number of pages unless the price of a newspaper is raiseo 
alongwith the curtailment of advertisement, forcing the hike in the price 
of newspapers, is no remote but the direct consequence of the impungeo 
order. The net direct and immediate effect of the said order is bringing down 
the circulation. And when a law is intended to bring about that result, it is a 
6. Express Newspapers V. Union of India A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 578 at p. 620 
7. Sakal Papers V. Union of India A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 305 
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direct interference with the freedom of speech and expression.^ 
The aforesaid approach was firmly established in Bank Nationalisation 
case' where Shah, J. speaking for the Court said, "It is not the object of the 
authority making the law imparing the right of citizen nor the form of the ac-
tion taken that determines the protection that he may claim; it is the effect ol 
the law and the action upon the right which attract the jurisdiction of the Court 
to grant relief. If this be the true view and we think it is, in determining the 
impact of state action upon constitutional guarantees which are fundamen-
tal, it follows that the extent of protection against impairment of a fundamen-
tal right is determined not by the object of legislature nor by the form of ac-
tion, but by its operation upon the individual right".'^^ Thus Shah J., delivering 
judgement on behalf of the ten judges in this case has rejected the theory 
of object and form of state action as it is inconsistent with the constitu-
tional scheme. 
The Supreme Court's attitude is of extreme importance to the press for 
two reasons. First: because what the legislature can not do directly they 
seek to do it indirectly; and secondly, the Government often pretends to en-
act the legislation for pro-bono publico reasons when its real object is to 
infringe private and public rights.'''' 
8. Id at p. p. 310-14 
9. R.C.Cooper V. Union of India AIR 1970 S.C. 564 
10 Id at p. 596 
11 Dhavan, R : Only the Good News - On The Law of Press In India at p. 106 
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In Bennett Coleman's Case^^ the Supreme Court whi le following the 
aforesaid approach and expressing its agreement with Mr. Palkhivala and 
describing his views of pith and substance of the subject matter and of direct 
and of incidental effect of the legislation are relevant questions of legislative 
competence but are irrelevant to the question of infringement of fundamen-
tal rights as sound and correct approach, opined, "If it be assumed that the 
direct object of the law or action has to be the direct abridgement of the right 
of free speech by the impeached law or action it is to be related to the direct-
ness of the subject matter of the impunged law or action. The action may 
have direct effect on the fundamental right although its direct subject matter 
may be different therefore, the word "direct" would go to the quality 
or character of the effect and to the subject matter The object of the law ot 
executive action is irrelevant when it establishes the petitioner's contention 
about the fundamental rights".'^^ 
Mathew J., however in his dissenting judgement has linked and equated 
the "pith and substance" theory to the "direct effect test", and pointed out 
that, "pith and substance test although not strictly appropriate, might serve 
a useful purpose" in deciding whether the law in question infringes the fun-
damental right. The Court finally observed: 
"The various provisions of the newsprint import policy have been 
examined to indicate as to how the petitioner's fundamental rights have 
been infringed by the restriction on page limit, prohibition against new 
newspapers and new editions." The Court created a chain of events in 
highlighting the effect of impunged policy on fundamental rights. It said. 
12. Bennett Coleman V. Union of India AIR 1973 SO. 106 
13. Id at p. p. 119 - 20 
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"The effect and the consequences of the Impunged policy upon the 
newspaper is directly controlling the growth and circulation of newspa-
per. The direct effect is restriction upon the circulation of newspapers 
The direct effect is upon the growth of newsprint through (The limita-
tion of) pages. The direct effect is that newsprint are deprived of their 
area of advertisement. The direct effect is that they are exposed to 
financial loss, the direct effect is that freedom of speech and expres-
sion is infringed."^* 
The Supreme Court, it may be submitted, adopted the test in de-
termining the validity of a law impunged as violating the fundamental 
right, guaranteed under Article 19 (1)(a) to (g) has been formulated v^ith-
out considering the situation where several fundamental rights inhere 
in one person in respect of the business of publishing newspaper; and 
the test adopted by Mathew. J., though not in substance but in form is 
the correct test and the conclusions which he reached are correct 
The extent of direct and indirect intervention by the government can 
be seen from the Express Newspaper case''* where on behest of Lieutinent 
Governor of Delhi, notices for the forfeiture and demolition of the building 
constructed by the Indian Express were issued. The Supreme Court did not 
laid emphasis on "direct and inevitable effect" and only one judge (A.P Sen 
J.) saw this as a clear, direct and immediate threat to freedom of speech 
when he said that, "impunged notices threatening the re - entry and demoli-
tion of Express Building constitute a direct and immediate threat to the free-
14, Id at p.p.120-21 
15. Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. V. Union of India A.I.R 1986 B.C. 872 
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dom of press". But in later newsprint case."*^ the Supreme Court while ac-
knowledging and reiterating the freedom of press tends to avoid a system-
atic discourse on the kind of direct and indirect pressure that can be placed 
upon the press. Sounding more formally the Court held that there appears to 
be a good ground to direct the Central Government to reconsider the matter 
afresh when it observed that, "The Government should strike a just and a 
reasonable balance of freedom of speech and expression on the one hano 
and the need to impose the social control on the other" In other words the 
government must at all material times be conscious of the fact that is dealing 
with an activity protected by Article 19{1)(a). Thus Venkataramiah, J; 
emphasised the absence of any arbitrariness in State's action. He added 
that the power exercisable under Sec. 25 of Customs Act, 1962 was a dis-
cretionary power, but it was not unrestricted, and stressed the need that the 
discretion must be exercised according to law. 
The apex Court in printer (Mysore) Ltd. V. Asstt. Commercial Tax 
Officer''^ evolved one more formula of testing the validity of a taxing statute 
and laid emphasis on the spirit of the amendment into consideration. The 
court observed, "Though the Parliament was empowered at any rate, tih 
1956 to levy tax on sale or purchase of newspaper, no such tax was 
ever levied by it. On the contrary, soon after coming into force of the 
Constitution the Parliament enacted the Tax on Newspapers (Sales ano 
Advertisement) Repeal Act, 1951, whereby taxes levied earlier on the 
sale of newspapers and on the advertisement of published therein was 
repealed." The Court further observed. In short the position is : "no tax can 
16. India Express Newspaper (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. V. Union of India AIR 1986 
8.0 515. 
17. Printers Maysore Ltd. V, Asst Commercial Tax Officer (1994) 2 S.CO 434. 
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be imposed on the inter state sale of newspaper and no tax is imposed on 
thier intra - state sale/^^ 
The Supreme Court, therefore, avoided the literal construction 
but examined the spirit of the amendment and found though in accor-
dance with the provision tax can be levied on the sale of nevy/spapers 
but as the spirit of amendment clearly excludes this possibility, news-
papers are free from the tax which might have been imposed upon it. 
The right to publish advertisements has always been an important as-
pect of freedom of press as they are major source of revenue and conse-
quently responsible for lowering the price of the newspaper. The question 
whether the advertisements are protected under Article 19 (1) (a), for the 
first time, was raised in Hamdard Dawakhana V. Union of India^^ where 
the advertisement in respect of certain drugs claiming a magical relief was 
banned. The Supreme Court in such cases stressed the need of ascertaining 
its nature and true character and came to the conclusion that it was only 
when an advertisement was concerned with the expression or the propaga-
tion of ideas, it could be said to relate to the freedom of speech. 
The Supreme Court though admitted that advert isement is a part 
of freedom of speech and expression yet it is not protected under Ar-
ticle 19(1) (a) of the Constitution as it is purely commercial in nature 
and has nothing to do with the propagation of ideas. It is submitted 
that the advertisement could have been prevented on the ground of 
decency and morality under Article 19 (2) because at the time 
18. Id at p. 441. 
19. Hamdard Dawakhana V. Union of India AIR 1960 SO. 554. 
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when the advertisement was released and the diseases it claimed to cure 
were not considered fit to be discussed or brought in public The Supreme 
Court, therefore, need not to go into the nature and character of the adver-
tisement once it admitted that they were the part of freedom of speech and 
expression. The same position regarding the publication of advertisement 
was reiterated in Express Newspaper case but simultaneously easing the 
commercial concept the Court declared that they can not be denied the pro-
tection of Article 19 (1) (a) simply because they were issued by business-
men. Referring the Hamdard Dawakhana case the Supreme Court made it 
clear that certain observations in that case were beyond the need and made 
in the light of American decisions, which in America itself in latter cases 
were not approved by the courts.^" The judgement of the Court though reit-
erating its earlier stand v/idened the scope as the advertisements were not 
to be denied the protection of Article 19(1) (a) because they were issued by 
the businessmen. In Tata Press Case the Court however, adopted a different 
approach and examined it not from the angle of person issuing it but for 
whom it was made. The Court declared that Article 19 (1) (a) protects not 
only the interest of person making the speech but also of those for whose 
benefit it was made as the economic interests of a citizen are guided by the 
information guided through the advertisements. Thus the Supreme Court 
boldly asserted, a position in most clear terms which it failed to adopt in 
earlier case.^^ 
In L.I.C of India V. Munubhai. D. Shah with the added emphasis of 
'fairness' while rejecting the plea placed by the L.I.C. the Court observed, 
20. Supra note (16) at p. 548. 
21. The Tata Press Ltd. V. IVtahanagarTelephone Nigam Ltd. AIR 1995 SO. 2438 
at p. 2448. 
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"The attitude on the part of LAC. refusing to publish the rejoinder in then 
magazine financed from public funds can be described as both unfair ano 
unreasonable; unfair because fairness demands that both view points were 
placed before the readers, however limited be their number, to enable them 
to draw their own conclusions and unreasonable because there was no logic 
or proper justification for refusing publication ". The most striking feature 
of the judgement is that for the first time the apex court recognisea 
that the freedom guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a) incudes the right to 
reply though limited to the exceptional circumstances. ^^ 
In Reliance Petro Chemicals Ltd. Case the "present and imminent 
danger concept evolved by U.S. Supreme Court was followed by our Su-
preme Court . Though it admitted, "It is difficult to lay down a fixed standaro 
to judge as to how clear, remote or imminent the danger is. It must be re-
membered that the continuance of the injunction would amount to interfer-
ence with the freedom of press in the form of preventive injunction and li 
must, therefore, be based on reasonable grounds for the sole purpose oi 
keeping the administration of justice unimpared. There must be reasonable 
ground to believe that the danger apprehended is real and eminent.^'* 
22. L.I.C. V. Manubhai. D. Shab (1992) 3 S.C.C. 637 at p. 655 
23. The right is not general in nature but available only in the cases where 
an attempt is made by the state to negate its cirticism through publish-
ing the views of a person favouring the working of the state in a depart-
mental magazine but simultaneously denying, without providing any op-
portunity, to publish rejoinder of the person who earlier criticised the 
functioning of the corporation. 
24. A.I.R. 1989 SO. 190 at p. 202 
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The Court nevertheless admitted the failure to lay down any formula or 
test to determine how the balance of convenience under the situations as 
posed in the aforesaid case should be judged where It Is a case of preven-
tive publication of an article in a pending manner. The only formula, in the 
opinion of the Court, therefore, remains of reasonable apprehension of such 
danger that is mere upon a suspicion of "present and imminent danger", the 
freedom of press can not be curtailed. But the court once again failed to 
laydown the guide lines as to when such an apprehension would constitute 
the "present and imminent danger" to the freedom of press. 
Article 19 {1)(a) of the Constitution while providing the freedom of 
speech and expression also puts a rider upon it and makes the right quali-
fied that reasonable restrictions may be placed upon the freedom. In the opinion 
of the Court no party may be restrained from propogating to develop any of the 
language recognised under the Constitution itself. The Court in the instant case 
however, ignored the fact that any appeal to voters to favour it on a ground of any 
language is prohibited under Sec. 123 of Representation of People Act.^ ^"'^  
Our country has always been a great preacher of peace and good 
neighbourly relations. The Constitution of India, therefore, contains the pro-
vision giving effect to this long standing policy under Article 19 (2)advocated 
by our leaders. It is therefore, not permissible to the press to publish any 
material which adversely affects India's relations with other countries. In 
Jagannath Sahu V. Union of India " . The apex Court made a distinction 
between a 'foreign state' and a ' foreign power ' and held that Pakistan 
though a member of Common Wealth, was a foreign power of the purpose or 
the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, hence the Foreign State Order 1950 
was not applicable in petitioner's case. 
24-A A.l.R 1984A P353 
25. Jaganath Sahu V. Union of India A.l.R. 1960 SO. 625 
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Supreme Court based its decision upon the distinction between a for-
eign state for the purpose of constitution and the foreign power under the 
Act of 1950. The question for Supreme Court's consideration should have 
been whether Sec. 3 of Preventive Detention Act, 1950, was saved by Artilcle 
19 (2) of the Constitution as a reasonable restriction. It is submitted that the 
law could have been saved as a reasonable restriction on following grounds 
(1) If such writ ing in the newspapers create the tension to an extent 
that there was a l ikel ihood of war or other restr ict ions, then un-
der the security of state: and, 
(2) Since the wri t ings in the newspapers not only had the tendency 
to affect relat ions with the countries of commonwealth but also 
with other countr ies out side the Commonwealth who were still 
the foreign states for the purpose of this Constitution 
The Supreme Court in India borrowed the English Concept of "de-
prave and corrupt" the minds of those in whose hand it is likely to fall, 
developed in Hicklin's case. Hidayatula J. (as he then was) in Ranjit UdeshI 
V. State of Maharashtra acknowledged in a thoughtful, careful and humane 
consideration of the problem that times and values have changed and might 
change very considerably and significantly, but he upheld the conviction on 
Hicklin's principle. Expressly recognising the clash of the "claims of society 
to suppress obscenity and claims of the society to allow free speech", He 
observed : 
"(Counsel) is not right in saying that Hicl<lin case emphasized the im-
portance of few words or a stray passage. The words of Chief Justice 
were that 'the matter charged' must have a tendency to deprave ano 
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corrupt". 
The observations do not suggest that even a stray word or an insignifi-
cant passage would suffice. An observation to that effect in the ruling must 
be read secundum subjectum materium, that is to say, applicable to the pam-
phlet there considered We need not attempt to bowdler-
ize all literature and thus rob the freedom of speech and expression. A bal-
ance should be maintained between freedom of speech and expression ana 
public decency and morality but when the latter is substantially transgressea 
the former must give way.^ ® 
After the amendment of Indian Penal Code in 1969, the Supreme Court 
in Chandrakanta Kakodkar V.State of Maharashtra while affirming the de-
prave and corrupt' test restricted the scope of the offence under section 292 
I. PC and expressed the view that, "It was the duty of the Court to consider 
the obscene matter by taking an over all view of the entire book and to deter-
mine whether obscene passages were so likely to deprave and corrupt those 
whose minds were open to such immoral infuences and into whose hands 
the book was likely to fall."^''. The Court further held that while doing so it 
must not overlook the influence of the book on the social morality of our 
contemporary society. It was observed that, "The concept of obscenity would 
differ from country to country depending upon the standards of morals in 
contemporary society But to insist that the standard 
should always be for the writer to see the adolescent ought not to be brought 
into contact with sex or if they read any reference to sex in what is written 
whether if that is the dominant theme or not they would be affected would be 
to require authors to write books only for adolescents and not for adults 
26. Ranjit Udeshi V. State of Maharashtra A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 881 at pp. 888-89 
27. Chandrakant Kakodkar D. V. State of Maharashtra A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1390 at p. 1392 
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Finally in Samresh Bose V. Amal Mitra " the Supreme Court ex-
pressed it's opinion in favour of dominant theme of the book alleged to be 
obscene. On the question of obsenity it made an important observation that 
"The mere fact that the language used vi'as vulgar would not be enough to 
adjudicate the book as obscene because a vulgar writing is not necessarily 
obscene. The essence of obscenity of a novel is the effect of depraving 
debasing and corrupting the morals of readers. Vulgarity may arouse disgust 
and revulsion among them but does not necessarily corrupt their morals" It 
is however difficult to agree with the view of Sen J, that description of female 
bodies, scantly dressed or involved in love making are not necessarily ob-
scene. It may be submitted that the public in general still has not become so 
adventurous. 
Thus, the test of 'deprave and corrupt' as borrowed from English deci-
sion in Hicklin's case is still being follwed in India with certain adjustments. 
Though the continuing affirmation has been criticised as the legacy of En-
glish law "has not been a very happy one and the Indian courts in spite o1 
their several attempts have failed to adjudge the concept of obscenity to the 
needs of a different society and a different time and have not been able to 
free it completely from the concepts Qf a more intolerent age". Inspite of the 
aforesaid criticism it is wrong to say that the law in this regard has been 
static and the Supreme Court in Samresh Bose's case has tried to bring the 
law in tune with the time by giving enough weightage to the expert testimoney 
in arriving to its conclusion though at the same time it made clear that the 
Court was not bound by the expert opinion and it was only for its own satis-
28^  Samresh Bose V. Amal Mitra A.I.R. 1986 SO. 967 
29. Id at p. 983 
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faction It may however, be submitted that the Court has deliberately over 
looked the interest and right of adult and mature persons to read vy^ hat-
ever they like declaring that if the work may deprave and corrupt the 
adolescents, It may be banned. 
The law of contempt of Court is well settled in India. Any act done or 
writing published, calculated to bring judiciary into contempt, or to lower its 
authority, or to interfere with the administration of justice is bound to suffer 
the wrath of the courts. 
The apex Court's approach prior to the contempt of Courts Act, 1971 
regarding the contempt by the press, keeping in view the role of the press in 
the society, seems to be quite lenient and where the judicial verdict was 
criticised in an objectionable manner the Supreme Court did not inflict any 
exemplary punishment. In E. M. S. Namboodaripad's case'" where the 
appeallant was the Chief Minister of Kerala and levelled certain allegations 
against the judiciary as " an instrument of oppression" and guided by "class 
hatred", he was held guilty of committing contempt of the court. Neverthless 
the decision of the Supreme Court even after holding him guilty leaves an 
impression that the Court softened its attitude by not only reducing the fine 
to a nominal but also when it seems to justify its decision by saying that it 
had given various decisions against the exploiting class too, instead of in-
sisting a rigid stand on the contemptous remarks made by the scandlising 
jurisdiction to cover other than serious allegations of corruption but went out 
of its way to prove that the erring Chief Minister has also misunderstood his 
marxism and was, therefore, entitled to a reduction in fine. 
30. E.M.S. Namboodaripad V. T Narayanan Nambiar A.I.R. 1970 SO. 2015 
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This lenient approach on the part of Supreme Court continued even 
after coming into existence of contempt of courts Act, 1971, though time 
and again it exercised the contempt jurisdiction. In C.JJ. Daphtary's case ^^  
apex court held that a person can commit contempt by scandlising a sitting 
judge, avoid execution of an arrest warrant and then contend that there was 
no contempt. A man can not take advantage of his own wrong to convert 
contempt of a sitting judge into the contempt of a retired judge. The apex 
court, however, did not rest the decision on special facts and laid down 
general proposition and its view that truth can not be a defence after it has 
found that statements made by Gupta were untrue, is not correct. Moreover 
under the special circumstances, the criticism of a retired judge may amount 
contempt but not under general circumstances because he is no more a judge 
and, therefore, the confidence of public is not shaken out of fear that they 
may not get justice.^^ Again a retired judge is entitled to file a suit against a 
person if he is defamed on account of false allegations. 
Any attempt to interfere in the administration of justice amounts the 
contempt of court But in Baradkant Mishra V. Registrar Orissa High Court ^ ^ 
it felt the problem of not having any comprehensive definition of 'administra-
tion of justice'. Nevertheless under the circumstances vilificatory criticism of 
a judge functioning even in an administrative or non-adjudicatory matter 
amounted to a contempt and fur ther an appeal does not give a nght 
31 C.K. Daphtary V. O.P.Gupta AIR 1971 S.C. 1132 
32. Op Cit note (5) at p. 516 
33. Baradkant Mishar V. Registrar Orissa High Court AIR 1974 S.C. 710 
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to commit contempt of court. The Court in this case failed to take into 
consideration the importance of freedom of speech and expression, ana 
therefore, the concurring opinion of Krishna Iyer. J. that power of com-
mitting for contempt could not be used to stifle freedom of speech is 
noteworthy in its appraoch. 
The extent of fair criticism was further explained in National Textile 
Worker's Union case ^* where the Supreme Court made clear that fair crifi-
cism, even if strong, may not be actionable but attributing improper motives 
to judges without justification tending to bring them to ridicule, hatred and 
contempt can not be ignored. The judicial approach seems to be that the 
defence of fair comment would be available even if it extend to atributting 
improper motive against judge as well as the Court itself provided it is justi-
fied under the circumstances.^^ 
34. National Textile Workers Union V. P.R. Ramakrishnan AIR 1983 S.C. 
759 
35. The Court, therefore, did not agree with its own view expressed in 
Umaria Pamphlet case where it curtailed the scope of fair criticism by 
subjecting it to non-pendency of the suit. 
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The approach of the Court was firmly established in M.R. Parashar V. 
Farooq Abdulla when it expressed the view that " the right ol 
free speech is an important righ>of the citizen, in the exercise of which he is 
entitled to bring to the notice of the public at large the infirmities from which 
any institution suffers, including the institution which administer justice, but 
the court also warned that "though law does not restrain the expression oi 
disapprobation against what is done in or by the courts of law, the liberty oi 
free expression is not to be confounded with a licence to make unfoundeo 
allegations of corruption against the judiciary. The abuse of the liberty of free 
speech and expression carries the case nearer the law of contempt.^^ 
In India therefore, what is needed as proof is the tendency to bring the 
administration of justice into contempt, to prejudice the fair trial if any case 
which is the subject of civil or criminal proceeding, or obstruct the course ana 
cause of justice. The obstruction may be actual or merely a definite tendency 
What the general public will feel how the administration of justice is likely to 
be lowered in the estimation of the public is the criterion. 
Freedom of press does not extend to the publication of false and 
malacious allegations in order to defame a person. If publication has been 
made in good faith and for public good, it is protected under ninth exception 
to section 499 I.PC. The issue whether or not a particular publication based 
on an enquiry report by a government official and which is yet to be proved if 
published in 'good faith' and for 'public good' is protected under the afore-
said exception. The judicial opinion does not seem to be unanimous, 
A.P.Sen J. expressed the view that even if it is proved that the publi-
36. M. R. Parashar V. Farooq Abdulla AIR 1984 SO 615 at p.p. 617 - 18 
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cation was made on the basis of an enquiry report and was in good faith and 
for 'public good', it may not be sufficient to exonerate a person for defaming 
other unless the enquiry report has been proved". 
Chennappa Reddy J. on the other hand expressly held that questions 
of "good faith" and "public good" etc. are questions of fact to be decided 
after the regular trial is held. He observed, "were the imputations made rashly 
without any attempt at verification? was the imputation was the result of any 
personal ill will or malice which the author bore towards the political group to 
which the complainant belonged? was the article merely intend to malign the 
political group to which the complainant belonged? was the article intended 
to expose rottenness of jail administration which permitted free sexual ap-
proaches between male and female detenus? was the article intended to 
expose despicable character of persons who were passing off as saintly lead-
ers. Answer to these and several other questions which may arise are oi 
questions of fact and matters for evidence." 
Bahrui Islam, J., in his minority judgement held that if a report has 
been officially prepared by a Government offials after examining several wit-
nesses, it is exhaustive, reasoned and based on evidence and, therefore, it 
can not be said that respondent published the report with out due care ana 
attention.^® He also made it clear that even if the findings of report be proved 
to be false, the respondent is protected because under the law (IXth excep-
tion U / S 499 IPC) if any person genuinely believes that a par t icu lar 
37. S.R. Sobhani V. R.K. Karanjia AIR 1981 S.C.1574 at p.p.1517 - 19 
38. Id at p. 1520 
39. Id at p.p. 1523-24 
231 
Statement or fact is true and in good faith and for public good, publishes it 
he is protected though the statement or fact may not be true. 
Thus the majority opinion therefore, seems to revolve around the tech-
nical aspect of report and cross examination of accused to asertain ques-
tions of fact.*° While the minority opinion directly descends upon the law. 
And, therefore, it may be submitted that the minority opinion presents cor-
rect approach as it is also in consonance with the apex court's own verdict 
on several occassions that procedural hurdles should not be allowed to come 
in the way of imparting justice. 
The view that if a person is defamed, may claim damages against the 
press is not correct approach as it would amount to provide a licence to 
press as first to defame any one and then compensate, him did not find favour 
from the Supreme Court in Auto Shankar's case where it opined that when 
an autobiography is claimed to have been written on the basis of public 
records then the press can not be denied the freedom to publish it on the 
ground that it is defamatory to some public officials. In case, if the officials 
feel that they have been defamed they may seek remedy under the law The 
view of the Court is that the press would be l iable only if it publishes any 
matter which is false and also without any reasonable attempts to verify 
it, is not laudable because it excludes the requirement of mensrea The 
freedom, therefore, may be abused by press barons to serve their own 
polit ical interests.*^ 
40. The Court seems to give over emphasis to the fact that the report must 
have been verified through independent source and questions of facts 
may be ascertained only after cross-examination conducted during 
regular trial. 
41. R. Rajagopal V. State of Tamil Nadu A.I.R 1995 S.C. 264 at p. 277 
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Again the view expressed by the Supreme Court that no body can 
publish any material about a person, relating to himself, his family, marriage, 
procreation, motherhood, child bearing and education without his consent or 
when he, himself invites or raises a controversy extends the restriction even 
where the statement is true or essential and for the public good. The position 
is not laudable as right to privacy being a constitutional provision, civil law 
(where truth is defence) or criminal law (where under exception 9th of Sec 
499 I.P.C. any statement made for public good in good faith is exempted 
from any liability) can not have over riding effect upon such provision even 
where such publication beside being violative of Article 21 of Constitution is 
alleged to be defamatory*^. 
Extending the scope of freedom, Supreme Court observed that any-
body can publish the biography of a person if based upon public records 
The reasoning forwarded by the Court that any publication concerning cer-
tain aspects becomes unobjectionable if publication is based upon public 
records including Court records because then it is a legitimate subject for 
comment by press and media among other, is logical.*^ 
It has been a universally recognised principle that freedom of press 
could not be extended to a limit where it constitute the incitement to an of-
i l The language used by the Court is also vague and may include even a publication 
waming the people not to marry their daughter to a particular person (where there 
is a definite evidence to prove the intention of contracting a bigamous marriage on 
the part of such person) as he is already a married man. Under such circum-
stances if in order to authenciate the statement, the name and address of his 
legally wedded wife or children or any other material to substantiate the claim is 
published, the press would become liable for violating the privacy. The press, there-
fore, is left to publish either the statement made by him or other activities at public 
places whether defamatory or not. 
43. Id at p. 276 
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fence. As the term 'incitement to an offence' is of very wide connotation it is 
only the judicial review of the facts which decides that whether under the 
circumstances a particular act amounts the incitement to an offence or not 
The Supreme Court has expressed its opinion time and again that the of-
fence alleged must be a "definite offence". Further it is also important that 
any incitement upon which the reasonable restriction is being placed must 
be a pre-existing offence. Unless the alleged incitement is a pre-existing 
offence no restriction can be imposed to curtail the freedom Further when a 
citizen would consider it desirable to raise his voice, in the public interest, to 
disobey the order in non violent manner to create a public opinion and force 
the government to reconsider its decision, he can not be held guilty for in-
citement of an offence. 
The judical attitude regarding freedom of press during emergency has 
been very encouraging. Though Article 19 may be suspended during the 
operation of a proclaimation of Emergency declared under Article 352 of the 
Constitution and the freedom as the fundamental right remains suspended, it 
does not mean that even an illegal order made prior to the aforesaid 
proclaimation would survive. In Bennett Coleman's Case the Supreme Court 
observed' "Executive action which is unconstitutional is not immune during 
the proclaimation of Emergency. Article 19 is suspended but it would not 
authorise taking of detrimental executive action during the emergency affect-
ing the fundamental rights in Article 19 without any legislative authority or in 
purported exercise of power conferred by any pre-emergency law which was 
invalid when enacted" **. 
44. Supra note (12) at p. 116 
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On the question of press censorship during emergency the view ex-
pressed by Bombay High Court is noteworthy. It opined that it is true when 
the emergency is in operation fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 
19 are not enforceable. But the censor can not exercise the power beyond 
the purpose stated in censorship object and guidelines, and in case if the 
censor acts beyond that it can be challenged notwithstanding of the fact that 
the emergency is in operation. Because in that case it would not be a prayer 
for enforcing the fundamental rights but to prevent the censor from using his 
powers, illegally. 
The gist of the judgement is that despite the fact that proclaimation of 
emergency is inforce, a person is free to write whatever he likes so far as no 
law is violated. The censor also should exercise his authority having regard 
to the purpose and objects setout in the censorhsip order, and in such a 
manner as to interference with the ordinary advocations of life and the 
enjoyment of property as little as may consonant with these purposes.** 
The judgment has renderd an equally great service by recognising the 
limits and responsibilities of the right of dissent. The end of every civilised 
society has not been lost in an over emphasis of the means. Dissent does 
not and can not mean freeom to destroy, weaken the nation. Civil liberties, 
including freedom of speech, imply the existence of an organised society 
maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the ex-
cesses of unrestrained abuse. 
45. The views were expressed by Bombay High Court in B.U. Rao V. M R 
Masani. The judgement was delivered during emergency period and remained 
unreported. 
2^5 
Privileges are essential for the Parliament to discharge its functions without 
any hindrance. In India the Parliament enjoys such privileges which were 
being enjoyed by the House of Commons when the Costitution came into 
force.** On the point whether a particular privilege exist or not, the apex 
court is of the view that the issue is justiciable. But once the existence of a 
privilege is established, it is exclusively for the Parliament to decide whether 
a particular act or ommission constitute the breach of privilege or not. Be-
cause if the function is assigned to the Court it may, in a given situation may 
acquire untenable situation where the House and the individual or authority 
involved would occupy the position of two contesting parties and the Court 
will act as a court of original jurisdiction.*^ The decision of Allahabad High 
Court based on the opinion of the Supreme Court represents a sound judi-
cial approach that House is free to decide the question of breach or con-
tempt and the courts would refrain from interfering merely to correct the mis-
take of judgement of the House. 
The application of Article 22 (2) of the Constitution in Nafisul Hasan 
case indicated that the exercise of parliamentary privileges must conform to 
the requirementof fundamental right. But in S.M. Sharma's case it was made 
clear that the privileges enjoyed by the Parliament on the analogy of House 
of Commons were not subject to Article 19 (1) (a) and that the House could 
46. The Supreme Court in its advisory opinion held that legislature may claim 
only those privileges which were being enjoyed by the House of Commons 
as legislative organ and not as a court of record. But Allahabad High Court 
seems to have deviated from the opinion of the apex court in Keshav Singh's 
Case where it held that it is sufficient tha a privilege exist but in what from 
did it exist, the Court refused to entertain. 
47. Khan, G. A: privileges: Dilemma of Democretic Indian Alig. L.J. Vol VII11983 
at p. 159 
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validly prohibit the publication of any report of its debate and proceedings 
even if the action contravenes the fundamental right guaranteed under Ar-
ticle 19(1) (a). Article 21, may however, be invoked against any action in 
case of breach of privilege on the ground of being malafide, capricious or 
perverse. The observations in M.S. Sharma and Keshav Singh's cases that 
where the House acted under the rules laying down procedure for enforcing 
its privilege to commit for contempt will be treated as valid procedure under 
Article 21 of the Constitution indicate that whenever a person is committed 
for breach of privilege according to procedure laid down in the rules of pro-
cedure it can not be challenged as violative of fundamental rights. The view 
expressed in Maneka Gandhi's Case, however makes it difficult to concede 
the aforesaid position according to which the procedure must be in confirmity 
with natural justice otherwise the courts may hold the procedure unconstitu-
tional. 
The judicial attitude as a whole has concentrated upon two factors -
national and social interest on the one hand and the freedom on the other 
While dealing with these two issues whenever they come in conflict with 
each other the apex court has tried to struck a balance between the two. It is 
however, not possible to adopt any uniform principle when dealing with dif-
ferent situations. The Supreme Court, therefore, has evolved various prin-
ciples from time to time to achieve this balance. The judicial approach re-
garding press censorship has provided a sigh of relief to the press where the 
action of the censor if beyond his power may be challenged as ultra vires to 
the law. Regarding legislative privileges it has been very restrained. The 
exercise of legislative privileges in India, until now has not been very happy 
one and the relationship between press and legislature during the last few 
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years have raised many problems. The Court which are very much conscious 
about the guarantee and implementation of fundamental rights, often in the 





^ e v e r in the history of India was there such a pressing need for 
ascertaining the independence and role of the press as it is today. The 
vital decisions in every sphere of life be it pol i t ical , social, economic, 
or otherwise are inf luenced by it. The freedom of speech and expres-
sion including freedom of press has been regarded by great thinkers 
and the jurists al ike as necessary for achieving a variety of ends. 
In the absence of a written Constitution in England the freedom 
of press means to write whatever it pleases and a cut off line can only 
be drawn at a point where it violates any law. Thus the liberty consists 
in printing without any previous licence, subject to the consequences 
of law. 
In U.S.A., freedom of press has been given specific recognition 
through first amendment which makes any law unconstitutional if it 
abridges the freedom. It, therefore, not only disal low the censorship 
but also any action of the government provided it places any hindrance 
in general discussion of public matters which is essential in a demo-
cratic society. However, the view developed by American Supreme Court 
through a catena of cases is that the freedom of press includes more 
than merely serving as a "neutral conduit of information between the 
people and their elected leaders or as a neutral form of debate." A free 
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press means a press which is free from compulsions from whatever 
sources governmental, social, f inancial external or internal. 
A free press is free for the expression of opinion in all its phases 
but simultaneously it also means that it may be punished under 
constituionally permissible limitations (evolved by the judiciary) where 
it offends against an action, legitimately undertaken by the state in 
order to protect eg. security of state, obscenity and the like and the 
restriction imposed is in accordance with due process of law 
Though there is no specific provision under the Indian Constitu-
tion guaranteeing the freedom of press but Dr.Ambedkar's speech in 
the Constituent Assembly and the judicial verdicts leave no doubt that 
it is guaranteed under article 19(1 )(a). 
The freedom of press means freedom from and freedom for. The 
essence of the freedom of press lies in the right of dissent and co-
existence of varying and conflicting view points contending for the 
supermacy in the minds of the citizens of a democratic state. Or in 
other words one of the important feature of the democracy which dis-
tinguishes it from dictatorship and other forms of Governments is the 
freedom to express a view different from that of a ruling party or the 
individual. 
The importance of the press at present is second to none. It can 
help the community by giving men knowledge of the world and of one 
another by promoting comprehension and appreciation of the goals of 
free society that shall embrace ail men. 
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The importance of the press at present is second to none. It can 
help the community by giving men knowledge of the world and of one 
another by promoting comprehension and appreciat ion of the goals of 
free society that shall embrace all men. 
The observat ions made by the Supreme Court of India in this re-
gard are noteworthy. In its opinion "Liberty of press remains an 'Ark 
of covenant' in every democracy and that it has acquired the role of 
public educator." The freedom of press thus, is the very foundation of 
democratic way of life contemplated by the Constitution and the bulwork 
of the democratic form of Government in India. At the time when the 
world is facing various problems, vital for the survival of mankind, the 
press can certainly create a climate conducive for the settlement of 
those problems. 
The press despite its importance in modern society does not en-
joy any specif ic rights or privilege in U.K., U.S.A. or India other than 
those to which a cit izen is entit led. Though as an exception the Con-
tempt Of Courts Act, 1981 in England and the Press Council Act, 1977 
n India provide some relief against the disclosure of source of infor-
ation. Similarly under exceptional circumstances the press has been 
allowed to enjoy to a little extent some addi t ional rights. 
Therehas been no smooth sailing for the press from its earliest 




the political aspirations among the native people; Therefore, for most 
of the part the laws made by the British rulers relating to press were 
appressive in nature barring occassional exceptions during which the 
press was encouraged to react more freely on the affairs of the state 
The freedom of press primarily means the dissemination of infor-
mation which in turn is ensured by the freedom of circulation. No mea-
sures, therefore, can be adopted which would have the effect of cur-
tailing the circulation and consequently narrowing the scope of infor-
mation. The freedom not only includes the matter which a citizen is 
entitled to circulate but also the volume of circulation to propagate his 
views. Any order, therefore, if forcing a newspaper to cut down its size 
or raise its price to the extent that it affects the concerned newspaper 
adversely, or any policy which hampers the free growth of newspaper 
would be unconstitutional. 
However, the liberty of press is confined not merely to freedom 
of circulation, or freedom of publication, or freedom to determine the 
extent or volume of circulation, or freedom of fixation of price or page, 
or freedom to determine the area of advertisement but would also in-
clude the freedom which will leave the press free in regard to the choice 
of employment or non-employment in the editorial force, and above all 
which will enable the press to choose any instrument for the exercise 
of the freedom. 
However any law which affects the economic position of the press 
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is not unconsti tut ional per se, but requires two elements 
(1) it must be made with the specific intention to curb the press; ana 
(2) it must not be saved under Article 19(2) of the Constitution 
Every modern government, liberal or otherwise has a specific 
position in the f ield of ideas; its stability is vulnerable to critics in propa-
gation to their abil i ty and persuasiveness. A government on popular 
suffrage is no exception to this rule. It does not however, mean that 
the state is free to take any action against the press to compel it to 
follow its l ine. If the press, therefore, refuse to fol low the states direc-
tive to adopt a particular stand on certain issues or where it vehemently 
crit icise the state policies, no punitive action may be taken against it 
by the government. Similarly the state or any public authority can pre-
vent the press by an order having no force of law from publishing any mate-
rial if it is based on public records. Moreover a person whose own bi-
ography is being published can not restrain the press from publishing 
it provided it is based on public records because the concept of inva-
sion of privacy becomes irrelevant in such cases. 
Though the press doesn't enjoy any privi lege to defame others 
but if it is proved that the publication was made in good faith and for 
public good, no liability would accrue . The good faith implies due care 
and attention and may be ascertained only after cross examining the 
accused but at the same time it is not necessary to prove that each and 
every word spoken or written is literally true. If the allegations are such 
that having regard to certain facts and circumstances with his knowl-
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edge the accused might as an ordinary, reasonable and prudent man 
have drawn the conclusion which the press expressed in defamatory 
language for the protection of his own interest, he can be said to have 
acted in good faith. The reason behind the defense of public good is 
that right of a person to have his reputation maintained has some times 
to give way to public good, but any injury caused to a person must be 
compensated for by the resultant advantage to the public. Neverthe-
less, press may still be held l iable for violation of privacy if it pub-
lishes any matter relating to certain aspects, obtained through any other 
source and without consent of the person concerned. 
In present scenario when the economic activities are showing an 
upward trend, the freedom may come in conflict with the other.s funda-
mental rights under such situation where respective fundamental rights 
are claimed by the lit igating part ies, on balance of convenience ap-
proach the press may be restrained from publishing any material which 
is injurious to the commercial interest of other party. But due to im-
portance the press has in society, the restraint should not last beyond 
the period than actually required under the circumstances of the case. 
In other words it may be said that the moment present and imminent 
danger is removed, the press can not be restrained any more from en-
joying its freedom. Though no person can claim as a matter of right to 
get his views published in any departmental magazine even if it is be-
ing publ ished out of public funds. However, if the views of any person 
against the policy of a part icular department are seemed to negate 
through the 'in house magazine' the person whose opinion is so ne-
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gated has a right to reply through the same magazine. The absence of 
arbitrariness in the action on the part of any authority, therefore, ex-
tends even to the publications of the government itself. 
The issue that whether commercial advertisements are protected 
under Article 19(1 )(a) or not has now been settled by the Court and 
such advertisements are now covered under protective umbrella of Ar-
ticle 19(1 )(a). The press, therefore, has a right to publish the adver-
tisements which are purely commercial in nature unless they fal l under 
any of the prohibition provided under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. 
The absolute powers or rights are always open to be abused by 
the state and the individuals al ike. The absolute power in any society, 
therefore, is neither practicable nor desirable. The Consti tut ion of In-
dia unlike U.S. Constitution where the courts have evolved the noble 
rules of restrictions, expressly recongnise this principle and provides 
for reasonable restrictions which may be imposed upon the press on 
the grounds enshrined under Art icle 19(2) of the Constitution. 
The restrictions however can not be imposed in such manner 
which take away the spirit of the freedom itself. There must be a bal-
ance between the freedom and the restrictions provided under Article 
19(2). Consequently it is not permitted to place any restr ict ion on the 
ground of integrity of India if there is a promise for the development of 
any particular language recognised by the Constitution itself. 
245 
It is universally recognised principle that under no Cfrcumstances 
the press may be allowed to publish any material which may endanger 
even the security of the state. In India too, this cardinal principle o1 
patriotism is fol lowed without any hesitat ion. The apex court however 
has made it clear that the disturbances of extreme nature and not which 
create local law and order problem may be dangerous to the security 
of state. The press, therefore, may be restrained only when there are 
disturbances of exceptional nature, and not of local, significance on 
the ground of security of state. 
The press may also be restrained from publishing any matter 
which causes or has the tendency to cause public disorders. In such 
cases it would not be an unreasonable restr ict ion. The restriction if 
circumstances warrant may extend even to complete prohibition pro-
vided it is done with proper safeguards. But a law which prohibits even 
the innocuous speech or writing is not a val id law because mere insti-
gation to disobey the law itself is not a disturbance to public order It 
excludes normal law and order situations and includes only when there 
are threats to public peace, safety and tranquil i ty. Similarly the press 
can not publ ish any matter the overal l impact of which may deprave 
and debase the adolescent readers into whose hand the book may fall. 
However, taking the aforesaid plea every work containing suggestive 
portions can not be banned because there is a difference between ob-
scene and vulgar writ ing. Therefore, in order to present an honest and 
correct picture of the events if the language becomes vulgar, it can not 
be restrained. But on the issue whether language used in a particular 
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work is obscene or not, the opinion of the experts though not binding 
upon the Court play an important and dominant role especially where 
the Court is not conversant with the language used in the work alleged 
to be obscene. It is for the courts and not the press to decide any case 
pending before it . The press would be guilty of contempt if it ventures 
to form its own opinion which cast a shadow on the impartiality of judi-
ciary or place any hindrance in the administration of justice. In a demo-
cratic set up, however no public institution is beyond criticism and the 
judiciary is no exception to such scrutiny. Any fair comment by the 
press, therefore, made in good faith to point out the short coming and 
to secure its improvement would not amount the contempt of Court. But 
the fairness of any comment will depend upon the facts of particular 
case to be judged by the courts. The apex court has not been very 
strict in respect of contempt jurisdiction and on most occasions let oft 
the press after giving warning or when an apology was forwarded by 
erring press. The Court however, has not missed any opportunity to 
stress that no attempt to undermine the confidence of the people in the 
administration of justice should be allowed because all those public 
rights can not outweigh the public interest in the judiciary as the public 
institution. 
The press does not enjoy any right to publish a matter which is 
defamatory to others. It is however exempted from any liability if the publica-
tion is made in good faith and for public good. But the issue whether the 
publication was made in good faith or not can only be decided after the ac-
cused has been cross examined before trial court. The press is not liable to 
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the state or any of its officials for their alleged defamation unless the publi-
cation was false and the same was published without any attempt to verify 
the facts. Nevertheless such officials continue to enjoy the equal rights with 
others in their personal capacities. Further the freedom may not extend to a 
point where it amounts incitement to an offence. Every publication however 
may not amount the incitement to offence because changes may be brought 
not only by advocating violence but also through democratic means. 
During emergency declared under Art icle 352 of the Constitution 
the freedom of speech and expression is suspended under Article 358 
to deal with emergent situations. The Constitut ion (44 th ) Amendment 
Act, 1978 has enhanced the scope of the freedom because the press 
now, can not be restricted if the emergency is declared under Article 
352 on the ground of armed rebell ion. It is also obligatory that a law 
which tends to curb the freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1 )(a) must 
bear a specif ic recital as provided under Art ic le 358(2)(a) failing which 
any law placing restrictions upon the press would be unconstitutional. 
Moreover, a law curtail ing the freedom of press, if itself was ultra-vires 
when enforced would not acquire legit imacy even if a promulgation of 
emergency under Article 352 is issued subsequently. Declaration of 
emergency though suspends fundamental right of speech and expres-
sion, the press, nevertheless, remains free to express its views unless 
it violates any law for the time being in force and the order of censor 
though may not be challenged as violat ive of Article 19(1)(a), yet it is 
stil l open to be attacked on other legal grounds, i.e. for exceeding its 
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power and acting without the authority of law etc. 
After the First Constitutional Amendment in 1951, it is no more 
sufficient that the restr ict ion was saved by Art icle 19(2), but it must 
also be reasonable. The concept of reasonableness of any restriction 
includes both substant ive as well as procedural reasonableness. The 
substantive reasonableness refers to the content or subject matter le 
an ordinance, whi le the procedural reasonableness refers to the man-
ner in which a law, an ordinance or an administrative practice or act is 
enforced. Consequently where the restriction fai ls to stand the test ot 
reasonableness it is bound to be struckdown as ultra-vires to Article 
19 (1)(a)of the Const i tut ion. 
The reasonableness of any restriction may also be tested inde-
pendently of Art icle 19(2), and if the 'chil l ing effect' of the legislation 
places a restr ict ion which directly affect the press adversely the re-
striction would be unreasonable and violative of Article 19(1 )(a) of the 
Constitution. 
The privi leges at present being enjoyed by the parliament and 
state legislature are identical to the House of Commons. The High 
Courts and the Supreme Court are competent to examine and settle 
the issue of existence or non-existence of any particular privilege but 
once it is establ ished that a particular privi lege exist, only the Parlia-
ment is empowered to decide whether there is any breach of such privi-
lege or not. 
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The dual system (Parl iamentary privileges and the fundamental 
rights) has sometimes given rise to a situation where the action of the 
House is challenged as violative of fundamental rights. It has now been 
settled that Parliamentary privi leges are not subject to Article 19 (1 )(a), 
but Article 21 can be invoked on the ground that the act of legislature 
is malafide; capricious or perverse. The exclusion of the rule of natu-
ral justice too (M.S.M. Sharma & Keshav Singh's cases) in the light of 
Maneka Gandhi's case is no more a good law. Though a guarantee 
has been extended to the press under Parliamentary Proceedings (pro-
tection of publication) Act, 1977 (which has now been accorded consti-
tutional recognition under Art icle 361-A of the Constitution) against 
any proceeding civil or criminal before any court of law but the same 
protection is not available either against the parliament itself or the Su-
preme Court and the High Courts. 
The entire discussion shows that despite the consti tut ional guar-
antee of a free press the government often attempts to interfere by re-
sorting various coercive measures i.e. policies, newsprint control, tax-
ing statute, punitive measures, etc. Whenever its actions do not find 
favour or crit icised by the press. The press too, some times behave in 
an irresponsible manner but this does not lessen the graveness of the 
actions of the government. The press is to provide the society a truth-
ful account of events, a forum for exchange of comments and criticism. 
and agency for the presentat ion and classification of goals and values 
of society. If such goals are to be achieved the government must set 
250 
l imits on its authority to interfere with, regulate or suppress the voice 
of the press or to manipulate the data on which public opinion is formed 
government must set these limits on itself, not merely because free-
dom of expression is a reflection of important interests of the commu-
nity but also because it owes a duty about it. 
However, there is a consensus of opinion that the governmeni 
must necessari ly have some control over the press as it must over all 
other sort of institutions operating in the society in a suitable manner 
which prevent the undermining of the basic structure of the society 
without affecting the spirit of freedom. 
The Supreme Court too, has shown considerable awareness m 
protecting the press whenever its freedom is encroached upon It has 
time and again rescued the press against the arbitrary actions and harsh 
measures adopted by the government and al lowed any restriction only 
when there is a resultant public advantage. Thus, it has tried to struck a 
balance between freedom of press and the social and national inter-
ests asaresult laws dealing with such issues have been given a blanket 
protection under Article 19 (2). Similarly it has always been over con-
scious of its crit icism resulting into contempt cases. Lately a very posi-
t ive indicat ion (of extending the scope of fair comment) has been given 
by the apex court expanding the scope of the freedom. We must hope 
that this posit ive attitude on the the part of the apex court would be 
helpful in broadening the horizons of freedom of the press. The follow-
ing suggestions may however, be forwarded to strengthen the freedom 
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of press guaranteed under the Constitution. 
(1) Though the Supreme Court has often administered the sermon to 
the press whenever it trari^gresses the freedom guaranteed to it 
under the Constitution but nothing has been done to confer some 
additional rights to the press required as public institution enabling 
it to play its role more effectively. Therefore, there is a need to 
confer certain privileges upon the press as a public institution 
(2) The enactments dealing with law and public order are given almost 
blanket protection. The experience of the enforcement of such laws 
in certain cases however, shows their misuse. Such enactments, 
therefore, should be amended to define the powers of the authori-
ties in clear terms and to assure the compliance of natural justice 
whenever any action is proposed or taken under such statutes 
(3) The Hicklin's test in cases relating to obscenity is still being followed 
with certain modifications and while doing so the interest of 'young 
readers' has been given due protection but simultaneously the in-
terest of 'adult and mature' persons has been overlooked. The Court 
must pay the attention towards the right of such class of persons. 
(4) During emergency promulgated under Article 352 of the Constitu-
tion the rights guaranteed under Article 19 remain suspended. The 
press may be restrained under Article 19(2) on the ground of secu-
rity of state' also, such restriction may extend even to the 'prohibi-
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tion' if the circumstances require. The purpose of Article 358, there-
fore, may be achieved under Article 19 (2) itself. Consequently Ar-
ticle 358 should have no application in respect of Article 19(1)(a) 
Such step wil l also eliminate unnecessary interference in the af-
fairs of the press. 
(5) The privileges of the Parliament and state legislatures must be codi-
f ied. It will remove the existing doubts and the journalists would 
know the sphere of their freedom and stop int ruding into the 
legislature's domain. 
(6) The press under certain circumstances is not l iable for any civil or 
criminal l iabi l i ty before any court of law but not against the legisla-
ture. The protect ion must be extended against the legislature also 
in accordance with the constitutional spirit of rule of law 
Some problems may crop up when the aforesaid suggestions are 
put into practice and to overcome those problems further study may be 
undertaken. 
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